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An Introduction to the KPSA
Commonwealth Review of Political Science

Michael W. Hail
Morehead State University

It is an honor to serve as the Senior Editor for this inaugural issue of the Commonwealth Review of Political Science. In my capacity as Executive Secretary-Treasurer of KPSA, I was given the responsibility to develop the initial plans for the journal and then to implement its establishment and operations. While this task has been greater than imagined, the support from numerous colleagues has been equally great in bringing the journal to realization. I am writing this article to explain the development and purpose of this journal, but also to acknowledge the many leaders of KPSA that helped to make this possible.

In 2008, at the annual meeting of the Kentucky Political Science Association (KPSA), Dr. John Heyman presided over our annual business meeting where as Executive Secretary-Treasurer I was tasked with doing a study of the feasibility of founding a journal for KPSA. Dr. Heyman gave important emphasis to the prospects and Berea College hosted an outstanding meeting. Updates were presented and discussed at the University of Louisville the next year where Dr. Jason Gainous presided over another great KPSA conference and then at the next meeting at Murray State University where Dr. James Clinger presided we decided to follow through with the study and organize to publish the journal. In 2012, at Campbellsville University we held the first Editorial Board meeting. The purpose for which KPSA undertook the journal was to promote scholarship on Kentucky government as well as scholarship from across the discipline presented at the annual KPSA conference.

Thus with this issue, the Commonwealth Review of Political Science was established in 2012 with an Editorial Board and two excellent editors. The Editorial Board features a mixture of public and private institutions of higher education from across the Commonwealth of Kentucky: Saudra Andrée, Western Kentucky University; Mike Berbeide, Berea College; James Clinger, Murray State University; Jason Gainous, University of Louisville; William Garrison, Centre College; Joe Gembicki, Eastern Kentucky University; Michael Hail, Morehead State University; and John Heyman, Berea College.

The Editorial Board serves to govern the journal and meets annually at the KPSA conference. The support of the KPSA Executive Committee is very much appreciated, and it includes John Chowning, Campbellsville University, Past-President 2012, Saudra Andrée, Western Kentucky University, Past-President 2011, James Clinger, Murray State University, Past-President 2010, Stephen Voss, University of Kentucky, Past-President 2013, Murray Bennett, Morehead State University, President 2014, and Michael W. Hail, Morehead State University, Executive Secretary and Past-President 2007.

Our editors, Dr. Stephen Voss of the University of Kentucky and Dr. Jonathan Pidgyns of Morehead State University, are an outstanding editorial team. Dr. Voss is an Associate Professor of Political Science and he received his Ph.D. from Harvard University. Dr. Voss' research specialization is in elections and voting behavior, with a focus on racial/ethnic politics and his research has appeared in various journals, including the American Journal of Political Science and Journal of Politics. Dr. Pidgyns is an Assistant Professor of Government and he received his Ph.D. from Boston College. Dr. Pidgyns' research specialization is American political development and he does work in both American politics and political philosophy and he has published in Advances in Design for Cross-Cultural Activities by CRC Press. These co-Editors are scholars of the highest caliber and have demonstrated the outstanding qualities requisite to found this quality journal and the Editorial Board is most grateful for their service to the discipline.

The co-editors, Dr. Stephen Voss and Dr. Jonathan Pidgyns, have collected some outstanding manuscripts presented at prior KPSA conferences and several of which were peer reviewed at those conferences to receive awards. These awards are the Rafii and Hughes awards. Each year, the KPSA awards the Abdul H. Rafii Award for the best paper presented by an undergraduate student at its annual meeting. The award was established in honor of Dr. Abdul H. Rafii, 1986 KPSA President and professor of government at Berea College, in recognition of his outstanding commitment to student teaching and scholarship. And each year the David Hughes Memorial Award recognizes the outstanding paper presented at the previous year's conference by a faculty member from a Kentucky college or university. The David Hughes Memorial Award was established to honor the memory of Dr. Hughes who was a former Centre College professor and 1972 KPSA President.

The mission of this journal is to provide a venue for publication of outstanding student research (undergraduate and graduate) and draw from the ever stronger submissions to the student paper panels at KPSA, provide a venue for outstanding research from faculty presented at KPSA, helping build participation and interest in our annual conference; provide a venue for those
3 An Introduction to The Commonwealth Review

doi research on Kentucky and/or state politics and policy with strong relevance to Kentucky; provide an outlet for pieces of solid research that are not clearly able to track into standard publication outlets (often methodological and theoretical pieces). In sum, this journal will provide a publication venue for excellent work from all political science subfields for faculty and students.

There is a great debt owed to another KPSA leader that deserves special mention. Dr. Michael Berheide, professor of political science at Berea College, who served as 1996 KPSA President and for many years as Executive Secretary-Treasurer of KPSA. Dr. Berheide was an excellent leader of KPSA and the steward of the KPSA that built the solid financial foundation from which this journal could be developed. He serves on the journal editorial board and everyone at KPSA owes Dr. Berheide an incalculable debt of gratitude for his outstanding service to KPSA over the years.

The KPSA is excited to welcome faculty and students from across the state to our 2014 meeting at Morehead State University and our 2015 meeting at Somerset Community College. In 2016, the KPSA will return to Murray State University. We welcome political science faculty and students from across the United States to attend our annual meeting and engage the growing KPSA conference with their research. Manuscripts submissions to this journal are strongly encouraged from members of the association as well as nonmembers. For more information on our conferences or to join the KPSA listserve, please visit the KPSA website at either: www.kpsa.us or www.kpsaweb.org.

We hope that this journal serves well the faculty and student members of the Kentucky Political Science Association, as well as those in the Commonwealth of Kentucky interested in political science scholarship.

1 November, 2012

Bowling Online: The Internet and the New Social Capital*

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The decline thesis proponents in the social capital literature have largely ignored the fastest growing venue for new social capital formation - the Internet. We argue that the Internet is making a larger impact than the current research acknowledges. Using survey data from the Pew Internet & American Life Project combined with a survey of college students, we confirm a strong positive relationship between online social networking and political participation. Further, we present evidence that, at least in 2008 election, there was a bias toward voting for Democrats among those who utilized online social networking services including Facebook and Twitter. The implications of these results are discussed.

Key Words: social capital, social networking, Facebook, Twitter, civic engagement

Robert Putnam (1995A, 1995B, 2000) makes the sweeping claim that decaying social capital, or the interconnectedness between people, is causing a decline in political participation. Further, that as a result the viability of democracy is threatened. While many have challenged this premise (Althaus 1998; Arnett 2006; McDonald and Popkin 2001; Portes 1998), we offer a different perspective. Rather, we suggest that the Internet is shaping a new kind of political participation and engagement. It is creating networks and interactivity on scales that are larger in scope and implication than at any time in American history. Thus, we present an alternative view of the American political future

*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the Kentucky Political Science Association, where it won the David Hughes Award for outstanding paper. This is a revised version of that manuscript which was published in our book, Rechoosing American Politics: The Internet Revolution (Rowman & Littlefield).
that is substantively different from the theories of declining participation and lower rates of belief in the system that have dominated the scholarship within political behavior. Concurring with Putnam, we also suggest that democracy is rooted in an understanding of social networks and communicative ideas but believe that, potentially, the Internet is a solution to decaying social capital and the decline of political participation. It promotes social capital through networking with a speed and interactivity and versatility that were never before possible. While the ultimate implications of this modern Internet society are and will be unclear for some time, the initial data suggest that there is a far more rich and diverse engagement of people with governance than political scientists have been willing to concede.

Specifically, the findings presented here suggest several things. First, people are networking on the Internet in a variety of different ways including social network sites, emailing, and blogs. Second, the degree to which people are doing so varies across demographics. This variation is fairly consistent across the national sample and student sample we utilize here. Third, and most central to the premise here, heightened social networking on the Internet is positively related to political participation, both voting and broader political involvement, in both datasets even when controlling for traditional predictors of such. Finally, for exploratory purposes, we look at the possibility that social networking could actually be related to vote choice. Interestingly, we find that among the typically young respondents in the student data, those who do more networking on the Internet are more likely to vote for Democrats. Before moving on to the analysis, we present a theory as to the likely impact of the Internet on participation and discuss the literature that has explored similar questions.

Rethinking the Participation Puzzle

Within this literature, perhaps the most widely disseminated and durable explanation of the continued viability of democratic government and its more recent decline is Robert Putnam's (1995A, 1995B, 2000) theory of social capital. Putnam contends that democracies are dependent on social capital or social connections that generate trust. "Social capital" is defined as the "norms of reciprocity and networks of civil engagement" which are created by participation in groups such as civil organizations (1995A: 167). People, engaging with each other through social and civic groups, create bonds tying and investing them into the greater society. It also works well in providing the mechanism for the transmission of information along the lines theorized by Page and Shapiro (1992) and Popkin (1991). Isolated people cannot share experiences and make informed aggregate decisions. Nor are they able to develop working heuristic shortcuts. Some have suggested that the Internet may stimulate participation by increasing voter information (Tolbert and McNeal 2003). Social networking via the Internet may be the impetus for increasing voter information. Returning to the original puzzle, social capital has become a popular lens to use in describing the perceived decline in turnout and participation in the U.S. electoral system. Various measures have been used to illustrate that the United States has managed to combine declining turnout with increasingly unbalanced voting electorates that over-represent the upper classes (Burnham 1987; Leighley and Nagler 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). These observations dovetail with Putnam's explanation that the decline of social capital, as measured in large part through decreasing participation in civic groups and civic activities, is leading to fewer voters and a less visible democracy. Putnam presents many factors that may or may not be hurting social capital, but he saves particular emphasis for the negative role of television which correlates with anti-civic behavior. The underlying proposition is that the revival of civic groups such as the once popular bowling league can the foundations of American democracy be stabilized (Putnam 1995B, 2000).

Before addressing Putnam's chief assumptions, it is noteworthy that while the decline thesis has been dominant within the literature, it is not unchallenged. There is some suggestion that both the perceived lack of information and the progressively lesser turnout are produced by poor measures rather than true representations of trends (Abiaus 1998; McDonald and Popkin 2001; Achen 1979). Nonetheless, it is beyond the scope of this article to again take-up the methodological debate. We attack the underlying theoretical premise itself. The major problem with the decline thesis itself is that it presumes a fairly static environment and an unchanging greater society.

Presuming for a moment, that Putnam has correctly identified that shared interaction and engagement is foundational for democracy, his static view of human interaction leads to a faulty prescription. How people interact and engage with each other is not the same today as it was immediately after World War II. In searching for evidence of this phenomena, Putnam seeks out measures based on civic institutions that are either no longer extant or are in serious decline leading him to predict a less optimistic democratic future. We suggest that any measure of civic engagement that relies on an analysis of the means of interaction is flawed. For example, a measure of civic interaction could be done by counting the number of conversations an individual has with different people within a day. If one were to measure these conversations by face to face communication the trend would be stark. After the invention and dissemination of the telephone, the measure would surely show decline, even if in reality, people were speaking to each other with greater frequency by means of telecommunication.
CHALLENGING THE DECLINE THESIS

The difficulty with assessing any theory of participation is in making sure that what is measured is a fair representation of how people engage each other during a fixed temporal period. Yet, nothing remains fixed over time. Technology growth is affecting the way that government goes about its tasks in almost every aspect. While there is little argument that the Internet has changed the nature of political campaigning, it is often difficult to measure this change. Thus, the impact often is addressed more speculatively rather than with empirical data.1

If one is to take issue with Robert Putnam’s prevalent theory that a disconnected society is causing a decline in American democracy, the first issue has to be the measure. The continued disengagement of Americans from the political system is the subject of significant research. Supporting Putnam’s approach are broad measures of participation. We are witnessing declining participation, declining voting patterns, and lower rates of belief in the system (Kosciuszko and Hansen 1995). In short, the American Democratic Model is threatened and many view the likely future with pessimism based on these trends. We propose that the Internet may be the solution to reconnection and participation. More directly, the volume of elections at multiple levels hurts both the ability of citizens to stay informed as well as their ability to remain engaged. People vote because they wish to influence public policy so elections with low electoral salience result in low turnout (Franklin 1990). Low turnout can be the product of an institutional structure which inhibits turnout and leads to socioeconomic factors playing a larger role (Powell 1986).

Putnam’s view, social capital is part of the solution to the institutional limitations on participation. When one is engaged with their neighbors and invested in their communities, there is a greater willingness to bear the burden and costs associated with participation even where the elections have lower salience and greater frequency. The declining social capital is leading to less participation (Putnam 1995A, 1995B, 2000). In fact, this isolation thinks is not limited to civic groups but suggested to be a cause of declining turnout because of the nature of political campaigns. Gerber and Green (2000) assert that turnout decline is the result of lower amounts of face-to-face mobilization, not mobilization in general. The modern campaign which is dominated by television and exposure to negative advertising reduces intention to vote and lowers political efficacy (Aronson and others 1994). We suggest that this literature misses the changing nature of society itself and fails to measure nontraditional means of communication. By reconnecting not just people and information, but people to people, the Internet recreates the missing elements in the participation model. The Internet campaign changes the dynamic of the election. By increasing the volume of information easily accessible, it changes the nature and scope of institutional limitations. The difficulty in becoming informed is reduced making turnout and participation more likely. More directly, if the cost in time and effort of elections are people from participating, the cost savings of the online community can and should reverse that trend among the most adept Internet users increase overall participation as the technology penetrates larger groups. Finally, the Internet bypasses the negative campaign model by offering an alternative to the sound byte approach that can be both comprehensive and interactive. Early studies suggest that if targeted and presented correctly, the Internet has the potential to reverse the regular disinterest among younger voters (Lapid and Phlipot 2007). The Internet is such a versatile medium that advances such as Web 2.0 allow users to not only choose the content they would like to access, but create the user experience with the content of choice delivered in multiple formats ranging from text to video, to even multi-layered discussion forums. The conversation and interaction on the Internet can vary widely based on the device used and the demands or desires of the users. It can range from the dissemination of short messages using Twitter to lengthy and responsive blog postings or even video messages using websites like Youtube or even social websites like Facebook where fan pages and status updates can become forums for political debate or just information sharing.

Putnam suggests that in rebuilding social capital through civic engagement the decline in participation can be curtailed. Yet, Putnam’s scope of participation is so limited. The Internet can be the venue for modern social capital. While bowling leagues may have been the means for social networking at one time, the absence of bowling leagues does not mean the absence of networking. Bowling is no longer the focus of the social network, the online community, which is not

1 The question of whether internet use is related to political participation has been explored using empirical data but primarily not within the U.S. context. Both De Vries (2007) and Vreven (2007) found that online activities are positively related to political participation in Holland and Australia, respectively. Rose and Katz (2004) find a relationship between inactive Internet usage and offline forms of political activity in the U.S. but they do not look specifically at the effects of social networking on political participation. None of these studies are framed within social networking theory. That said, other researchers have also identified a relationship between online social networking and political participation/civic engagement in the United States (Kolle 2011; Guinous and Wagner 2011; Paske, More, and Romer 2009; Valenmadia, Parks, and Kerr 2009).
only fostered, but often hosted by candidates, serves many of the same functions of the traditional Potemkin model. The Internet hosts thousands of online communities and despite initial commercial beliefs, the Internet is much more frequently used as a means to interact and communicate than as a place to purchase goods and services (Horning 2001). Critical to Pauman’s argument is that social networking stimulates social capital through building trust. Rest and Krueger (2006) present clear evidence that online networking is related to common indicators of social capital, such as general social trust, but their focus is not to look at how this trust may encourage civic engagement. Krueger (2002) does present empirical evidence that the Internet shows real potential to bring new individuals into the political process, but does not make the connection between social capital and participation. As mentioned above, others have (Boyle 2011: We explore this possibility below.

DATA AND MEASUREMENT

The analysis here utilizes data from two sources: 1) The Pew Internet & American Life Project 2008 Civic Engagement Survey, and 2) A survey of college students from a variety of classes at the University of Louisville and Florida Atlantic University. The Pew project randomly surveyed 2,251 U.S. residents including both random digit dialed and cell phone respondents. All respondents were at least 18 years of age. The survey of college students with similar questions was conducted in February and March 2008. The sample of 666 respondents (70% from the University of Louisville and 30% from Florida Atlantic University) consists of students from a variety of political science and business courses, both lower and upper division. There are a total of 18 different courses with 6 sections of a lower division American federal government class containing students from a multitude of majors. Instructions for each course were given instructions on how to administer the survey. They were not allowed to answer questions that involved explaining the items. Respondents anonymously filled out a paper form that included the questions and response categories.

1 We removed the weight added to the Pew project to eliminate interpretation problems in the multivariate analysis. We also replaced any missing values in both datasets using the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm (Dempster, Laird, and Rubin 1977). This is a technique that finds maximum likelihood estimates in parametric models for incomplete data. The EM algorithm is an iterative procedure that finds the MLE of the parameter vector by first calculating the conditional expectation of the complete data log likelihood given the observed data and the parameter estimates. Next, it finds the parameter estimates to maximize the complete-data log likelihood from the last step. The two steps are iterated until the iterations converge (for a complete description see Li and Rubin 1987; McLachlin and Kalinah 1997; Schafer 1997).

The student sample is obviously not a national sample but we contend that, in certain ways, these data can be used to strengthen our case by having built-in controls. Being more educated, college students are both more likely to have knowledge about politics and use the Internet more often. Thus, if differences in knowledge are apparent among a group that is already expected to have more knowledge than the general public, the evidence is stronger. Also, because college students are the next generation of frequent users, these data can give us some sense of what to expect when it comes to Internet use and political behavior in the future. There is significant overlap in the indicators in each dataset, so we compare results wherever possible.

The following analyses have several purposes. First, differences in means tests are used to explore the varying frequency of Internet social networking across behavioral indicators such as civic attentiveness and party identification. These tests are also used to look at the potential variation across demographics such as age, education, income, race, and gender. Second, Internet social networking is modeled as a function of these variables. Third, political participation is modeled as a function of Internet social networking, campaign contact, civic attentiveness, age, education, income, and race. The idea here is to control for explanations of participation alternative to Internet social networking to help assure that the predicted effects are not spurious. Thus, other than a positive relationship between Internet social networking and participation, we also expect one with campaign contact, civic attentiveness, age, education and income, and we expect racial minorities to less likely to participate. Fourth, we constructed models of voter choice. These are purely exploratory. We had no real theoretical reason to expect heightened Internet social networking to be related to vote choice but we decided to explore this question because this is a relatively new area of inquiry. We control for party identification, race, and gender.

The primary dependent variable, political participation, is measured using two different indices: one in the Pew data and one in the Student data. We use an additive index in the Pew data comprised of 15 items. Respondents were asked if they had done any of the following things in the last 12 months:

3 Only the Pew data had a measure of whether or not the respondent was contacted by a campaign.
5 See The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960) for theoretical justification of the included controls.
These items scale fairly well together ($\alpha = 0.55$). The ordinal additive index ranges from 0 to 8.

The primary independent variable, Internet social networking, is also modeled as a dependent variable. It was measured by constructing indices in both the Pew and Student data. The Pew data had observations for responses to the following 6 items (all items were centered between 0 and 1 and an index was constructed $\alpha = 0.60$):

- Do you ever use a social networking site like MySpace, Facebook, or LinkedIn.com? Did you happen to do this yesterday, or not?
- Do you ever create or work on your own online journal or blog? (If respondent answered yes) Did you happen to do this yesterday, or not?
- Do you ever use Twitter or another 'micro-blogging' service to share updates about yourself or to see updates about others? (If respondent answered yes) Did you happen to do this yesterday, or not?
- Thinking about the political/community group in which you are most involved, in the past 12 months, have you communicated with others in this group by-- email?
- Thinking about the political/community group in which you are most involved, in the past 12 months, have you communicated with others in this group by-- using the group's website?
- Thinking about the political/community group in which you are most involved, in the past 12 months, have you communicated with others in this group by-- using a social networking site?

The Student Data had observations for the following 2 items. Both were inverted and recoded to scale between 0 and 1 before constructing an index ($\alpha = 0.58$):

- How often do you use social networking websites such as MySpace.com or Facebook.com? (more than once a day, everyday, three-to-five days per week, one-to-two days per week, less often, never)
- How important are social networking websites, such as MySpace.com or Facebook.com, to you for learning about campaigns and candidates? (very important, somewhat important, rarely important, not important)
The dependent variable used was vote choice. In the Pew data, it was measured using the following indicator: In the presidential election, did you vote for the Democratic ticket of Barack Obama and Joe Biden or the Republican ticket of John McCain and Sarah Palin (options were rotated)? In the student data, we used the same vote choice indicator used in the political participation scale but rather we coded the Republican candidates (Mike Huckabee and John McCain) as a 0 and the Democratic candidates (Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama). This made it consistent with the Pew data.

Several other variables are used as independent variables. We may expect that those who pay more attention to public affairs generally would be more likely to use the Internet to network via the Internet and to participate. Thus, we measured civic attentiveness using available indicators from both datasets: 1) How often do you discuss politics and public affairs with others in person, by phone, or by a letter — every day, at least once a week, or at least once a month, less than once a month, or never? (Pew Data). 2) Some people seem to follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most of the time, while others don’t. Would you say you follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all? (Student Data).

Several group characteristics including party identification were also gauged. While we have no real expectations regarding networking and party identification, we include it in the analyses for exploratory purposes. In the Pew data, party identification was measured with the following question: In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or Independent? In the student data, first, it was measured using this indicator: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? Dummy variables were created for each available response. Next, in the student data, there were follow ups to the party identification question that gauged strength. Partisans were asked: Would you call yourself a strong (Republican/Democrat) or not very strong (Republican/ Democrat)? Independents were asked: Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party or neither? Some demographics were also measured. Respondents were asked to report their race in both datasets. From both datasets, we were able to create dummy variables for white, black, Latin, Asian, and other race. For both datasets, gender was recorded and coded as 0 male and 1 female. Income was self-reported in the Pew data with the following question: Last year, that is in 2007, what was your total family income from all sources, before taxes. Just stop me when I get to the right category: less than $10,000, $10,000 to under $20,000, $20,000 to under $30,000, $30,000 to under $40,000, $40,000 to under $50,000, $50,000 to under $75,000, $75,000 to under $100,000, $100,000 or more. This creates an 8-point ordinal scale. Given that students, for the most part, have not started their careers, we decided to measure their assessment of their parent’s finances instead of individual income. The 3-point ordinal indicator was as follows: Would you say you grew up in a home that was well off financially, somewhere in the middle, or poor? Well off, somewhere in the middle, or poor.

For education in the Pew data, respondents were asked to report the last grade or class they completed in school: none or grades 1-8, high school incomplete, high school graduate, technical, trade or vocational school. After high school, some college, no 4-year degree, college graduate, post-graduate training/professional school after college. This creates a 7-point ordinal scale. Respondent age was also self-reported in both datasets and collapsed into a 6-point ordinal scale based on the following age groupings: 18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60 and up.

Finally, we control for campaign contact in the Pew participation model. Respondents were asked the following questions:

- How often have you—Received an email asking you— to get involved in a political activity? (daily, every few days, once a week, once a month, never)
- How often have you—Received a letter asking you— to get involved in a political activity? (daily, every few days, once a week, once a month, never)

An index was constructed from these two items. There were no campaign contact measures available in the Student data.

**RESULTS**

The results in Table 1 are tests for a difference of means across the dichotomous independent variables and one-way ANOVA tests for ordinal and non-dichotomous nominal independent variables. All results in this chapter are based on respondents that gave an affirmative answer when asked if they use the Internet at least occasionally. First, one-way ANOVA tests indicate that those who are more attentive to public affairs are more likely to social network than the less attentive in both the Pew and Student Data. In measuring networking online, we were careful to include in our indicator index the use of prominent websites or protocols like Facebook and Twitter which may be used for politics, but are primarily social outlets. These outlets are part of the increasingly
important movement to Web 2.0 which allows users to define or even create their own web experience. Previously we have found that those who are more attentive are more likely to politically participate. If social networking also leads to engagement, the effect on participation may be magnified by the combination of the two. The pervasiveness of social networking is not high in the Pew Data but nonetheless the highest value of social networking is among those who pay the highest attention to public affairs. In contrast, social networking is common in the Student Data. The mean score for Internet social networking among those who pay attention to public affairs most of the time is 2.28. This is near the midpoint of the index demonstrating that these attentive students are, for the most part, all doing some kind of networking on the Internet. For that matter, even the least attentive are likely to be doing some networking via the Internet.

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</table>

**Table 1: Differences in Social Networking on the Internet**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008 Pew Data</th>
<th>Student Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>S.D.</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<th>0.82</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.77</td>
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<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.54</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.54</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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There is some divergence in the findings across the datasets when it comes to party identification. In the Pew Data, there are no significant differences across party identification. In the Student Data, Democrats score highest (1.98) followed by Republicans (1.87) and then Independents (1.65). Again the numbers are substantially higher among the young people represented in the Student Data. This could have implications for participation as older cohorts are replaced. If younger Democrats are more likely to social network via the Internet and those who network are more likely to participate, we could see a participation gap across party identification as older cohorts are replaced by younger ones. Interestingly, the Student Data suggests that there are no significant differences across age cohorts regarding who is more likely to network. However, in the Pew Data, the younger cohorts participate at higher and more significant rates in social networking. These results only include those respondents that responded affirmatively when asked if they use the Internet at least occasionally. Young people are far more likely to respond affirmatively (p < 0.00). Yet, even among those who use the Internet, younger people in the Pew Data are the more likely to use social networking. The growth in the use of networking websites like Facebook is driving this finding. The lack of significance in the Student Data may well be the influence of education which is also correlated with networking as we will see below.

*Data come from the Pew Internet & American Life Project, August 2008 Civic Engagement Data and a 2008 survey of college students at the University of Louisville and Florida Atlantic University. P-values represent the probability that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the magnitude of political internet use across all above independent variables (T-tests for dichotomous independent variables and One-way ANOVA tests between groups for ordinal and non-dichotomous nominal independent variables).
Many of these effects hold up in a multivariate setting, but simultaneously controlling for each leads to changes. The results are presented in Table 2. In the Pew Data, civic attentiveness, education and age are still significant but income becomes insignificant (and most of the other insignificant predictors remain so). This suggests that the income effects were spurious. The variation in Internet social networking explained by income can be explained away by the variation in civic attentiveness and education. The significant effects indicate that social networking on the Internet increases with civic attentiveness and education, **not** income. There are also some changes in the Student Data results. Party identification also becomes insignificant suggesting that the results are spurious. Civic attentiveness and age remain significant positively and negatively, respectively. Interestingly, parent’s finances and gender become significant in the multivariate setting. The results suggest that Internet social networking is higher among those whose parent’s earn more and among females. Again, this has interesting implications considering that the sample is comprised of primarily young people. We may expect the proposed effect on participation to have a varied effect on different groups across time.

While it is important and interesting to explore variation in Internet social networking, more central to our theory in this chapter is examining the relationship between networking and political participation. The results contained in Table 3 indicate that heightened Internet social networking does indeed significantly predict participation in both datasets. This is a more significant finding than simply predicting the likelihood of voting. We measure political participation broadly including participating in rallies and protests, giving speeches, petitioning government, and volunteering in campaigns. Despite this, the Internet was a significant predictor of political participation. Importantly, these findings hold up even when controlling for several theoretical predictors of political participation. The Pew and Student model predicts a significant positive relationship with as stated above, Internet social networking, and also campaign contact, civic attentiveness, age, and education, **not** income. Surprisingly, the findings on income are mixed. Income is a significant predictor of political participation in the Pew Data, but parent’s finances is not significant predictor in the Student Data. Race has only limited effects in both datasets. Most important to our theory is that the effect of Internet social networking appears to be independent of both general engagement, external campaign influence in the Pew model with the demographic controls.

---

**Note:**

- Data come from the Pew Internet & American Life Project, August 2008 Civic Engagement Survey and a 2008 survey of college students at the University of Louisville and Florida Atlantic University. Table entries are ordered logit estimates.

---

**Table 3: Models of Political Participation**

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>2008 Pew Data</th>
<th>Student Data</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Internet Networking</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
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<td>Campaign Contact</td>
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<td>0.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civic Attentiveness</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Latino</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-log likelihood</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke Pseudo R²</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Cases</td>
<td>1626</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*associated standard errors, and 95% confidence intervals. Operationalization descriptions are all in Chapter 2.

**Note:**

- Data come from the Pew Internet & American Life Project, November 2008 Civic Engagement Survey and a 2008 survey of college students at the University of Louisville and Florida Atlantic University. Table entries are ordered logit estimates with associated standard errors. **p ≤ 0.05, *p ≤ 0.10.**
While we have no real theoretical reason to expect that heightened political Internet use would be related to actual vote choice, given that so little is known about how the Internet is affecting people’s political perspectives, it is a question worth exploring. Thus, we modeled whether or not one voted for more Democratic candidates versus Republican candidates as a function of Internet social networking, party identification, race, and gender. Interestingly, Internet social networking is significant in the Pew model and in the Student model. Both models suggest that the more people use the Internet for social networking the more likely they are to vote for Democrats. This suggests that the Democrats have an early advantage in using the Internet to mobilize support among young networkers and networkers in general. The Pew Model is likely influenced by the efforts of the Obama campaign to mobilize online resources with a greater intensity and effect than the competing McCain campaign. The Obama campaign used multiple methods of online social networking with unprecedented success. There were multiple Facebook groups supporting the Obama campaign, which is not particularly noteworthy until the magnitude of the groups is seen. In just one of the many student groups the Obama campaign had 3.2 million networkers signed up (Vargas 2008). The Obama campaign had a vast network of online donors regularly recruited from social networking protocols such as Twitter and websites including Facebook and many others which allowed them to assemble millions of email addresses from which to solicit money and support (Vargas 2008).

Nonetheless, it is problematic for us to generalize with these data. In 2008, there was a clear advantage to the Democrats in the use of online campaigning and the appeal to social networkers, but it is far too early to predict a long term partisan benefit. Yet, there is a developing pattern among young educated people that initially favors the Democrats. Those with education are more likely to vote, so as older generations are replaced, these data would suggest that those replacing them could give gains to the Democrats. Party identification and race are significant in both models but gender is not. As expected, Democrats and African Americans are more likely to vote for Democrats. As a result of the significance of these variables, we can be confident that the effects of Internet social networking in the Student model are not spurious. As more elections are conducted in the Internet age, a larger pattern will emerge to see whether the advantage wielded by the Democrats in the 2008 election is sustained.

### Table 4: Modeling Democratic Vote Choice***

|                  | Estimate | S.E. | P>|value>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internet Networking</td>
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<td>Democrat</td>
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<tr>
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</table>

### Student Data

|                  | Estimate | S.E. | P>|value>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internet Networking</td>
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<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party Identification (7-point)</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<td>Black</td>
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<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke Pseudo R²</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of Cases</td>
<td>666</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### CONCLUSION

The findings presented in this chapter suggest several things. First, there is some variation across political variables and standard demographics when it comes to who is more likely to social network via the Internet. In addition, there is some evidence that heightened Internet social networking is related to vote choice at least among young people represented in the Student Data and in the 2008 election. While this is interesting, the most important finding in this study is that Internet social networking is positively associated with political participation. This finding provides hard empirical evidence in support of

*** Data come from the Pew Internet & American Life Project, August 2008 Civic Engagement Survey and a 2008 survey of college students at the University of Louisville and Florida Atlantic University. Table entries are logit estimates, associated standard errors, and 95% confidence intervals. Operationalization descriptions are all in Chapter 2.
conjecture in previous work suggesting that the Internet actually represents a new means of building social capital which in turn can stimulate political participation.

While these findings are revealing, more needs to be done to make this relationship clearer. It would also be interesting to see if more or less social capital is built across the different ways that people use the Internet. Do networking sites have a greater effect than the exchange of information through email, are videos more influential than written communication, and are blogs more influential than traditional news? These are all questions that can still be explored. For now, it can be clearly stated that there is a relationship between political Internet use generally and the propensity to vote and participate.

REFERENCES


25 BOWLING ONLINE: THE INTERNET AND THE NEW SOCIAL CAPITAL


Comparing Redistricting Outcomes Across States: A Comparison of Commission, Court, and Legislative Plans

Jonathan Winburn
University of Mississippi
jwinburn@olemiss.edu

The question of redistricting reform has become an important topic in many states throughout the country. At the heart of the matter is how to effectively deal with the perceived detrimental effects of allowing legislators control over selecting their own constituencies. The most common prescription is to remove legislative influence by handing over control to nonpolitical or bipartisan commissions. However, little empirical evidence exists comparing the outcomes of commission plans versus legislative plans. In this paper, I address this question by examining the role of commissions throughout the states. I argue an important aspect to limiting the problems of redistricting and promoting strong representation between legislator and constituent is not necessarily in who draws the lines, but rather the rules they must follow when putting the maps together. My results show that these rules do a better job of promoting the continuity of representation than does removing legislative control over the process.

Key Words: redistricting, redistricting reform, democratic representation

The question of redistricting reform has become an important topic in many states throughout the country. At the heart of the matter is how to effectively deal with the perceived detrimental effects of allowing legislators control over selecting their own constituencies or that elections may be made a process "in which the representatives have selected the people" rather than one "in which the people select their representatives" (Vera v. Richards; Thompson 2002). The most common prescription is to remove legislative influence by handing over control to nonpolitical or bipartisan commissions. However, little empirical evidence exists comparing the outcomes of commission plans versus legislative plans. In this paper, I address this question by examining the role of commissions throughout the states. I argue an important aspect to limiting the problems of redistricting and promoting strong representation between legislator and constituent is not necessarily in who draws the lines, but rather the rules they must follow when putting the maps together. My results show that these rules do a better job of promoting the continuity of representation than does removing legislative control over the process.

COMMISSIONS

The controversy around redistricting often centers on the issues of how effectively those drawing the maps can help themselves in the coming elections by drawing partisan or incumbent gerrymanders. As a result, most of the discussion of reform focuses on the use of neutral commissions as a way of solving the ills of legislative redistricting. Kansas State Senator Derek Schmidt recently summed up this view when discussing a proposal in Kansas to move towards the use of a redistricting commission. "There is an inherent conflict of interest in allowing those of us in public office to draw our own districts, and we're trying to mitigate that conflict" (Grenz 2003). Most supporters of neutral commissions do not claim they are panaceas of reform that will completely remove all the legislative evils from the process and automatically produce fair and equitable maps for all involved. Rather, the common view is that the move to commissions is a viable and practical, but not perfect, solution for removing the inherent conflict of allowing legislators to pick their own constituencies (Kubin 1997; Morrill 1981).

Many argue that commissions are the most common and seemingly practical alternative to legislative redistricting (Kubin 1997; Confer 2004). Theoretically, at least, the hope is that commissions will be fair and neutral bodies that do not draw lines for partisan gain but rather produce maps that are fair towards both parties and, more importantly, take better account of constituency sovereignty (Butler and Cain 1992; Kubin 1997). The main desired advantage to using a commission format is the reduction of partisan influences (often discussed in terms of partisan bias) and to produce more "fair" plans (Casson and Crespin 2004; Confer 2004).
For the 2002 round of redistricting, twenty-two states used commissions in some capacity. Table 1 breaks these down into states that grant a commission primary redistricting authority, those that use commissions as a back-up if the legislature cannot complete the process, and those states that use commissions as an advisory body.

Table 1: The Use of Commissions in State Legislative Redistricting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Backup</th>
<th>Advisory</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Alaska</td>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>Iowa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Maine</td>
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<td>Colorado</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
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</table>

Overall, the primary commissions fared quite well in implementing plans for the 2002 elections. Only the commissions in Arizona and Missouri were unsuccessful as the courts drew the maps for the 2002 elections. As for the backup commissions, four of the six states relied on commission drawn plans with only the Mississippi and Oklahoma legislatures completing the process without help from the commissions.

Another important component to these commissions is the membership criteria. There are three main forms of membership: the bipartisan tiebreak method, general partisan methods, and the statewide official method. Eleven states use a bipartisan tiebreak method in which the parties appoint an even number of members and those members then select a chair of the committee. Six of the states use the general partisan method in which there are either an odd number of members appointed from various offices or an even number without the appointment of a chair. Colorado is a good example of a partisan commission in which of the eleven members appointed two each comes from the party leaders in the legislature, three from the executive, and four from the judiciary. The partisan split could be 9-2 if the executive and the judiciary appoint clearly partisan members to side with two of the members from the legislature. Finally, six states use the statewide official method in which the members come from various elected statewide offices. The most common being the governor, secretary of state, and attorney general. Oregon is an interesting case since it does not have an official commission, but if the legislature fails to act as it did in 2002, then the process falls completely to the Secretary of State's office. Of these methods, the bipartisan tiebreak appointment is closest to a central commission used throughout the states as both the statewide and partisan appointment methods can easily give one party control over redistricting.

Clearly, there is no one set method to the use of commissions across the states. In all cases, legislators are losing power over redistricting to a third party; however, not all commissions necessarily take away the partisanship from the process. While each commission format takes away direct legislative control over the process, it does not necessarily eliminate partisan influence. The commissions made of statewide officials or members appointed by the leadership put one party in the majority on the commission. Only the bipartisan commission format takes both the direct influence of legislators out of the process and neutralizes party control.

**REDISTRICTING RULES**

Another potential constraint on the negative consequences of redistricting are the rules in place in a state that the remappers must follow. While the specific rules for redistricting vary throughout the country, over forty years of court decisions and state practices generally fall into seven traditional principles that attempt to maximize concepts of fair representation. These principles are (NCSL 1999):

1. See Kahan (1997) for a detailed discussion of the perceived strengths and weaknesses of these methods.
2. Barabas and Jett (2004) discuss these principles for Congressional redistricting. The general applicability is the same. Although, the practical applications of these
Comparing Redistricting Outcomes Across States

- Protect Political Subdivisions: This principle refers to drawing districts that adhere to local political subdivisions in a state. The most common of these is the county level, but others include city and townships and other election districts.
- Protect Communities of Interest: This principle refers to the concept of drawing districts that encompass groups of voters united by common social, political, ethnic, or economic characteristics.
- Compactness: This principle relates to drawing districts as to minimize geographic area around a district center.
- Continuity: This principle refers to drawing districts that are completely within a single geographic unit. The general idea is to draw districts in which a person can walk the entire district without crossing into another district.
- Protect District Core: This principle relates to drawing new districts specifically based on the old districts in attempts to minimize district change.
- The use of incumbency Information: This principle refers to using incumbent data in the process or attempting to protect incumbents. Some states specifically prohibit this practice while others either allow or require incumbent protection.
- Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Requires covered jurisdictions (either entire states or parts of states) with certain minority demographics to pre-clear their redistricting plans with the Justice Department. The Justice Department checks the plans for any attempts at diluting minority-voting strength.

Table 2 breaks down these rules by state. There is not a clear pattern to how the states use these rules throughout the country. Only South Carolina falls under each principle in some manner and three other states have six of the principles in place. Three states only have one principle in place (Indiana, Kentucky, and Rhode Island). Overall, the compactness, continuity, and protection of political subdivisions are the most common principles with the principle of protecting the district core the least popular rule.

Table 2: Traditional Districting Principles for State Legislative Redistricting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Compactness</th>
<th>Continuity</th>
<th>Political Subdivisions</th>
<th>Communities of Interest</th>
<th>Pro-Protected District</th>
<th>Use Incumbent Data</th>
<th>Voting Rights Act Section 5</th>
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Rules are more important in state legislative redistricting since the reapportioners have a 10% population deviation standard when drawing districts. For Congressional redistricting, the courts have upheld strict population equality as the overriding principle.
### Comparing Redistricting Outcomes Across States

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While some dispute the willingness of remappers to follow these principles or the courts to enforce them (Althanas 1998; Eric A. Engstrom 2002; Winburn 2005) finds these principles play an important role in limiting gerrymander and Benabas and Jett (2004) find these principles can influence minority representation. However, few studies have tested for the influence of these principles on redistricting outcomes.

### Representation and Redistricting

In producing any redistricting plan, regardless of who draws the maps and the roles in place, the important theoretical question is how far constitutes a fair plan that benefits the voters instead of the politicians. There appears to be two major concepts in attempting to construct a fair redistricting plan. One view pushes for more competitive districts as an avenue for increasing voter control over the elections. The general view is that an increase in competitive districts allows voters to gain the normative benefits of a strong democracy. Carson and Crepsin (2004) find that Congressional redistricting removing legislative control, either in terms of commission or court drawn plans, does increase the number of competitiveness districts. At least two states, Arizona and Washington, have adopted commissions with specific instructions to focus on competitive districts; however, most states appear more focused on issues of fairness in general terms of geographical representation.

The second view calls for a focus on traditional districting principles that focus on the importance of geography in districting and representation. The importance of geography as it relates to representation is an important component for implementing fair redistricting plans. Perhaps the most important and straightforward political science argument for considering geography comes from Richard Fenno’s Home Style (1978). According to Fenno, most incumbents first think of their districts in terms of geography and they value the geographic aspects of the districts they represent. As such, the geographic change a district undergoes during redistricting is an important component for incumbents, as they must compare the geography of their new districts with that of their old districts. This basic geographic change provides a lot of information for most incumbents when evaluating their potential redistricting bids as they know if they are representing the same core constituents that they have counted in previous years, if the constituents are new but the internal makeup is similar to their old districts, or if they have mostly new constituents in a new geographic, demographic, and partisan district.

Geographers generally make the case that geography is a key component of the representational link and is an important consideration in drawing district lines. Johnston (1979) argues while redistricting is inherently political it also inherently territorial as a matter of spatial arrangement and organization. Monmonier (2001) argues from a representational standpoint that geography and the shape of districts matter because geographic concerns often lead to political alliances among dispersed social and economic groups. Spawling districts that weave throughout a state may make it harder for representatives to do their jobs. Further, modern conveniences such as better travel, increased media exposure, and the Internet make the representatives’ job of visiting their districts and their constituent’s ability to obtain information easier. However, vastly spread out districts may deter the representatives from visiting the remotest parts of their districts and urban and suburban districts that weave in and out of cities and neighborhoods may make it more difficult for constituents to even know which district they live in and more confused and ignorant than they would otherwise be about their representatives (Butler and Cain 1992).

When redistricting the ultimate goal is to create districts with equal population for the purposes of a fair electoral system and equal representation for the voters. To promote fair and equal representative districts, one concept to consider is the continuity of representation. Gaddie and Bullock (2005) refer to the continuity of representation as the stability between incumbents and constituents from the old maps to the new maps. Another way to think of this argument is in terms of geographic district change and not necessarily in terms of incumbent stability. By focusing on geography, the potentially biasing issue of incumbency is removed from the discussion. The continuity of representation should reflect an attempt to keep as many voters as possible in the same district during redistricting. As such, redistricting should not be a game where those in control are able to completely undo the previous

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1 Many reformers argue incumbent protection is one of evils of redistricting and for the removal of all incumbency considerations during redistricting. I do not totally agree with this point. I think the problem is more of a partisan gerrymandering issue of creating safe districts, and not necessarily one of general incumbent protection. I think it is impractical and possibly a negative to the system to advocate for removing incumbency data from the process. As the term limits movement is beginning to show, getting rid of incumbents does not guarantee a reformed legislature and may actually create more problems than it solves (Sarkaugh-Thompson, et al. 2004).
electoral boundaries and carve them up for their own political advantage. Rather, redistricting would better serve the electoral system as a tool for updating the boundaries, where necessary, due to population shifts and keeping the old districts as intact as possible. This district stability should put citizens in a better position to elect their representative of choice and not essentially pre-determine the outcomes based on how some partisan else decided to draw their districts.

EXPLAINING REDISTRICTING OUTCOMES

I examine the control over drawing the maps and traditional redistricting principles in terms of influence on a plan’s overall change in the continuity of representation. If non-legislative redistricting focuses more on fair maps rather than partisan maps, I expect to find both comminution and court drawn plans to show greater respect for the continuity of representation. When discussing legislative control, it is important to break down the important distinction of control of government. For plans drawn under unified partisan control, the majority party should be most likely to attempt a partisan gerrymander that is more likely to redraw the map for their gain. The strategy under divided government tends to be bipartisanship or incumbent protection plans that will probably produce fewer changes than a partisan gerrymander.

The traditionalredistricting principles are designed to protect the continuity of representation by limiting the remappers ability to draw districts that cut across geography. The one important exception to this is the rule that prohibits the remappers to consider incumbent information in the process. These plans should show less continuity as the remappers are presumably drawing the maps “blind” from the old maps, at least in terms of where incumbents lived in their old districts.

An important component to this study is the relationship between the control of redistricting and the rules the remappers must follow. From previous studies (see Winburn 2005), I expect the rules to place to be more important than the control of the process. Winburn (2005) found little evidence to support the idea that simply removing the process from the legislature does little to remove partisan politics and strategies from redistricting. Rather, I found the rules the remappers must follow offers some conditional limitations on the success of implementing gerrymandered plans.

DATA AND METHODS

I examine the influence of redistricting control and rules on redistricting outcomes in the state legislatures for the 2000 round of redistricting. I examine this for each plan implemented prior to the 2004 elections. This includes 91 plans. I exclude Oregon due to incomplete data, six states (Arizona, Idaho, North Dakota, New Jersey, South Dakota, and Washington) only draw one map since the house, and senate districts are coterminous.

To measure the continuity of representation, I construct a measure that accounts for district geographic change in each plan. I do this in terms of district intactness or core retention of a district. To measure district intactness, I determine the proportion of constituents shared between a new district and its parent district. I develop this intactness score by calculating the number of precincts that the new district shares with its parent district and dividing by the total number of precincts in the new district. For example, if 10 precincts fall into a district and nine of those came from the parent district then the new district would be 90% intact with its parent district. I then take the mean intactness measure for each plan as my dependent variable with higher scores showing more continuity and lower scores indicating greater amounts of geographic change in the new districts.

There are two primary reasons for a lack of district intactness between plans. The first is to move constituents between districts to account for population shifts within a state. For most districts, this involves shuffling a minority of constituents, by either adding or subtracting population, but allows for the majority of the district to remain intact between the plans. However, some districts must undergo either complete or almost complete boundary shifts to accommodate either concentrated population losses or gains in a state. The most common scenario involves the areas of population decline, the inner cities and/or rural areas, losing entire districts to the fastest growing suburban areas. The second reason for a small core retention of constituents is gerrymandering. In either a partisan gerrymander or controlling party incumbent gerrymander, the majority party will attempt to keep their incumbents districts intact while splitting the core districts of the out party incumbents. The reason is simple. Incumbents like to represent constituencies with which they are familiar. New constituents bring in more uncertainty for.
the incumbents personal vote (Desposato and Petrock 2003). Under a bipartisan incumbent gerrymander, the remappers will try to keep all incumbent’s district as intact as possible while using open seats to equalize population and should have greater overall district intactness.

While this measure does not directly measure for partisan gerrymandering, it is worth noting that is probably a good indicator for whether a partisan gerrymander could be present. Plans with the greatest district intactness have little room for partisan gerrymanders since the districts underwent few changes during the process. Likewise, plans with the least amount of district intactness have a higher probability of a gerrymander given the districts underwent widespread change. However, this is a matter for future research.

Table 3 provides the summary statistics for the intactness measure and shows the average plan kept 71.61% of the old districts intact. In other words, nearly 72% of all precincts in a parent district moved together in the new maps. Table 3 highlights the range of district intactness as the standard deviation is 10.45 and the five most intact plans are all above 88% with the five least intact plans below 56%. This means the districts in the Vermont Senate kept the districts 93% intact with only about 5% of constituents shifting between districts and the Illinois Senate only kept the districts 43% intact with 57% of constituents changing districts. Overall, the range of district intactness provides an interesting measure for which to test the influences of the rules in place and control of the process.

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I test for the importance of redistricting control by coding for the control of the plans drawn for the 2002 elections. I break control into four groups: commissions, courts, divided legislative control, and unified legislative control. In the model, I use unified legislative control as the reference group with dummy variables for each variable being coded 1 for control and 0 if not. As McDonald (2004) and Warburton (2005) show control of drawing the maps does not necessarily equate into a specific outcome. As such, I also

code for the predicted outcome of the plan based on McDonald’s (2004) study. In that group, there are three categories: neutral plans that did not appear to have any partisan/incumbent advantage, incumbent protection plans, and partisan plans that appear to be gerrymanders favoring the controlling party. I code these as a dummy variable with the partisan plans as the reference group.

Table 4 indicates the control of the process along with the type of plan implemented. It is clear that having a commission does not guarantee a neutral plan as even the neutral commissions produced only one neutral plan. Overall, the partisan commissions produced partisan plans while the neutral commissions implemented slightly more incumbent protection plans.

To test for the importance of the rules, I include dummy variables for whether or not a state prescribes to the principles of protecting political subdivisions, communities of interest, and the district core. Additionally, I code for whether or not a state prohibits the use of incumbent data and whether or not a state falls under the Voting Rights Act. I code these as dummy variables for the presence or absence of the principles (1 if the state has the rule, 0 if not). For the incumbency principle, I code this as 1 if the state prohibits the use of incumbency data and 0 if otherwise. In the analysis, I expect to find a positive relationship between political subdivisions, communities of interest, and district core if these rules protect the continuity of representation. The incumbency variable should be a negative direction as the inability to use incumbency data should lead to less district intactness. Finally, if a state falls under the Voting Rights Act, I expect to find less continuity of representation as the remappers most contend with producing fair maps in terms of racial composition and this may trump the need to preserve district intactness.

*Mean Intactness: 71.62, Standard Deviation: 10.45, N = 91

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DOI: 10.6161/2994-0044.1031
Within the traditional districting principles, I do not include compactness and contiguity in the analysis. Generally, remappers accept contiguity as a part of drawing districts with a court accepted definition of being one in which “a person can go from any point within a district to any other point without leaving the district” (Engstrom 2002: 67). Forty-five of the fifty states include a provision calling for contiguous districts, and this does not appear to be a contentious issue in the other five states.

I exclude compactness for the opposite reason of not having a clear and accepted standard in districting practice. Throughout the years, the states and courts have relied on a variety of measures from the "eyeball approach" of picking out bizarre districts on the map to some of the dozens measures developed by social scientists (Monmonier 2001). Neither the courts nor scholars have declared one measure the "best" for judging the compactness of districts. Recent decisions have held only that compactness is an important

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* States are divided by control of the process and the columns indicate the type of plan implemented. Neutral commissions are in bold. Sources: McDonald (2004) and compiled by the author.

principle, but have not established a definition for measurement purposes. Hofeller (2000) concludes current compactness standards do not effectively limit gerrymandering and the courts are unlikely to enforce the standard. I also include two important control variables. The first is the population growth in a state between 1990 and 2000 measured in terms of percent growth. This is crucial to control for given that population change is the impetus for redistricting. If a state underwent major population growth (or loss), the remappers first responsibility is to equalizing district population and not preserving the continuity of representation. Conversely, states that did not undergo much population change do not have the need to do much in terms of redistricting, at least in terms of equalizing population. I should find the states with the largest population changes had the smallest overall district compactness.

I also control for whether or not control of drawing the maps changed between the last implemented plans from the 1990s and 2000. I code the variable as 1 for change in control and 0 if not. I expect chambers that underwent a change to have less district compactness as the new remappers, regardless of their goals, will probably have a different perspective for drawing the maps than those who previously controlled the process.

ANALYSIS

What influences the continuity of representation in state legislative redistricting? Table 5 presents the OLS regression results from five models that test for these influences. Model 1 establishes the base model by controlling for population change in a state. As expected, the more population change in a state the less district compactness in a plan. The redistricting control model (model 2) suggests that who drew the lines has little influence on how the plans change. There are no significant differences between commission, court, and legislative drawn plans.12 If we look at the perceived outcome of the plan, we once again see no difference between partisan, neutral, and incumbent protection plans. This finding is a bit surprising; however this is a general code for the outcomes in a state and does not provide much insight into the complexities and compromises of each individual plan. Or, this could accurately account for the importance of population change in the process suggesting the remappers first responsibility is to equalizing population and not gerrymandering the districts.

11 This does not account for in-state migration and the change of population between districts.
12 The findings do change when controlling for bipartisan or partisan commission membership.
### Table 5: Influences on District Intactness*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Population Change</td>
<td>-0.34 (0.006)***</td>
<td>-0.34 (0.004)***</td>
<td>-0.34 (0.001)***</td>
<td>-0.33 (0.007)***</td>
<td>-0.31 (0.006)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Control</td>
<td>-4.10 (2.267)</td>
<td>-4.14 (2.341)</td>
<td>-6.20 (2.351)**</td>
<td>-6.06 (2.345)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>-1.75 (2.792)</td>
<td>-1.60 (2.715)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court</td>
<td>-1.60 (3.071)</td>
<td>-1.33 (3.427)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divided Legislative</td>
<td>1.671 (2.742)</td>
<td>1.671 (3.505)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Natural</td>
<td>-7.88 (2.661)</td>
<td>-7.54 (3.401)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent pension</td>
<td>2.647 (2.119)</td>
<td>1.671 (2.610)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules</td>
<td>Political Subdivisions</td>
<td>7.653 (2.583)***</td>
<td>6.170 (2.326)***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commisions of Interest</td>
<td>5.771 (3.187)</td>
<td>3.891 (2.209)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Code</td>
<td>3.190 (2.993)</td>
<td>-2.081 (2.917)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbency Data</td>
<td>-7.55 (2.317)***</td>
<td>-7.34 (2.660)***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAs</td>
<td>-1.88 (2.193)</td>
<td>-2.76 (2.214)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>77.52 (1.610)***</td>
<td>77.65 (2.354)***</td>
<td>77.39 (1.804)***</td>
<td>73.99 (2.462)**</td>
<td>73.29 (3.371)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R2</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rules model shows a significant relationship for the principle of protecting political subdivisions and the use of incumbent data. As expected, remappers that must follow political boundaries produce plans with greater district intactness and in those plans that could not consider where the incumbents lived had lower levels of district intactness. Neither the community of interest standard nor the district core standard reaches significance and this is not surprising given the vagueness of the definitions of these principles in many states. Additionally, this model improves the model fit by nearly 10% suggesting the rules are nearly as important in explaining district intactness as the population change in a state.*

Finally, the full model supports the idea that the rules are more important in explaining district intactness than the method of drawing the lines as the control of the maps or the type of plan implemented adds no additional explanatory power to the rules model and does not greatly change the importance of the rules coefficients. Overall, the rules in place appear to be a significant factor in preserving the continuity of representation by limiting (or enabling in the case of not being allowed to consider incumbent data) the amount of changes those drawing the lines can implement. Additionally, this suggests the rules can also limit the amount of partisan gerrymandering that can occur since a successful gerrymander generally requires the ability to draw district lines unimpeded across a state.

**Discussion**
What do these findings suggest about redistricting reform? Clearly, the control of the process matters little when discussing the continuity of representation as commissions, court, and legislative plans show no significant differences in levels of district intactness. This study also highlights that the use of commissions, even neutral commissions, does not appear to guarantee neutral redistricting plans. On the other hand, the use of traditional redistricting principles appears to be an important factor in preserving the continuity of representation for constituents in state legislative districts.

* Notes:
OLS regression
Standard errors in parentheses
**p<.05 ***p<.01
N = All legislative plans enacted for the 2002 elections with the exception of Oregon. The data collection for Oregon is currently incomplete. Six states (AZ, ID, ND, NJ, SD, and WA) only complete one map as the house and senate districts are coterminous.
Unified legislative control and partisan implemented plans are the control groups.
However, not all principles seem to influence the remappers. In this analysis, the principle for protecting political subdivisions and the inability to use incumbency data stand out as significant influences. These findings are not surprising given the clear and rather unambiguous standards of these principles. Additionally, these findings support my earlier findings that for these principles to be an important part of the process a state needs to define clearly the parameters of the principles. A clear definition of these principles makes it more difficult for the remappers to ignore and easier for the courts to uphold.

Turning to the principle of protecting political subdivisions, I argue this is an important principle that enforces fair redistricting plans that benefit the voters and enhance representation. I base this on Grofman's concept of congugatability, which he defines as "the ability to characterize the district boundaries in a manner that can be readily communicated to ordinary citizens of the district in common-sense terms based on geographical referents" (1993: 1262). Grofman's concept of congugatability relies heavily on the central place of geography in the American political system. Central to Grofman's argument is the way that voters identify themselves with the geography within a state. Districting based on this concept would involve following natural geographic boundaries and political subdivisions within a state (Grofman 1993). An emphasis on congugatability provides an option for a partisan neutral redistricting. A focus on congugatability appears to be a fair method to distribute districts so that all constituents are able to identify which district they vote in based on clear geographic units within a state. I argue that geographic units are inherently politically neutral and shift the focus from political considerations to those of the voters.

Overall, this paper provides an important empirical test of the use of commissions in the redistricting process and shows that the rules, and not control of the pen (or computer program), do a better job of supporting fair maps and limiting the detrimental effects of gerrymandering. The next phase in this research is to delve into issues of partisan gerrymandering and district level changes that go beyond a succinct measure of overall plan change.

REFERENCES


Comparing Redistricting Outcomes Across States


The Electoral College: A Critical Analysis*

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This paper looks critically at several of the principal arguments employed for and against the continued use of the Electoral College, as opposed to a system of direct popular vote. The Electoral College does not merely diverge from our common American practices of direct popular vote, but does so in ways that arbitrarily benefit some states at the expense of others. While federalism clearly has desirable features for the United States, and a two-party system may be desirable, neither is threatened by the removal of the Electoral College. Many of the defenses of the College appear to indicate a skepticism toward holding a large-scale national election, but, to the extent that such skepticism is justified, the Electoral College system, which is essentially a national election with some arbitrary twists, is not a reasonable alternative.

Key Words: Electoral College, presidential elections, federalism, two-party system, democracy

One of the strange beliefs of the defenders of the present system—a myth of very considerable convenience—is that the American democracy is so fragile that the very slightest constitutional job will have an apocalyptic effect. Thus, presumably we would fall apart if President Nixon were impeached. We would fall apart if President Nixon were not pardoned. We would fall apart if FDR were elected to a third term. We would fall apart if the Supreme Court seriously implemented Brown vs. Board of Education. The defenders of the status quo will always invoke the specter of a constitutional crisis when in fact constitutional crises are contemplated by the Constitution itself.

—Theodore Lowi*

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* This paper was originally presented at the 2003 annual meeting of the Kentucky Political Science Association. It won the David Hughes Memorial Award for outstanding paper the following year.

1 Lowi wrote this in the context of advocating a multi-party system, but the argument is quite relevant here. Theodore Lowi, "Toward a More Responsible Three-Party System: The Mythology of 'Two-Party System and the Prospects For Reform," *PS: Political Science and Politics* Fall 1983: 704.
In November and December of 2000, the inevitable finally occurred: after a gap of 112 years, a presidential election produced a split result, with one candidate winning the popular vote, and the other the electoral vote. The fear that such a result might have been expected to cause was largely absent. Of course, loyal Democratic voters were outraged, and there has been a renewed interest in discussing the Electoral College among some scholars, but the event had only a brief impact on editorial pages, and produced little outcry in the public as a whole. No citizens’ movement to change the College has sprang up, and Congress’ discussion of the topic has been minimal.

The democratic, majoritarian aspects of our system increased in those 112 years. Consider, for example, the switch to directly electing senators (in 1913), the granting of actual suffrage to almost all adult citizens (via the Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s and 1960s and the 19th Amendment granting votes for women in 1920), and the rise of public opinion polling (in the last half of the twentieth century), just to name a few significant changes. Thus, resistance to a non-majoritarian institution such as the Electoral College might be expected. The relative lack of outcry may have something to do with just how few Americans care much who gets elected president in the current era. Moreover, as Jack Rakove noted, “the tedious business of considering a constitutional amendment with little prospect for adoption could hardly compete for public attention with the tumult in Florida.” But that is a slightly different topic. Here I wish to examine the Electoral College itself, and whether we ought to be concerned that it is still an integral, functioning part of our political system.

The specific purpose of this paper is to critically analyze some of the major claims that scholars make both for and against the Electoral College’s continued existence. It is my conviction that many of these claims have not been carefully pondered, certainly not sufficiently for the current relevance of the topic.

Ultimately, I will argue that the supporting arguments for the Electoral College fail to satisfactorily explain why such an institution is appropriate in a modern democracy (or even a democratic republic). I will begin with discussion of the most significant criticisms of the College. The first, and most obvious, is that it is anti-democratic, or, at the least, anti-majoritarian. The second, related (but much less discussed) point is that the specific ways that the Electoral College differs from national majority rule and advantages some states at the expense of others are quite arbitrary.

The defense of the Electoral College are interesting, in part because they have shifted in emphasis. A significant defense traditionally has been the College’s support for a moderate, two-party political system. This is an important argument that I will analyze, but it is less prominent in many recent discussions. A more constant defense through the years has been the College’s role in promoting federalism. A popular third point since 2000 has been the problems of vote counting and vote fraud in a close national popular election. This is a variant on the general theme of the difficulties of a true popular national election in the United States. Finally, and reluctantly, defenders point to the problems with either of the direct popular vote alternatives, run-offs or simple plurality elections.

Given the presumed low probability of any change in a system that requires the passage of a constitutional amendment, one might reasonably ask: why bother discussing the College at all? First, prospects for change are presumed to be low in part because of a widespread belief that most states (especially small ones) are greatly advantaged by this system so that they will not ratify a popular vote amendment. It is my conclusion that this belief is at least somewhat mistaken, that the College leads many states to be ignored now. Secondly, there is value in examining our systems and comparing them with alternatives, if only to better understand their functioning and effects. Finally, related to the above two points, I believe that there are many weak arguments and false claims made about the Electoral College, even by intelligent scholars, and these should be disputed for the sake of truth and good scholarship.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST MAINTAINING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE

The case against the Electoral College is perhaps simpler than the case for it. The two main (and related) ideas that I will discuss here are the anti-democratic nature and arbitrary effects of the College. In discussing these arguments, I will consider the counter-arguments of the College’s defenders. Thus, arguments for and against are interwoven here, as in the next section on arguments for the Electoral College.

The Electoral College as Undemocratic

The most frequent criticism of the Electoral College is simply that it runs counter to our accepted principles of democracy in that it allows a president to be elected even if that person has received fewer popular votes than an opponent. As prominent Electoral College critic Lawrence Longley puts it:

The Electoral College is not a neutral or fair counting device for tallying popular votes cast for president in the form of electoral votes. Instead, it counts some votes as more important than others, according to the state in which they are cast.1


Of course, this distortion from pure majority rule occurs because of the winner-take-all rule within each state and the constant two votes that each state receives regardless of population.

This criticism is so simple and obvious that defenders do not dispute it, but instead point out something almost equally obvious: our system is not, nor should it be, completely democratic or majoritarian. Of course, the Constitution contains many other aspects that are not wholly majoritarian or democratic, such as the many checks and balances built into the Constitution that may thwart the wishes of a majority.

Defenders of the Electoral College state that democracy does not necessarily mean simple majority (or plurality) rule. Judith Best describes this criticism of the College as a desire to reduce democracy to mere numbers. To this, she responds that “the right winner must be defined politically not arithmetically.”

Paul Schumaker and Burdett Loomis, in explaining why their group of scholars chose the Electoral College over all the major alternatives, respond to the majoritarian criticism as well: “this criticism is problematic because it misunderstands democracy and has an oversimplified conception of the public will.” They then make several thoughtful and important points along these lines:

Because no one set of election rules is clearly best, the critical issue for democracy is that agreement exists on electoral rules. Public choice theorists have demonstrated that the concept of public will is often vacuous, an abstraction intended to signify what most members of the public want, but a concept that is impossible to operationalize precisely.

These points are all well-taken. And indeed, from the standpoint of some social choice theorists, most discussions of the meaning of particular elections are useless, since elections are so arbitrary and manipulable. But that is an extreme view. A reasonable conclusion from the 2000 election is that the public was split; any democratic theorist would be hard-pressed to show why either Gore or Bush deserved to be president more than the other.

by some democratic criteria. It may be that such a choice is so arbitrary that national public elections of this kind should not be held.4

But if we are to hold elections that tally the votes of all citizens, the burden of proof would seem to be on those who would hold them under conditions in which the votes of these citizens are treated unequally. There are indeed many reasons why the desires of a simple majority or plurality should not hold sway, such as the defense of important individual rights. But why weight the votes in this particular way? These leads to the next point.

The Arbitrary Nature of the Electoral College’s Effects

The Electoral College emphasizes states, to be sure, and thus federalism provides one set of justifications for it, as will be seen in the section on defenses of the College. But first I wish to explore some of the actual effects of the College on campaigning.

At the heart of most practical discussion of the Electoral College today is the question of whom it is advantaged by it. What is intended by this question, specifically, is how do candidates (and perhaps presidents) behave differently from the way that they would in a direct popular vote system? For such an essential question, the answers are elusive. This is an excellent example of the relative neglect from which the Electoral College has suffered as a topic of study.

American government and presidential election textbooks routinely state that the College’s existence operates to the benefit of the largest states. The logic of this argument is that the winner-take-all process magnifies the influence of large states by making them often decisive huge blocs of votes. This can be supported with so-called power indices, which measure the percentage of the time that each state would make the difference among all possible winning coalitions of states. Using this type of reasoning, for example, Brann and Davis developed the “3/2s Rule,” arguing that candidates will spend resources at a rate of 3/2 times the electoral votes of the state.

4 Best, The Choice of the People; 30.
5 Paul Schumaker and Burdett A. Loomis, “Reaching a Collective Judgment” in Choosing a President: The Electoral College and Beyond, ed. Paul Schumaker and Burdett A.
7 Loomis (New York: Chapman House), 185.
Yet popular wisdom also has it that the College benefits small states.
Indeed, one of the major impediments to any change is assumed to be the reluctance of small states to give up this advantage, which arises from the constant two votes added to each state's number of representatives.11 Thus, the smallest states get a larger share of the total than they would in a pure popular vote. Rainey and Rainey point out that the largest nine states in 1990 contained 52% of the population but only 45% of electors.12 Furthermore, they calculate that removing the constant two would have affected some electoral outcomes, including that of 2000.13 In other words, it can be argued that Gore lost because of the small state advantage.

It may well be that large states and small states are advantaged at the expense of middle-sized states. If so, it cannot be a very large advantage. To be fair, I must conclude that the jury is still out on this question, but the Raineys' case for small states' advantage is powerful. Of course it begins the question: why should small or large states be advantaged? As many commentators have pointed out, small versus large states per se, while an important issue at the 1787 convention, is not a significant issue division in the U.S. now, nor has it been.

And, though this fact is strangely absent from most textbooks, there is little dispute that the Electoral College over-emphasizes states in which the electorate is expected to be close, since the winner-take-all rule makes other states' exact popular vote total unimportant. And one could search constitutional history and democratic theory for a long time to find philosophical justification for that distinction. As Rakove ably points out, the winner-take-all provision itself gained favor in the early Nineteenth Century for political gain in particular elections.14

Among the best recent evidence for this tendency is the paper by Hagen, Johnston, and Jamieson, in which they measure actual candidate appearances and ad spending, state by state, in the 2000 presidential election. Closeness of

Gergarous Rainey, "Representational Issues and Electoral College Reform: Implications of the 2000 Presidential Election," (paper presentation, annual meeting of the Kentucky Political Science Association, Northern Kentucky University, March 2-3, 2001), 4. The great swath of mountain states that vote steadily Republican, for example, see a decisive bloc just as New York is.

11 For example, Gerald M. Pomper writes that "the present system works to the advantages of small states, which could prevent such an amendment from passing." Pomper, "The Presidential Election" in ed. Pomper, The Election of 2000, (New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2001), 149. Amazingly, advocates of the small states are advantaged school and of the large states are advantaged school often ignore each other's existence; Pomper is an example.


the 1996 presidential election in each state predicted both of these variables well. Not only did Bush and Dole's 3/2 rule gain extra attention to large states not hold, but there was little clear relationship between state size and candidate attention.15

Thus, especially when combined with more-and-more refined marketing and polling techniques of recent elections, the winner-take-all rule used in states leads to campaigning that is pin-pointed to particular media markets. The 2000 election was almost the opposite of what some defenders of the Electoral College describe when they discuss the College's role in promoting broadly-based, national campaigns. The argument has been made that the College encourages such widespread campaigns because, without it, a candidate could ignore large sections of the country.16

The logic of that argument is questionable, since winning candidates made up of relatively small portions or broad samples of the nation can be easily imagined in both the Electoral College and in a popular vote system. But the 2000 election example ought to dismiss the point altogether. No national ads were run by either Gore or Bush; they were replaced completely by spot ads in key markets in swing states. As Rakove puts it,

Although the national electorate was closely divided, whole swaths of the country, comprising large and small states alike, essentially sat out the campaign because there was never any doubt in whose column their electoral vote would fall.17

This is an excellent example of arbitrary effects of the Electoral College. The College in 2000 positively discouraged a broad national campaign in this close election.

ARGUMENTS FOR MAINTAINING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE

The Electoral College and the Federal System

There is little doubt that the Electoral College was federal in its origin, as writers such as Gregg, Best, and Stoner argue.18 These defenders are on
relatively strong ground when emphasizing the importance of federalism for our system overall, and the extent to which the College was a significant part, both politically and philosophically, of the federal system developed by the Founders. The difficult and important questions then become: just how federal is the College now, and in what important ways would replacing it with direct popular electoral change federalism in the twenty-first century?

Judith Best points out that counting votes by state is one of the many ways in which our system works through states rather than through simple, equal counting of all persons in the country. The Senate's equal votes for each state, and the constitutional ratification process are good examples. Interestingly, she draws a parallel to the way faculty senates in universities may represent faculty in departments, as departments, rather than as equally-weighted individual faculty.

Changes in popular attitudes over time are a relevant point to consider here. Best rightly states that the Constitution itself had to be ratified by each state before that state would join it (New York could not, for example, outvote New Jersey because it is larger, and force both to join). Such a process was both natural and politically necessary at the time, when states were more important units than the national government, both in their power and in the attachment individual citizens felt towards them. But is that the case today? I suggest that the faculty parallel is not a good fit with the current U.S. While many Americans feel an attachment to their state, they are far more likely to move from one state to another than a faculty member is to change disciplines. They may well live in one state and work in another. They are more likely to vote in national elections than in state and local ones, despite the lesser likelihood of one citizen affecting national election outcomes.

The trends toward nationalism mentioned in the above paragraph may be depicted by adherents of a stronger state version of federalism, but such trends do suggest that in current times it is not necessarily more natural to count by state. I do not by any means suggest eradicating or even eroding the federalism that remains in our Constitutional system, but proponents of keeping the College to promote federalism need to be more concrete and clear on how the College promotes federalism. Best, for example, states that the existence of the College

means that to be successful a presidential candidate must win states. This means the states as political units have an influence on the presidency as well as on the Congress. And because they have an influence on the president, who maintains all the members of the federal cabinet, as well as on the Senate, which confirms the nominations, the states have an influence on the federal judiciary. The federal principle is the fulcrum, the fixed support, for the whole national government and for the Constitution. It is the base upon which the three branches of government turn. Applying the principle to the presidency establishes balance in the arrangement of the three branches.24

This is as close to a precise argument as one finds. But even if one accepts the debatable point that federalism is the base of the system,25 why is this one aspect (the College), so important to that base? Any successful candidate for president will "win states" in either an Electoral College or direct popular vote system. For almost two hundred states have not been decision-making units as much as counting units in the Electoral College system. Returning to Best's college faculty parallel: it would be perfectly reasonable to have faculty in departments or divisions be represented by someone else at another level, and to thus aggregate faculty members' preferences by department. Ideally, in such a process, individuals would discuss issues within a department and their representatives would take the issues to the next level, representing each distinct constituency. But if a college or university chose instead to poll each faculty member individually on an issue, we would think it odd indeed to add all those votes up within each department, and then sum weighted members for each department's plurality view on the issue. Yet that is a close parallel to the Electoral College: no collective decision is being made by a group called a state; numbers are merely being tallied at that level.

The existence of the College leads to a list of discussion of states in the campaign, but candidates in the modern era are at least as concerned with other levels of analysis, such as demographic groups or media markets. Even at the time of the founding, it is less than clear that the Electoral College was an essential part of federalism, since it did not appear until late in the convention, when other aspects of federalism were in place. Ranney and Ranney interestingly observe that no other federal system in the world has seen the need for such an electoral mechanism to guarantee federalism26.

Thus, the notion that the Electoral College's removal would threaten the core of federalism is unsupported. Low's quote at the start of this paper makes

24 Best, The Choice of the People, 54.
25 The horizontal checks among the three branches are arguably at least as important as the vertical ones of federalism, and there are many crucial aspects of the Constitutional system, including the defense of rights and popular sovereignty.
26 Ranney and Ranney, "Representation Issues and Electoral College Reform," 16.
a relevant point on the strength of the American system. The actions of state
government, Congress and the Supreme Court, for example, appear to be
much more important variables for the viability of federalism.24

Defects of Our Two-Party System

The two-party system is as American as apple pie, and, to quote expert
commentator on American politics Michael Barone, the Electoral College is a
"great institutional support of the two-party system."25 The College, according
to this line of reasoning, penalizes third-party candidates by requiring them to
win whole states in order to receive any electoral votes. Thus, third parties,
and extreme views in general, must compromise and fold themselves into our
traditional centrist two-party universe. Barone's essay focuses on the
importance of discouraging third parties, but it contains little evidence that the
Electoral College is necessary to do so.

I will not mince words and argue that, while this has been a popular
argument for the Electoral College, it is among the weakest. My argument
takes three parts:
1) the Electoral College is not necessary for promoting two-party
because single-member districts (and other U.S. laws) do so quite effectively.
2) Neither the Electoral College nor single-member districts can
completely eliminate third parties from playing a significant role because
regionally-strong parties can gain seats or electoral votes.
3) It is at least a debatable proposition that the two-party system should
be encouraged.

The first point is so obvious because the connection between single-
member districts and two-partyism is among the most well-established
relationships in political science. Sometimes called Duverger's Law, after
Maurice Duverger, this relationship says that virtually all political systems that
employ single-member districts in which there is one winner per geographical
area26 have two dominant parties.27 Any other parties tend to be weak and/or
short-lived, because there is continuous electoral incentive for other parties to
merge into one of the larger ones. Only parties with some variant on the
proportional representation system, where all vote-getting parties receive some
representation in multi-representative areas, are likely to have more than two
significant parties. In such systems, several parties can thrive electorally, and
then compromise at the legislative level to form governing coalitions.

This analysis is very familiar to political scientists, because it appears in
every American government textbook.28 The absence of powerful third parties
in most non-presidential elections testifies to the effectiveness of single-
member districts, along with other electoral laws in the U.S., such as those
limiting the ballot access and campaign finance that is available to minor
parties. There have been a small number notable exceptions to the two-party
dominance of late, such as Jesse Ventura in Minnesota, and a few other
independent office-holders. But, as in other periods of U.S. history, these
exceptions tend to be short-lived. Indeed, it is notable that third parties have
made so few inroads in recent decades, given the low levels of support for the
two major parties.29

My second, less crucial, point is that some third parties may actually
thrive, at least for a while, in a system with single-member districts or an
Electoral College. These are regionally-based parties. Thus, Populists gained
some power and elected many officials in the Midwest in the 1890s, and
George Wallace garnered forty-six electoral votes in a few Southern states in
1968. But any attempt at building a broader-based third party runs into the
problems inherent in winner-take-all systems.

Finally, the assumption that two-partyism ought to be defended in open
to question. Barone argues that the Electoral College is good because it
discourages small and dangerous third parties; "it restrains the fissiparous
tendencies of political ideologues and zealots, who seek to impose their will
on a majority of those who reject their views."30 Whether more viable third
parties are desirable is a large topic, worthy of a separate essay. But a few
remarks are in order here.

Barone's view of the motivations and tendencies of third parties is a bit of
hyperbole: certainly one could not classify the leaders of all small parties in
multi-party systems this way. Twenty years ago, Theodore Lowi wrote a
thought-provoking essay, challenging various defenses of two-partyism. He
challenged various dire scenarios of what would occur if we elected a third-

24 A few decades ago, when federalism was perceived to be threatened by an ever-
expanding national government, the Electoral College was in place. And it has been
actions of these other institutions (Congress, courts, and state governments) that have
helped to revive federalism in recent decades.

25 Michael Barone, "The Electoral College and the Future of American Parties," in
Lessons Demystified: Why We Have an Electoral College, ed. Gary L. Gregg II (Wilmingtom,
Del: ISI Books, 2003), 79-86

26 This system is also called "winner-take-all" or "first past the-post."

27 Paul Allen Beck and Marjorie Randon Hershey, Party Politics in America, Ninth

28 And it is not much disputed, unless the large-state advantage theory that appears in
textbooks.

29 Since the 1970s, about one-third of the public considers itself "independent," rather
than tied to either major party. Fewer than one-third consider themselves "more
Democrat" or "strong Republican." Paul Allen Beck and Marjorie Randon Hershey,
Party Politics in America, 119.

party president and/or many third party members of Congress, such as the idea that government would often be deadlocked (more than now?)

At minimum, it should be concluded that reasonable observers of
American politics may differ in the two-versus-multi-party issue. It comes
down to values, such as representation of more views, versus belief in
moderate compromise, or belief in increasing participation levels versus the
need for stability. But, based on point number one, the supremacy of two
parties in the U.S. is hardly in doubt, so defense of the two-party system
cannot be a basis of the Electoral College’s defense.

The Magnifier Effect and Clear Winners

Another argument for the Electoral College is that it magnifies the margin
of victory and that it produces clear winners. The argument essentially is that
the College usually produces a clear, large margin of victory for the winner,
who has had an absolute majority of electoral votes in every election since 1824.

Thus, the winner is clear, and therefore considered legitimate. Our system is
kept stable, and presidents, with a reasonable claim for legitimacy, are able to
govern.

Small popular vote margins of victory are usually magnified for much the
same reason that a party that gets only slightly more votes nationally in U.S.
House elections than the other party usually rules the House by more than just
a few seats. If one candidate or party fairly consistently wins narrow elections
in winner-take-all states, that candidate or party will usually wind up with a
larger overall victory.

Aside from the presumed benefit of having clear results and legitimate
government, Judith Best argues that the "magnifier effect" tends to work for
candidates with broad-based victories in various geographical areas, and this
idea does make sense in light of the discussion in the paragraph above.9
Thus, the magnifier is not just "smoke and mirrors," but a reward for successfully
mounting a broadly-based campaign. This argument would be stronger if Best
could provide us with examples of deserving and undeserving candidates. E.g.,
there have been candidates who won many popular votes but did not gain
larger victories in the electoral tally due to a lack of a broadly-based

campaign.

Best’s analysis especially emphasizes the clear results and lack of
deadlocks. She concedes that the Constitution’s contingency plan for
deadlocks when there is no electoral majority is problematic voting in the

9 Theodore Lowi, “Toward a More Responsible Three-Party System: The Mythology
of Two-Party System and the Prospects For Reform.”
10 Judith Best, The Choice of the People, 11.
11 The broadly-based campaign issue was discussed also in Section II of the paper.

House is skewed by being one vote per state, and the possibilities of deal-
making in the House are disturbing.4

But the Electoral College works to decisively, she argues, that majorities
virtually always occur. She cites the 1992 Perot example, where, despite much
concern over the possibility of a deadlock due to his popularity, he of course
received no electoral votes and no deadlock was remotely likely.25 And even
George Wallace in 1968, with a regional campaign, could not deadlock the
College.26

These points harken back to my discussion of the two-party system. It is
true that third-party candidates are unlikely to impede an Electoral College
victory (or to impede a popular vote victory in any elections in our winner-
take-all system), and the College makes it less likely they will even deny a
majority. One could argue, however, that there are some smoke and mirrors
here. Perot was supported by a fifth of the electorate, and the count that
matters, the Electoral count, says he received nothing. This distorts the

More relevant to Best’s argument, she dismisses the regional candidates
such as Wallace too easily. The Electoral College makes a strong regional
candidate more likely to affect the results than would be the case in a popular
vote system. Such a candidate can receive more electoral votes than the
"electors," precisely because we are counting by states. A candidate such as
Wallace can be almost completely devoid of support outside one region, yet he
can garner significant electoral votes. While Wallace did not deny Nixon an
electoral majority, such a result is quite possible, and only requires a closer
electoral margin, such as we had in 2000, combined with a strong regional
candidate.

The clear results from the College are often contrasted with the alleged
problems of runoffs in a popular system. Some such problems are discussed
briefly below. For now, it is interesting to read Best’s description of a
hypothetical "contingency election" (runoff) and its threats to stability and
legitimacy in light of the 2000 election that dragged on for weeks:

We don’t want delay, uncertainty...We don’t want to have the
outcome uncertain for weeks or even months...while the world
watches in disinfect...37

No real crisis of legitimacy, either domestic or international, occurred
when the winner was in doubt for weeks in November and December of 2000
due to the Florida vote-counting problems. This lack of crisis may owe more to the stable political culture and rule of law in the United States than to any particular method of selecting the president. Again, as Lowi pointed out, our system is not as fragile as it is sometimes argued.

In conclusion, there is evidence that the magnifier effect occurs, and the Electoral College does have a history of being decisive. The latter is rather striking: many systems, including hereditary despotism, can be decisive in choosing a leader. Evidence on the significance of the magnifier is lacking. As mentioned in the introduction, only small segments of the public seem to get worked up about who is the president in most cases. Die-hard supporters of losing candidates have no problem disputing the legitimacy of winners in any case.38

Problems of Vote Counting and Fraud

The Electoral College served to center the post-election battles in Florida. Without it, I fully expect we would have seen vote recounts and court battles in nearly every state of the Union. Can you imagine the problems in Florida multiplied 10, 25, or even 50 times? Rather than being an argument against the Electoral College, the 2000 election was a strong and forceful warning against its abolition. — Mitch McConnell 39

(2001, xv)

Prospects for controversies over voting and ballots, as well as the temptation for actual vote fraud, are said by proponents of the Electoral College to be decreased by that body. While these arguments have not been written about as extensively as some of the above points for the College, they are mentioned so often since 2000 that they are worthy of analysis.

The argument is essentially that when the election is close nationwide, as in 2000, every vote among millions matters a great deal, and this in turn results, or "if Florida," as some would put it. Paul Rahe, in the same volume as McConnell, makes a similar point,40 as do Pomper41 and Herron, et al.42

38 After each of Clinton's presidential election victories, staunch Republicans quickly pointed out that there lacked popular vote majorities. Apparently the magnifier effect and decisive majorities in the Electoral College were not enough to modify them.


41 Gerald M. Pomper, "The Presidential Election," 149-150.
country. Is this the price we pay for more democratic elections, and, if so, is it worth paying?

Weakness of Alternatives to the Electoral College

All of the above arguments compare the Electoral College, explicitly or implicitly, with its alternatives, generally direct popular election of some kind. Some arguments, however, more specifically refer to the alleged flaws of alternatives, and these I will address briefly here.

Judith Best criticizes direct popular election on several counts. Many of her arguments refer to points above, e.g., that direct election is not federal, or that it harms the two-party system.64 Much of her other discussion involves problems with either a popular election allowing a winner with less than fifty percent or having a minimum percent requirement (usually between forty and fifty percent is suggested) that would frequently lead to a runoff.

Best argues that any popular vote system allowing a candidate with less than the fifty percent to win is undemocratic: "unless you hold a runoff election there is no accurate way to assert that a candidate who won a plurality has or would have the support of the majority."65 This is a reasonable point, but it sounds rather odd coming from an opponent of direct popular vote. Were the many presidents who failed to achieve a majority of the popular vote acceptable winners because the Electoral College gave them a majority? Clearly, Best would say yes, but the point is questionable. And what of all the non-majority winners in non-presidential elections across the country for governor, senator, mayor, etc.?

Best and other proponents of the Electoral College also dislike the runoff election needed to ensure a majority. This is in part because it encourages too much splitting of the vote in the first round, and also because a runoff is not "swift and sure."66 The splitting of the vote can be a problem. France's recent presidential election provides a good example of the worst of such a system. Several parties split the vote into such small parts that extremist candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen made it to the runoff before being defeated by President Jacques Chirac. That said, runoffs are used around the world without serious problems, and they have been used in some states of the United States. Innovative voting systems, such as an "instant runoff" in which voters list second choices might work better than the conventional runoff, but the simple plurality system without runoffs is well-rooted across the United States, as the ordinary way of structuring elections, and it avoids most of these problems.

64 Judith Best, The Choice of the People, 55.
65 Judith Best, The Choice of the People, 56.
66 Judith Best, The Choice of the People, 58.

This discussion of alternatives makes a reasonable segue to my conclusions. It should be clear that I have not found the defenses of the Electoral College very convincing. The direct popular vote alternatives mentioned above are so well tested that it seems odd to consider them too radical to adopt. The Electoral College clearly is unnecessary for defense of the two-party system, which is well (too well?) defended without the College. Federalism has many aspects, and the Electoral College, operating merely as a tallying mechanism (with no state-by-state deliberation) is barely a federal property of the Constitution at all. The problem of vote fraud is somewhat more convincing, but its overall centrality is not certain. And the magnificence effect, while often present, is of doubtful value.

Conclusions: Skepticism toward Popular Elections in a Democracy

Some of the most plausible arguments for maintaining an Electoral College over a direct popular vote plan seem to be based, in part, on skepticism of popular national elections. One of the better arguments against direct popular vote is the possibility of widespread voter fraud and recounts in close, important elections. Such a possibility is inherent in any election system made up of real, flawed humans. And there is consideration among defenders of the Electoral College of the issue of whether popular majorities really ought to choose a president in every case. Thus, some arguments for the College seem to be arguments against applying democratic elections to the presidency, despite our use of such methods for all other elected offices.

Some of this skepticism makes for awkward arguments, because the current Electoral College is "most of the way down the road to the choice of the president by the people."67 (Pierce and Longley, 22). Thus, if popular national elections are not generally a good way to choose presidents, then some alternative to them besides our modified Electoral College system would be in order. One can make a reasonable argument that hundreds of millions of people cannot choose one person to lead them in anything like a rational process. And by what right should Gore or Bush have won in 2000 when the race was closer than any counting system's margin of error?

If one takes such views to their logical conclusion, we should do something altogether different, such as return to the original Electoral College system or something like it, in which small groups of people weigh the choices. Or perhaps we should adopt a parliamentary system, in which leaders are chosen in part by the public, but in part by elected political leaders. Yet almost
no one seems to be advocating such radical solutions, since popular democratic elections are so entrenched in the United States.

In concluding I also should briefly consider the burden of proof on such an issue. Classical conservatives, in the tradition of Burke, would say that no major institution should be changed except slowly and carefully, considering the problem of unintended consequences. The difficulty of amending our Constitution makes this view prevail in practice. Yet we should recall again Low's point on the alleged fragility of our system. More radical democratizing changes such as mass suffrage, votes for women and Blacks, and the direct election of Senators did not shake the system, indeed they have presumably improved it. And the alternatives are hardly united and dangerous. As mentioned above, virtually all major elective offices in the U.S. are direct popular vote (usually with no run-off). These elections leave the powerful two-party system intact and seldom lead to any splintering or radical results. A crucial question is whether the presidency is different, and if so how?

Walter Berns states provocatively, that he has "yet to encounter a critic of the Electoral College who argues that a president chosen directly by the people is likely to be a better president." But the conservative argument of skepticism towards any change in presidential selection would be on sounder ground if defenders could seriously claim the recent choices of president were of too high quality to risk any change— is there that much to lose from moving just a little further toward democratization of our political system?

A classical liberal might ask whether our Electoral College system, as modified, is a system that we would choose. He or she might also think it is an amazing coincidence that, in the eyes of some ardent defenders of the status quo, it just so happens that the institutions we have at this point in time are the best ones possible. Given the obvious limitations of any election system, and conceding the point that majorities are often wrong and we should limit their power in our system, why do we choose this particular method, with its arbitrary advantages to certain types of states? Is not, truly, the Electoral College an odd product of the incomplete grafting of democratic movements onto older traditions of a more republican and mixed system? Ultimately, the answer to such questions does depend in large part on one's attitudes toward change in the American system.

48 See many of the arguments in Paul Schramke and Burdett A. Loomis, "Reaching a Collective Judgment."
49 Walter Berns, "Outside the Electoral College Produces Presidents." Inaving 
Democracy: Why We Have an Electoral College (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2001), 115-120.
IMMIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS WITHIN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

In a post-9/11 society, increased attention is placed on the security of the state and the state's preservation of its culture. Additionally, this dynamic has raised problems from the perspective of democratic rights and freedoms as a result of fears that immigrants might bring with them extremism and counter-cultural elements from their home countries, particularly those in the Middle East. Europe has tried to negotiate between economic growth through migration, and maintaining security alongside a commitment to multicultural policies. While the Schengen border-free zone has been expanded to include virtually all of continental Europe, the United Kingdom believes it has found an alternative solution to these long-standing issues: let them in. The result: the British Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (HSMIP), an immigration system modeled after the Australian and Canadian systems.

Since its inception, the U.K. has remained on the periphery of E.U. ever skeptical and occasionally resentful of supranational authority (Kinsella, Russett, Starr 412). Through member states have the right to devise and implement immigration policies of their own, the British points system violates several existing agreements within the EU, agreements the U.K. claims it supports. This conflict between U.K. immigration policy and E.U. ideals presents human rights concerns, especially in cases involving refugees and asylum-seekers; it seems cold to ask how many "points" an individual life is worth to the state? Moreover, this policy provides a basis for a clash with the European Commission, as well as future grounds for Britain to challenge the increasingly unpopular influx of Eastern Europeans immigrating through the E.U. Charter of Fundamental Rights (Treaty 16).

Between 1993 and 1998, the number of immigrants to the U.K. more than doubled, and in 1999, the number of asylum-seekers increased sharply. This presented a new problem for the Labour party and its immigration agenda. As a legislatively-based agenda for combating racism and xenophobia in their member states. Simultaneously, the United Kingdom began to devise a points-based system of immigration that violates the very values and policies the E.U. had prioritized. As the E.U. continues to let the autonomy of member states overtake their supranational agenda, the result is discrimination, inequity, and the maintenance of centuries of prejudice between cultures that have continue to affect contemporary foreign relations and immigration policy across Europe.

Beth Coleman

IMMIGRATION IN THE EU AND THE UK.

questions are, thus, raised: does U.K. immigration policy violate E.U. protections for human rights? And will those policies threaten relations with the E.U. and its member states? According to Berita Ferreira-Waldner, European Commissioner of External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy.

Human rights are the cornerstone of the European Union’s foreign policy. Is it in the political dialogue between the European Union holds with third countries, in the international agreements it concludes, in its development cooperation or its action in the multilateral fora such as the United Nations, the European Union seeks to uphold the universality and indivisibility of human rights – civil, political, economic, social, and cultural – as reaffirmed by the 1993 World Conference of Human Rights in Vienna. The protection of human rights, together with the promotion of pluralistic democracy and effective guarantees for the rule of law and the fight against poverty are among the European Union’s essential objectives (European Commission 2006).

By addressing the civil and fundamental rights of citizens, the European Commission finally examined the dynamics of internal migration from a broad perspective and began to understand how third-country nationals and external migration affect the socioeconomic profiles of its member states. The resulting image was that of an aging Europe with declining birth rates, struggling to retain and recruit the skilled workers and professionals necessary for industrial development – conditions that could potentially lead to the skilled labor shortage known as “Brain Drain.” Migrants also saw social disintegration along the fault lines of religion, race, and class because of immigration and discriminated erosion of protective multicultural policies within most member states. In response, the E.U. committed itself to equal opportunity employment for all people, and to non-discrimination in all matters dealing with external foreign relations, as well as a legislative agenda to combat racism and xenophobia in their member states. Simultaneously, however, the United Kingdom began to devise a points-based program of immigration that violates the very values and policies the E.U. had prioritized. As the E.U. continues to let the autonomy of member states override their supranational agenda, the result is discrimination, inequity, and the maintenance of centuries of prejudice between cultures that have continue to affect contemporary foreign relations and immigration policy across Europe.

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granted citizenship. Points are assigned to a particular applicant on the basis of his or her age, level of educational attainment (at least a Bachelor's/four-year degree is generally required,) earning power, U.K. experience, English proficiency, and region of origin. There are 5 income categories that divide minimum earning power by region, category A being the most developed countries like the U.S. and France and Category E containing developing nations such as Nigeria and Afghanistan.) Preference is given to the most advantaged of applicants from each category. In addition to earning points, candidates are completely disqualified if they have ever been bankrupt, convicted of a crime, or would be dependent for any time on government aid (Home Office of the United Kingdom 2007).

The points system does not just filter out low-skilled persons from the developing world, but is rather generous in its elimination of future laborers from across Europe as well. Applicants in their diaries only have a value of 5 points, and those who don't have an MBA from a prominent graduate school (specifically listed by the Home Office), or do not speak English as their primary language, have virtually no chance of gaining a visa. Select individuals may qualify for a temporary 12-month unskilled work visa if they are married, with no dependents, under the age of 27, and never intend on applying for permanent residency within the UK. Beginning in 2008, these standards will be applied to all visas issued within the U.K. with the introduction of a graduated system that will phase in the same standards for scientists, doctors, teachers, graduate students, undergraduate transfers, and asylum-seekers attempting to establish residency. The government will annually issue a number of visas for each category, with the greatest number of visas reserved for science professionals and the least for refugees (Macleod 1). By late 2009, experts say that the flow of migration will be cut in half from its peak in 1999 (Macleod 90). In a change that will affect many, the policy no longer guarantees long-term residency to the immediate family members of U.K. citizens. Additionally, under the extended HSMP, there is no appeals track for rejected applicants.

THE IMPACT OF THE POINT SYSTEM ON INTERNAL E.U. RELATIONS

Policy Impact on the United Kingdom

Though it may seem a logical first step towards solving Britain's labor and population crisis, we see that the U.K. loses many qualified workers to other developed nations such as France and Germany, and attracts the largest number of low-skilled workers from Eastern Europe of any E.U. country. By implementing restrictions on inward migration, the U.K. is failing to address the issue of retention in an attempt to incentivize growth, and exacerbating existing conflict by creating a public-opinion driven policy that feeds into anti-

by its citizens, the state must stand behind supranational mandates with vigor an energy rather than adopting policies that meet the bare minimum membership standards. Moreover, the effectiveness of a diplomatic strategy designed merely to save face among E.U. elites remains questionable amid severe enforcement tactics, for instance, the recent dawn raids that physically removed illegal residents from their homes and families for immediate deportation (Gordon 1). U.K. immigration policies raise questions about its commitment to E.U. human rights doctrines and its willingness to fulfill standards regarding the social equality of non-European citizens.

As mentioned earlier, dawn raids and racial profiling are already being used as tools for the recognition and deportation of asylum-seekers including Sudanese refugees that are being detained and sent back to Darfur. Scotland also seems to have encountered a large number of legal African and Caribbean immigrants overstaying their visas because they do not feel they can safely return home. As of 2006, nearly 1,000 asylum-seeking families faced the possibility of being forcibly extracted from their homes under the cover of darkness for immediate deportation back to their country of origin (Gordon 1). The majority of these were women and children who would otherwise be provided minimal provisions of safety and legal rights under the Hague Programme of 2004. Within the Hague Programme, the Receptions Conditions clause guarantees asylum-seekers adequate housing, food, and health care within member states for the duration of their application process. Britain does theoretically provide this. Detained asylum-seekers are put in a reception security facility, provided military ration, and given emergency medical treatment if it becomes necessary. Were the U.K. to abide to the spirit of the law instead of its minimum legal requirements, its changes of deeper E.U. integration would improve alongside the treatment of prospective immigrants.

Policy Impact on Prospective Immigrants

Currently, the point system takes the greatest toll on those individuals attempting to emigrate from Africa, particularly countries pressured by the European Neighborhood policy that reaches out to countries bordering member states in hopes of enhancing regional security and cooperation. The United Kingdom receives particularly large numbers of migrants from countries in North Africa of E.U. member states presently, after 2008, however, it is reasonable to expect those numbers to fall below other countries that attract residents of the Maghreb, France and Germany in particular. When we examine the current cultural violence in Paris, and Germany's increasingly assertive policing of Islamic extremism, it is safe to conclude that the welcome must not be extended gratuitously to asylum-seekers denied their petitions in Britain—what will also affect Britain's popularity with other member states. In all, those needing to leave their countries the most will find it harder than ever to find a new home. Prospective migrants in Britain's former colonies, in

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contrast (many of them quite stable, safe, prosperous) will have the easiest
time.

Policy Impact on the European Union

The E.U. has also established a commitment to students, and has
commited to providing equal opportunity for study irrespective of nationality.
In Council Directive 2004/11/CE, the E.U. mandates the qualifications and
handling procedures for third-country nationals seeking higher education
opportunities in excess of one year. This law was due to be transposed by
member states in November 2007, and has been by ratified by the United
Kingdom. However, the points system once again allows the U.K. to skirt
superfluous mandates by allotting quotas for the varying categories of
immigration. Students are only ahead of refugees in terms of the number of
available visas as a result, once the state’s quota has been filled, prospective
students will be denied the opportunity to study in the academic year of
their choosing. This is especially damaging to U.S. students seeking enriched
opportunities abroad in their late undergraduate years, as well as graduate
students who operate on a strict academic time schedule. It is also harmful to
colleges and universities in the U.K., which rely heavily on the patronage of
international students to finance and enrich their departments.

Through the ENP instituted in 2004, the Union committed itself to
extending a privileged relationship to those countries immediately bordering
member states, including Libya, Algeria, and Morocco, three of the major
contributors to the UK’s migrant inflow. This plan was a strategic diplomatic
effort to strengthen relations between member states and neighboring
countries, both in terms of economic and political cooperation. By
implementing a plan that benefits citizens from these regions (they belong in
the lowest earning power categories of the point system), it provides a basis for
greater social class, and contradicts the diplomatic efforts of the E.U. to
expand its influence and development in these areas. Typically, close to 90%
of those wishing to emigrate from these countries to the U.K. fall into the
student and asylum-seeker categories, which are of lower priority under the
Labour Party’s graduated points system. U.K. policies almost seem to be
designed to undermine E.U. priorities. In the most recent report issued by the
European Commission on the progress of the ENP, it stated that certain
elements were vital to the success and advancement of the project—specifically
greater cooperation between members, neighbors, and the creation of a
transparent civil society of member states.

Civil society contracts are gaining in intensity and variety through the
acts by individuals, organizations, businesses and local and
regional authorities. The role of the Commission and the Member
States in the civil society dimension is primarily as facilitators,
First, if the E.U. executive continues to tolerate the United Kingdom’s consistent aphytic and flagrant violation of superintendental authority, they risk losing credibility and authority over other member states struggling with similar problems. Currently, France is also experiencing conflict regarding immigration, social inequality, and the preservation of indigenous political culture. If Britain can successfully control and reduce diversity in their country at the expense of human rights, then the current conservative administration in France might be emboldened to institute a similar policy of its own. President Nicolas Sarkozy has not even attempted to make a secret of his personal distaste for the immigrant “scum” plaguing French suburbs. Judging from the most recent round of youth riots, and escalating violence towards police, it is highly possible that the French parliament could be open to such provocative public policy measures simply to restore calm and stability to these areas. Additionally, if matters such as age and country of origin are permitted to be criteria for evaluating an individual’s prospective utility to the state, countries like the U.K., France, Germany, and Spain may use their immigration systems to further exclude Islam from European society.

Recall, too, the earning power and income variable previously mentioned in the point system; several of the developing countries listed in the lowest levels of preference and economic consideration are also primarily Muslim. European (and primarily Christian) states could use the income requirements for immigration as an excuse to filter out those individuals who allegedly pose the greatest threat to their sociopolitical culture and security. The E.U.’s policies, designed in part to achieve some level of multicultural diversity, should not be ignored without objection from Brussels.

Second, acquiescing to a policy that removes much-needed agricultural workers from Scotland may bolster Scottish desire to separate from the U.K. and create yet another membership candidate for the E.U., with few resources to contribute and heavy needs for supranational subsidies and assistance. In January of 2007, the E.C. alerted the Scottish National Party that it would encounter more difficulty than they advertised when trying to seek membership. Not only have the effects on Scotland’s agriculture industry been condemned, but the public has also been galvanized against the points system by the inhumane treatment of illegal immigrants in the region. Beginning with the highly publicized 2005 case of an Albanian family who were apprehended in one of its infamous dawn raids, Scots have been sensitive to their own immigrant heritage and the ethical treatment of policy violators. The infant state would have to compete with Eastern European nations for resources and attention, as well as gain the approval of the French electorate if recently passed a measure prohibiting E.U. expansion until approved by a French referendum.

Third, both the European Union and the United Kingdom would be invalidating their own claims as champions of humanitarianism and liberal ideology in the international community. For the U.K., they would be directly damaging the lives of individuals and families seeking protection within their borders. Sylvia Vojcic, a thirteen-year-old girl deported from Glasgow to Kosovo described her circumstances to the media as “terrifying.” Her story alerted the public to a wave of kidnappings in her Albanian neighborhood—the girls kidnapped to sell as sex slaves—and described the desparate plight of her family in Kosovo since being extracted from their U.K. home of five years. Countless asylum-seekers from across the globe living in the U.K. on temporary visas live in daily fear of being torn from their lives in the developed world to be delivered back into countries whose dangers and political upheaval they barely escaped. Not asylum-seekers also suffer. Students, even well-seasoned professionals, from developed and developing nations will increasingly be denied the opportunity to pursue disciplinary and economic advancement in one of the wealthiest and most developed countries in the world. By its inaction, the European Union would effectively be supporting a policy that is in direct contradiction to its purported commitment to human rights. Furthermore, it would be supporting a policy that demonstrates a clear prejudice against specific ethnic groups in spite of its commitment to multiculturalism and diversity.

CONCLUSION

Finally, it is worth noting that an expanded points system is “bad business” on the part of the U.K. Not only does the policy directly contradict key policies within the E.U., this further attempt to set itself apart from an alleged “Union” will succeed in doing precisely that. As previously noted, other states have resolved similar problems in their labor markets, as well as their security concerns, without trampling on what should be considered foundational E.U. rights. The diplomatic, social, human, and supranational costs of the points policy will undoubtedly alter the landscape of European politics if it continues toward full implementation. Citizenship is not a recognized human right, but it is only right that a state view immigrants not as potential resources for the state, but as humans—as people with lives, values, and the capacity to make non-monetary contributions to civil society. How the E.U. chooses to deal with this conflict may result in any one of several possible outcomes. If they continue to turn a blind eye to the situation in the name of member autonomy, then other states will begin to pursue the same immigration system in the name of nationalism or economic strife. In this case, such discussion will lead to one of two outcomes: a wholesale reconsideration of the E.U. approach to external migration and human rights policy, or a final showdown between the E.U. and the U.K., the outcome of which will demonstrate which legislative power reigns supreme. If a compromise solution is not reached—the U.K. could, for instance, distribute the number of visas evenly among HSMP categories and loosen income restrictions on prospective

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migrants—there would seem to be two possible ways for this ideological crisis to be resolved. The European Council could move to limit states' ability to opt-out of certain separational agreements such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights or the United Kingdom could be ejected from the Union entirely, thus losing the economic benefits of remaining a part of the E.U. The stakes are high, and the most satisfactory and democratic outcome is undoubtedly the compromise.

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Imperium et Sacerdotium: Universalism, Fragmentation, and New Medievalism

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Contemporary international relations theory suffers from a stubborn reliance on the Westphalian notion of the state system. Theoretically, the sovereign state is the supreme political unit in world politics and is the only political unit with access to international decision-making. However, in the real world, globalization has led to the development of a myriad of transnational associations. Added to the complex of regional, international, and even supranational governing structures, these organizations and associations have created a web of interaction that works above, below, and across states. While skeptics question the political ramifications of globalization, it is without doubt that modern world politics is rife with non-state actors. Simultaneously, states suffer from increasing rates of internal disintegration along social, ethnic, and national lines. It seems then that world politics is experiencing, simultaneously, increasing interdependence fueled by globalization, as well as significant rates of disintegration across the globe. In the meantime, states have yet to give up their position of primacy in world politics and remain the supreme political organization. Yet Westphalian notions of the state system cannot account for the introduction of so many political forces above, below, and across state boundaries. A new framework must be established that better explains the phenomenon of global interconnectedness, interstate dissolution, and widespread faith in the state system. This paper suggests a New Medievalism as a viable alternative.

Key Words: Westphalian system, globalization, political disintegration, New Medievalism

**Introduction: The End of Westphalia**

International relations theory considers the state to be the prime unit of political organization. While political divisions may divide national authorities and responsibilities within the state, and international and transnational organizations may attempt to coordinate or persuade from above, the state itself remains the locus of sovereign authority and loyalty. This design, known

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as the Westphalian system, supposedly did away with the confusion and disinclinations of the complex medieval system of feudal realms within the social and imperial domains of Western Christendom.

However, as the adage goes, history repeats itself, and politics is certainly not immune. While Marx argued that history was the struggle between social classes, it has also been a struggle at a higher, less direct level. The dichotomy of classes within societies is paralleled in world politics by the struggle between forces of cultural cosmopolitanism and distingiveness, the latter of which usually manifests itself politically, while the former can manifest itself within other social facets, such as religion or economics.

What, then, does this mean for the state? While states remain, in international relations, sovereign powers, on an individual level they compete especially in nationally-homogeneous states, ethnic or cultural divisions, both of which can disturb the supposed absolute authority and loyalty of the state. These developments are clearly seen in the increasing width and depth of economic, social, cultural, and technological globalization, as well as the frequent disfranchising of states torn asunder on identity grounds. This has led to a growing focus on identity-based policies, such as multiculturalism, and the recognition of linguistic diversity as a legitimate expression of cultural identity.

Friedrichs developed the concept of "new medievalism" to address the challenges faced by states in the modern world. The concept of a "new medievalism" is a response to the changing dynamics of international politics, where the traditional concept of sovereignty is no longer sufficient to address the complex and interconnected nature of global politics. The concept of "new medievalism" emphasizes the need for states to adapt to new forms of political organization and governance, which are characterized by a greater degree of interdependence and interconnection.


2 Benjamin Rother tightly covered the simultaneous rise in the intensity of globalization and fragmentation in The New World: A World in Crisis, 1993, p. 15. Anyone as well as the front-page stories on the mechanics of information superhighway and the economics of communication networks, anyone who turns diligently to take a look at what in billions of messages the Business Times in the first 300-degree bottom, he wrote, "knows that our world and our lives are shaped by the political and social changes reflecting the tribal past, and that of soul anticipating the cosmopolitan future." 3-4.


5 Bull, Anarchical Society, 198, 266.

6 Ibid, 275.

DEFINING "NEW MEDIEVALISM"

Medieval politics was more than just decentralized feudalism. Medieval lords (dukes, barons, earls, etc.) had significant autonomy over their local territories and populations of serfs and villagers, not to mention the service of a private armed force. However, the lord's power was exercised over a fief, granted to him by a higher lord, usually the king. This created a complex—potentially conflicting—system of hierarchy. Moreover, the complexity of nobility led to political divisions at multiple levels, which led to multiple allegiances for noble and sovereign alike.

It was this complex arrangement that Arnold Wolfers described when he first coined and defined "new medievalism": a situation of the line between domestic and foreign policy. Later, Hedley Bull, a prominent IR theorist of the English School, contributed significantly to the development of the concept of new medievalism in his magnum opus, The Anarchical Society. Here, he considered the possibility of a "secular reincarnation of the system of overlapping or segmented authority that characterized medieval Christendom" in the modern world. Based on the criteria—regional integration of states, disintegration of states, the restoration of private international violence, transnational organizations (multinational corporations), and the technological unification of the world—he ultimately concluded that "If some of the trends towards a 'new medievalism', were to go much further, such a situation might come about, but it would be going beyond the evidence to conclude that 'groups other than the state' have made such introductions on the sovereignty of states that the state system is now giving way to this alternative." Thirty years later, the trends he perceived have unfolded further and important new ones have begun to affect the Westphalian system in interesting ways.

Friedrichs provided a breakthrough development for new medievalism in his 2001 article, "The Meaning of New Medievalism." Medieval politics was a complex web of overlapping authorities and allegiances, but there were more to it than that. Wolfers, Bull, and others believe Friedrichs had left out the most significant social characteristic of medieval Europe: Christianity. Politics ski

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not stop at the level of kings; above them was pope, the sovereign of the Church and God’s representative on earth, and the Holy Roman Emperor, his secular counterpart. These two formed what Friedrichs called “a duality of competing universalistic claims” whereby “in addition to the centrifugal forces of fragmented political entities there was a strong countervailing tendency of ecclesiastical and secular universalism that generated a considerable degree of cohesiveness” despite the multiplicity of political authorities to which various communities were also loyalty.

New Medievalism, therefore, is a complex system of overlapping authorities and loyalties held in check by competing universal claims. Importantly, the concept itself allows for multiple interpretations on the important question of what authorities and loyalties are politically meaningful. It is not a rejection of the state as a significant player in world politics, as some have suggested. Moreover, it is important to note that new medievalism does not predict the rise of major imperial powers or the re-establishment of an assertively political religion making universalist claims. Rather, this is a sociopolitical critique, calling for a re-establishment of feudalism, monarchy, aristocracy, or any such characteristic of the Middle Ages. Furthermore, as John Rapley has pointed out, it does not imply a cultural Dark Age. Rather, new medievalism uses the basic characteristics of the global medieval order to analyze the contemporary international system. Thus, this paper maintains the viability of the state system (internationalism) as a major component of world politics, yet also considers the increasingly political nature of the global market (internationalism) as competing universal claims. Moreover, this competition leads to the devolution of power from the centralized authority, and the dispersal of loyalty, thus accounting for the multiple sources of authority and feel of loyalty that once pervaded today beyond the state.

Of course, the “new medievalism” argument hinges on a persuasive demonstration that the state system has actually declined on the one hand, as well as the argument that the market can make real politics—as opposed to just economic, social, or cultural—claims on states and their citizens. In terms of international relations theory, new medievalism regards the interaction of non-state political communities or forces, not just governmental institutions, as an important variable in the international system, something the traditional understanding of the state system neglects. New medievalism offers an explanatory framework that accounts for new competing universalist claims as well as the breakdown of the state as the locus of authority and loyalty. In its broader sense, the duality of competing universalist claims comprises Inception of Sovereignty. This duality can be seen through several prevalent trends in world politics that are specific representations of the overall picture.

STATE VERSUS NATIONAL IDENTITY

In a true nation-state, individual loyalty to his nation should coincide with the authority his state exercises upon him—for example, a Frenchman is first and foremost loyal to France and recognizes the legitimacy of France’s political claims. Increasingly, however, individuals are finding sources of authority and loyalties beyond (or below) the state. This can be seen at the subnational, international, and supranational levels.

A nation-state requires a nationally homogeneous populace. Throughout the Western world, “people who identified themselves as nationals sought their own states,” a trend that continued through the twentieth century. In these cases, the state, including its territory, was defined by national loyalties and sentiments. However, in regions outside Europe, particularly in Africa, states govern nationally heterogeneous territories, encompassing multiple nationalities, ethnicities, and even politically autonomous regions themselves organized around claims to nationhood. Bull argued that “out of the demands of the Welsh, the Basques, the Quebecs, the Flemish and others, there may arise qualitative changes in the states system,” which would lead to a nonnational arrangement. Friedrichs claimed that in the “contemporary world the hegemonic claim posed by the nation-state system does not hold anymore,” particularly because so few nation-states exist. “Older conceptions...
of political order along ethnic, cultural, and religious lines begin to reemerge, particularly in the periphery but also in the Western world. The failure of arbitrarily drawn borders throughout Africa, the Balkans, and the Middle East, among other regions, shows the political utility of an alignment between nationhood and state boundary.

Aristotle wrote that the statesman “has to consider the size of the state, and whether it should consist of more than one nation or not.” However, given the rapid rate of globalization and the increased ease of travel, it might also be possible to draw lines around and within nations, taking in many states or dividing a state into several nations. In most cases, borders could be drawn around districts according to the majority population’s national identity. Aristotle’s preferred identity between the two no longer exists in much of the world. The breakdown of nationally heterogeneous states, as seen in Eastern Europe and central Asia after the Cold War, does not necessarily realign the state system by creating such an identity of nation and state either. Populations change and their beliefs and identities shift, especially in the modern era. Globalization leads to mixing of populations (what some have called citizens of the global society or consumers in McWorld) while claims to statehood based on ethnicity, language, tribal heritage or shared history continue to create fissures at lower and lower levels.

Even in (relatively) stable parts of the world, questions of identity raise doubts about the dominant I.R. theories. Consider European citizenship, effectively written into the Maastricht treaty. This was achieved in practice by the development of individual rights under the E.U. framework that superseded national rights. One provision—the most important right of E.U. citizens is to live and work in any of the 12 countries that do not apply to citizens of those countries”—cannot but contribute to the continued erosion of internal borders within the E.U. Add to the mix the E.U.’s Committee of the Regions, “established in response to a growing demand for greater regional autonomy and a corresponding belief that, as regions grow

19 Feierabend, “Meaning,” 484.
18 By no means was this an inevitable conflict between state sovereignty and national sovereignty, see J. Samuel Barker and Bruce Cumings, The State and the Nation: Changing Notions and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations,” International Organization 48.1 (1994), 107-150.
16 Wood and Yegehida, Emerging European Union, 109. Tove H. Miltby, “National Minority Regions’ in the Enlarged European Union: Mobilizing for Third Level Political” (working paper, European Center for Minority Issues, Flensburg, Denmark, July 2003) offers a significant introduction and analysis of the European Union concept of “regions,” while examining specific regions and their impact on EU decision making. (It is interesting to note that he establishes European regions as a third level of politics, along with the state and the international organization.) For some brief remarks on the Committee of the Regions, see also Gian Luigi Tassoni, “The Vertical Distribution of Competences in the EU Draft Constitutional Text,” The International Quarterly 2 (2003), 51, 57.

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constitute the transnational market economy.21 Territory, population, and resources—traditionally considered the foundations of state sovereignty—are now being contested not only between states but also among corporations and between states and corporations. This breakdown of the world into two interconnected, competing realms presents an interesting situation for world politics. As economic matters such as movement of capital and labor fall out of the purview of states, they bring along with them political matters such as definitions of territorial boundaries, citizenship, and tax base jurisdiction. This leads to two trends: fragmentation along socioeconomic lines rather than political ones, and economic universalism as states lose power and authority to clearly define their own national economic policies vis-à-vis global policy.

The real tragedy of the demise of the state via the global market is that the states themselves have permitted it, and in most cases, promoted it, even if unconsciously. This occurs in two ways. First, states adjust their economic policies so as to attract jobs creating infant industries.22 Because foreign and direct investors are increasingly able to use the threat to exit [the country] as a method to leverage beneficial tax and labor policies,23 Gellenny and McCoy have argued, "government policy independence is held hostage to market forces if they wish to maintain a high level of investment."22 As they point out, this leads to the proverbial "race to the bottom" as states bankrupt themselves financially and morally, selling sovereignty and capability for the economic benefits of giant finns. Keith Suter adds that as states offer lower and lower tax rates, funds for services become more and more scarce, causing two problems for the state: first, it can no longer afford to provide basic services for its citizens; and second, individuals become more loyal to the private companies and organizations that fill the service vacuum.24 Lower taxes mean more pocket money for individuals and the world markets they control.22 This extra money in the hands of individuals and corporations has helped to finance a vast consumer expansion over the past three decades or so, there also are shortages in essential services and infrastructure.25 Compounding this problem is the political nature of the problem: "No politician in the English-
BACK TO THE FUTURE: THE POTENTIAL OF NEW MEDIEVALISM

"One reason why European integrationists are and such groups as the Quebecois and the Basques (let us call them 'unintegrationists') are drawn towards solutions which would result simply in the creation of new sovereign states is the tyranny of existing concepts and practices," Hedley Bull wrote.

The momentum of the state system sets up a circle (vicious or virtuous according to the point of view) within which movements for the creation of new political communities tend to be confined. Perhaps the time is ripe for the enumeration of new concepts of universal political organization which would show how Wales, the United Kingdom and the European Community could each have some world political status while not laid claim to exclusive sovereignty.25

If the European Union, what began as an economic union designed to allow the states to retain autonomy over economic actors by agreeing to cooperative action in a limited sphere, continues to develop into a political union, it could reach a supranational position held only by medieval empires.

Closing off the straitjacket of state-centric thought could also lead to more innovative methods of handling sub-Sahara Africa, Eastern Europe, and other parts of the world plagued by interstate conflicts, civil war, and ethno-nationalist secession movements. Clearly in these areas maintaining the status quo is futile, even at a systemic level. The state system is one of many Western inventions forced on these peoples, and to reconsider ancient structures and arrangements may not be the worst idea. Complete fragmentation should not be allowed, but prolonging the inevitable is pointless, foolish, and cruel.

Beyond its status as an ever-deepening IGO, the EU holds other promising potential models for a post-state, neo-medieval world system. The example of the European Union's Committee of the Regions has already been offered as a potential method of handling intra-state tension, while the EU itself is a promising method to combat transnational problems. But the implications are far more than just political: the economic effects of understanding world politics beyond the sovereign state could lead to reforms in global trade, fiscal policy, and international aid that may be far more beneficial. But this first requires an end to the tyranny of the Westphalian system. Instead of assuming that state sovereignty is absolute, a permanent feature of the international system, students of international relations, world politics, and global economics would benefit from creative new thinking. In particular, they should devote more time to contemplating improved transnational and subnational arrangements and institutions better suited to addressing problems that do not respect the obsolete borders of the Westphalian system.


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Whythier Toqueville's 'Seed of Free Institutions'? The Importance and Decline of Localism in America

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Alexis de Toqueville argues that local government is the "seed of free institutions." On his account, active participation by citizens at the local level helps guard against the three great dangers to modern democratic regimes: sum of selfish preferences majoritarianism, tyranny of the majority, and mild despotism. This paper traces the decline of localism in the United States—an inevitable consequence of trends Toqueville foresees—and comments on the consequences, both from the perspective of the political community and from the perspective of individuals pursuing a decent and happy life.

Keywords: Toqueville, local government, tyranny of the majority, mild despotism, civic participation

Written some hundred and seventy years ago, by a Frenchman visiting the United States for the first time and for only a brief time, many still believe Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America to be "at once the best book ever written on democracy and the best book ever written on democracy." How can it be that a commentary about Jacksonian America—written before the Civil War, before industrialization to say nothing of subsequent technological revolutions; before the great migration to the cities; before revolutionary Progressive thinkers and their compelling arguments for a much more powerful national government—remains one of the most important books ever written about free government? In part, no doubt, for the prescient warnings Toqueville offers—about the dangers of industrialization and the attendant threat of materialism, the dangers of democracy's particular habits of mind, in particular equality, and related to this, the dangers of administrative centralization. Democracy in America is as much about maintaining healthy democratic government generally as it is about the particular exemplary

democracy that inspired Toqueville's book. Nothing, for Toqueville, is as important in this respect as local government.

Toqueville's appreciation that democratic reform in Europe was a "universal" and "providential fact", even "an irresistible fact against which it would be neither desirable nor wise to struggle" was the reason he wrote. For he realized that what we have lost sight of today: democracy is not unambiguously desirable as invincible historical development. When he writes that "to wish to stop democracy would... be to struggle against God himself" he is expressing the sad recognition that much of the brilliance of aristocratic Europe could not be saved no matter how heroic the efforts. For all the good democracy might bring, Toqueville also understood its potential to do violence to the human soul. His time in America, where "democracy such as antiquity had not dared to dream of sprung full-grown and fully-armed," had taught him that the revolution he was witnessing could turn out to be "dangerous or fatal to humanity," an outcome he very much wished to help subsequent generations avoid.

Modern readers are distinguished to take this possibility seriously. For it is the very ideal in the service of which grand revolutions shattered the old era, and in the service of which the regimes of the new era have been fashioned, that itself threatened, according to Toqueville, to become a poison. With unprecedented opportunity and class mobility so democratic centuries threatened to unleash the "depraved taste for equality in the human heart." Toqueville feared that by reducing men "to preferring equality in servitude to inequality in freedom" a new form of despotism might emerge—wilder than any before it, but also more pervasive and thoroughgoing.

Thus, Toqueville's provocative argument that the democratic social state has the potential to ruin communities, erode family life, sap individual ambition and initiative, and all but close off the kinds of excellence that redeems human life must be taken all the more seriously today, however uncomfortable it may be. Guarding against the potentially catastrophic effects of this new idea was, after all, Toqueville's reason for writing. As one commentator explains, the primary question for Toqueville, much as it had been for Rousseau (whose ideas literally pervade Democracy in America), "is whether freedom can accompany equality or [whether] universal tyranny will result from it." To this, one could do worse than add Allan Bloom's striking observation that "It is the transformation of free men and free communities founded on egalitarian principles to which both Rousseau and Toqueville are
determined. Toqueville aimed to establish a new political science for the altogether new world that had issued from a revolution in power that had already occurred, one that would lead, he was persuaded, to the proliferation of an egalitarian social state throughout the Western world. From it, he warned, a new form of despotism might just as well issue as free government arranged according to the principle of consent. As he put it, it is because he is a friend of democracy that he is so often to hazard with it—hazardously pointing out looming dangers, strengthening its bulwarks, and teaching his successors—if only they will listen—how to maintain the blessings of liberty they enjoy.

Those bulwarks and supporters came relatively easily in America at the beginning. The circumstances surrounding the settlement of New England and the nation’s birth, moreover, made the country exceptional in a number of ways. The abundance of land, the absence of an established central authority, a climate and soil replete to “territorial aristocracy,” the economic equality reigning among the first settlers, the “greater mass of enlightenment” present, and most importantly, an established habit of self-government at the level of the township and the peculiar character and ubiquity of America’s religious sects helped make the Founding of the United States a “singular phenomenon,” once which has yet to be repeated. In prose strikingly reminiscent of Rousseau’s Social Contract, Toqueville describes the genesis of the New England township: “We, the consent of the whole, unite ourselves together into a civil body politic, for our better ordering and preservation, and for our safety, to frame such just and equal laws, ordinances, acts, and decrees.” Thus, Partisan Review, “almost as much a political theory as a religious doctrine.”

As political scientists are noting increasingly today, the Enlightenment ideals of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau were important to the American Revolution and subsequent establishment of democracy in the new world, but they tended to be discredited and to gain resonance in hearts and minds thanks largely to similar ideas promulgated from the pulpit.

Americans recognized, and acted upon, “the right to form themselves into a political society—” and to govern themselves in everything that was not contrary to its laws” because they believed their religion demanded it. The New England township was the result; township government meant communities were free as they governed themselves locally. Toqueville goes far as liken township government to the very “seed of free institutions.”

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2 Alexis de Toqueville, Democracy in America, 27-8.
3 Alexis de Toqueville, Democracy in America, 35.
4 Alexis de Toqueville, Democracy in America, 29.

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TOQUEVILLE’S AMERICA: THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ASSOCIATIONS

Toqueville’s emphasis on the importance of local government is implicit and wide-ranging. He argues that the township constitutes a bulwark against what threatens democracy most: (1) classical forms of tyranny and despotism; (2) the excesses of popular government, most especially tyranny of the majority; and (3), the soft, humane, but pervasive despotism that arises from the combination of rampant individualism and administrative centralization.

In the first place, political instability has been the perennial problem for republican government. Faction represents majority rule in Athens more than once; for instance, the reign of the thirty tyrants saw leading Athenians who might oppose them summarily executed. Rome, that most famous of ancient republics and (one the most often on the Founders’ minds), was plagued by civil unrest for almost as long as it was a republic. Popular rule was often interrupted by the appointment of a dictator whose power was absolute—extending even to the right of execution without appeal. More than once, the struggle between Plebeians and Patricians led to the suspension, even to the expulsion, of the state’s representatives (the Senate, the Assembly, and the Tribunes), as, for instance, when the Decemvirs under Appius Claudius usurped the executive and legislative authorities in 451 BC. As everyone knows, Rome finally gave up her republican character under Julius Caesar, and was, under many of her Emperors, a particularly brutal and despotic regime. What must be noted is that ordinary Roman citizens acquiesced to Caesar’s ascent; they willingly ceded their liberties (and their duties as Republicans), to obey, with enthusiasm, a tyrant’s rise.

In short, popular government is often said to have the defense of its citizens’ equality and the liberty as its end, but historically, the success of such regimes has been questionable because the regimes themselves have been, for a variety of reasons, very unstable. Indeed, in a discussion of “the matter of tyranny’s coming into being,” Plato noted “it is pretty plain that it [tyranny] is transformed out of democracy.” In the context of the history of democracy, then, the American experience is truly exceptional. For by the time Toqueville was writing, the American regime had already accomplished something utterly unprecedented. What Thomas Jefferson refers to as the “Revolution of 1800”—a peaceful and bloodless transfer of political authority from one political faction to it rival the likes of which had been unseen up to that point in history—would soon become commonplace, both in America and throughout the western democratic world. Commenting on the event,
Jefferson was right to remark, "this whole chapter in the history of man is new."\textsuperscript{10} Why is not tyranny an omnipresent threat in modern democracies as it was in the classical republics? Most importantly, perhaps, Tocqueville believes a small national authority to be an important prerequisite for liberty. He remarks, for instance, that "in most European nations, political existence began in the higher regions of society... In America, on the contrary, one can say that the township had been organized before the country, the country before the state, the state before the Union."\textsuperscript{11} Precisely because there was no powerful national authority in place, the first Americans were supremely fortunate to find themselves governing themselves with very few restrictions imposed upon them by an authority external to their relatively small and homogeneous community; that is, in America, "political life was born in the very bosom of the township."\textsuperscript{12}

More than this, however, the habit of local self-government served to inoculate in Americans the desire (and the experience which would be necessary) to govern themselves democratically at higher levels. "In the heart of the township", Tocqueville argues, "one sees a real, active, altogether democratic and republican political life reigning."\textsuperscript{13} In short, the experience of local government serves to provide citizens with the political education requisite to govern themselves at higher levels. From the very beginning, Americans learned (by practice) that "each individual forms an equal portion of the sovereign and participates equally in the government of the state."\textsuperscript{14}

In other words, they learn much more than administrative skills; most importantly, they learn that legitimate political authority resides with the people—and with each individual equally. Enclosed by the habit of local government at the level of the township, this "dogma" is the reason "the townships have remained independent bodies". Americans came to believe they had a right to govern themselves. This universal opinion constitutes the basis of Tocqueville's observation that "one encounters no one among the inhabitants of New England... who recognizes in the government of the state the right to intervene in the direction of interests that are purely the township's."\textsuperscript{15} It is an opinion to which Americans adhere passionately, one that taught them to be dubious of far-flung authority. Democratic government, they learned, means self-government according to local laws, one's own laws. They learned to regard as morally legitimate only government

\textsuperscript{10} Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Joseph Priestly, 21 March, 1801.
\textsuperscript{11} Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 40.
\textsuperscript{12} Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 35.
\textsuperscript{13} Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 40.
\textsuperscript{14} Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 61.
\textsuperscript{15} Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 62.

in which they participate and to which they actively give their consent—if not personally, then through representatives they have elected personally.

Having grown accustomed to (and capable of) governing themselves at the local level, it was only natural that Americans would govern themselves in the manner at the national level once independence was formally secured. As Tocqueville recounts the story, "The American Revolution broke out. The dogma of the sovereignty of the people came out of the township and took hold of the government; all classes committed themselves to its cause, they did combat and they triumphed in its name. It became the law of laws."\textsuperscript{16} In short, that Americans are committed to the (Enlightenment) belief that legitimate sovereign authority resides with the people—and that an administration that lacks popular mandate can never be legitimate—constitutes the most powerful bulwark against tyranny. Rule by any authority not justified by this "law of laws" can never be legitimate.

Good democratic government also requires the subordination of individuals' particular interests to the common good, however. That is, it is not enough that people zealously guard their sacred right either to participate personally in government, or else to authorize a representative (of their choosing) to govern on their behalf. For as Tocqueville perceives very clearly, "Inequality and liberty go hand in hand; man cannot have one thing without the other".\textsuperscript{17} As his Social Contract, Rousseau goes on to ask the essential question that follows from this: "How will a blind multitude, which often does not know what it wants because it barely knows what is good for it", ever manage to rule itself well? Put simply, he concludes that the people "are in need of guides."\textsuperscript{18}

This is one of the reasons Tocqueville wrote Democracy in America: to guide democrats who have been emboldened by rights, though certainly not

\textsuperscript{16} Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 54.

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increased to govern well in an era in which democratic government is the only reasonable option. Among his most emphatic counsels reliance on local government. For not only did the typical New Englander become attached to directing local affairs "because he sees in that township a free and strong corporation that he is a part of and that is worth his trouble to seek to direct," but he learned simultaneously, by his direct participation, that his own best interests are intimately connected to the wider interests of his community. That is, by taking "an active part in the government of society," the naturally self-interested democrat "therefore sees in the public fortune his own;" ultimately, he pursues the common interest "not only out of duty or out of pride, but I would almost dare say out of cupidity." By participating in local government, citizens begin to understand that their interests overlap with their neighbors to a greater extent than they would otherwise realize. A concern for the common good is thereby born out of civic participation. As Tocqueville succinctly articulates the phenomenon in Volume II,

by changing citizens with the administration of small affairs... one interests them in the public good and makes them see all the need they necessarily have for one another in order to protect it.

Local freedoms, which make many citizens put value on the affection of their neighbors and close to them, therefore constantly bring men closer to one another, despite the inns and bars that separate them and force them to aid each other.

More than this, though, by encouraging, even by insisting on the participation of ordinary men, it taught citizens that their democratic rights come at the cost of (demanding) duties and responsibilities to the wider community. The character of the New England township moderated Americans' individualism and self-interest by assembling "clear and practical ideas on the nature of his duties as well as the extent of his rights"; or as Harvey Mansfield cogently puts it, the township "infects rights and duties." Most important, and most overlooked perhaps, the result of (meaningful) participation in the direction of one's own community is pride—pride of a sort that is, at once, public and private. It is a fact of human nature that individuals love those things (and people) to which or whom they can make a meaningful contribution, much more, in fact, than they love those that bestow benefits upon them. Put another way, the pride of contributing to one's community increases one's love for it; it is easier to subordinate immediate self-interest to collective good where one loves the community. Hence proper can thereby be used to restrain amour de soi, but only where the community creates a salutary outlet for it.

Much as Tocqueville feared this species of pride would be the quality of soul democrats would come to "acknowledge" (he calls it a "vice", but one for which he would trade "many" of the democrat's "small vices"), Harvey Mansfield eloquently argues that "a free individual must have the pride to think himself capable and worthy of governing himself; he must have at least a modicum of ambition." Pride, as inculcated through political participation at the local level, he continues, is "the spur to action required for the practice of liberty." This is why Tocqueville insists that "It is... in the township that the force of free peoples reside"; it is why he argues that "without the institutions of a township a nation can give itself free government, but it does not have the spirit of freedom."
modern sensibilities, served as a check on the central power; it permitted great families to “bathe in the rough” in the central government, as it were. Thus, French kings knew that to reduce the authority of the nobility was to increase their own, just as Queen Elizabeth well understood that to hold court on the estate of a proud lord would, before long, exhaust his resources and thereby further solidify her authority.

Having eliminated this important moderating faction, democracies—self-sufficient in the private sphere, but isolated, “impotent,” “weak and infirm” politically—are without powerful friends when it comes to undertaking great projects and when serious threats (and great opportunities) arise. As Tocqueville puts it, since they can “do nothing on their own,” democracies must either turn to the government, that “immense being that rises alone in the midst of universal desolation,” or they must “artificially create something analogous” to replace “the powerful particular persons whom equality of conditions has made disappear.”

The first option—to turn toward the government—is to invite or abet what Tocqueville describes at the end of Democracy in America, soft despotism. For to give up on the idea of self-government in favor of a centralized administrative apparatus is to relinquish one’s duties to a power “fit only to enervate the peoples who submit to it”; Tocqueville goes so far as to assert that when the central authority descends to regulate individual interests, “freedom would soon be banished from the New World.” His fear: above individualistic and impotent democracies—men and women who, by choice, live “withdrawn and apart,” and who exist “only in [themselves] and for [themselves] alone”—an “immense unitary power” can easily be elevated. It is true that vestiges of political freedom would remain (the right to vote, or the freedom to write to the editor, say), and so too this sort of despotism would be “more humane and milder”; in spite of this, it represents a serious threat to the human character for Tocqueville. As Tocqueville puts it near the end of the work, immense unitary government “does not break wills, but it softens them, bends them, and directs them... it does not tyrannize, it hinders, compromises, evenerves, extinguishes, defaces, and finally reduces each nation to being nothing more than a herd of timid and inoffensive animals of which the government is the shepherd.”

For to the extent we willingly cede our right to direct our own affairs, soft despotism is in a way self-imposed; and for this reason, because it changes our minds by extinguishing our desire for the freedom and independence of self-government, soft despotism targets the soul more than the body. For we willingly withdraw into ourselves, we willingly turn responsibilities once regarded as sacred duties over to a government which, more and more, resembles a “paternal power... [that] seeks only to keep [us] fixed irrevocably in childhood.” In the end, personal responsibility and initiative are all but annihilated. We look to the government to solve our problems for us, and often a promise to do so is more than sufficient. The funding crisis facing America’s entitlement programs is a perfect example. We all will the end—unlimited healthcare and a secure retirement for all, or even declining tax-rates, say—but we are simultaneously unwilling to will, or even to think about, the means or requirements of achieving these things in a sustainable way. To will the end while ignoring the means is the very definition of childishness. Tocqueville’s fear that democracies might come, increasingly, to resemble children as the administrative state expands in scope is hardly exaggerated, there: too many are happy to live in a state of dependence, unwilling to grow up because personal accountability can be suspended.

This is why Tocqueville asserts that “there are no countries where associations are more necessary to prevent the despotism... than in those in which the social state is democratic”; it is why he states more boldly in Volume II that “if [democracy] did not acquire the practice of associating with each other in ordinary life, civilization itself would be in peril.” Tocqueville is deservedly famous for his observation that “the art of association... becomes... the mother science” in democratic centuries. He believed it necessary to teach this art, this science, because associations can constitute an artificial replacement—one that is altogether compatible with democratic principles—for the secondary bodies equality and democracy have made disappear. The freedom to associate, by permitting the organization of individuals into more powerful groups, not only establishes powerful factions with interests of their own separated from government (and thereby equipped to influence and moderate its policies), it also serves to empower those groups with the most to fear from popular government (which inevitably empowers the majority)—what we today call minorities. Thus, associations represent an important bulwark against the political oppression as well, or as Tocqueville puts it, “in our time, freedom of association has become a necessary guarantee against the tyranny of the majority.”

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But they also (and perhaps more importantly) represent the most important bulwark against soft despotism. What must be emphasized is that for Tocqueville, civil association of every kind begins with township government. For it is the habit of local political engagement that prompts demands to come together for purposes less obviously political. That is, the habit of frequent association for the direction of the day to day activities of a city or township—an activity which once drew many townspeople to community centers—is indispensable as an impetus toward their associating for wider civic purposes. In Tocqueville’s words, local government and political associations “can therefore be considered great schools, free of charge, where all citizens come to learn the general theory of associations”; this is how narrowly self-interested individuals learn what it means to be a neighbor, a citizen.43 He continues: only “association in important political affairs teaches [democrats] in a practical manner the interest they have in aiding each other in lesser ones.”44 This is key for Tocqueville: it is by coming together to affect what clearly interests individuals personally—how the local school is run, the trajectory of a road—that habituates individuals, otherwise prone to withdraw from community, to active involvement and all of its rewards. Thus, community associations are strongest where they are rooted in a democratic community that governs itself; Tocqueville was convinced that (only) local political association provided this grounding; in short, participatory township government was the necessary foundation of an active community life. And indeed, once upon a time, Americans associated within the community for everything—to give fêtes, to raise churches and send missionaries, to care for the poor, to distribute books, to provide higher education, even to seek after truth.45
What is more, the existence of this sort of community organization—dedicated to making life good, even worth living—is, for Tocqueville, what redeems democratic politics. Near the end of his book, as if to clarify what he takes to be the goal of this new form of government which was forever to displace aristocracy, Tocqueville remarks that “it is no longer a question of retaining the particular advantages that inequality of conditions procures for men, but of securing the new good that equality can offer them.”46 We ought “to strive to attain the kind of greatness and happiness that is proper to us,” he insists. Happiness and greatness are what democratic individualism demands to erase by narrowing our focus to exclusively materialistic pursuits; it is associations that encourage and empower us to attain happiness and greatness

43 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 497.
44 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 487.
45 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 489.
46 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 675.
less meeting of one another and so the importance of coercive law enforcement (and with it, litigiousness) necessary increases; he notes that whatever prevents would be “free-riders” from riding for free in tightly knit communities disappears where social capital declines making collective action more difficult; from the most basic perspective of self-interest, he makes the obvious observation that the decline of social capital (in terms of “networks”) necessarily brings with it a decline in the concrete private benefits knowing people yields (job opportunities and financial support in business, for instance).46 Precisely because Putnam has compiled so many startling statistics and correlations, however, he forces his reader to go further than the conclusions he draws.

Putnam focuses on declining political participation first. He notes declines not only in voting and newspaper readership, but in all forms of political participation; he concludes that typically, “the more that [an individual’s] activities depend on the actions of others, the greater the drop-off in [that individual’s] participation.”47 Over the twenty year period he investigates, he discovers a 42% decline in the number of individuals who worked for a political party or served as an officer of a political organization, a 24% decline in the number of people who had made a public speech, a 10% decline in the number who had written a letter to the editor, etc.48

Much as Tocqueville would have predicted, the decline in political involvement is a harbinger of a decline in civil engagement. Putnam notes that that participation in most sports has fallen 10-20% in the last decade or two; that we donate half what we did in 1960 (relative to recreation dollars); that organizational membership has fallen by 15% even as organizations have been professionalized, many of them requiring nothing of their members beyond a yearly financial contribution); he even notes family dinners were approximately 55% more common twenty years ago.49 In short, Putnam contends (and proves decisively, I think), that “no corner of America has been immune to his anti-civic contagion.”50

The behavioral change Putnam chronicles (implying, as it does, a change in social custom), has occurred primarily in recent decades. Moreover, as Bowling Alone makes manifest, it is a generational transformation, which is to say, it is not so much that individuals are changing their habits and choosing to engage less with others, it is that “each successive generation is investing less.”51 In short, what Putnam calls the “long civic generation”—a generation

of men and women who voted more, trusted more, contributed more—is rapidly being replaced with by the boomer and Facebook generations. In contrast to our grandparents, we are radically self-centered, preferring a narrow individualism to social intercourse, and generally choosing to isolate ourselves from community, friends, family, and fellow citizens at every opportunity—the consequence of the democratic social state Tocqueville feared most. As Tocqueville may well have envisioned, in spite of the unprecedented prosperity and choice which virtually defines contemporary life (and with it, of course, our unprecedented materialism),52 Putnam also discovers a steep decline in happiness (by 1999 “younger people were unhappier than older people”), and what is a natural consequence of this, a dramatic increase in depression as well as a fourfold increase in the number of suicides between mid-century and 1980.53

To admit these change have occurred (which seems inescapable) is not equivalent to understanding why they have occurred, nor does mere awareness of them contribute much to our understanding their most important implications. In order to understand the significance of the generational shift currently occurring in the aware of Americans, we must therefore consider the character of the associations which have disappeared (as well as the changing character of those which have persisted), so as to gauge the sociological implications of this transformation from the developmental perspective of a generation no longer reared with, nor in important respects formed by, such associations.

In his attempt to explicate some of his most striking findings, Putnam does point us to the (helpful) work of other social scientists, whose words he uses to imply his most radical normative suggestions. Having correlated increased depression in American youth to declining social capital, for instance, he invokes Martin Seligman to express the rather Tocquevillian opinion that

individualism need not lead to depression as long as we can fall back on large institutions—religion, country, family... But in a self standing alone without the buffer of larger beliefs, helplessness and failure can all too easily become hopelessness and despair.54

Similarly, having speculated that “actual attendance and involvement in religious activities has fallen by roughly 25 to 50 percent”, he invokes Robert Wuthnow to explain that

46 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 134, 139; 145-6; 287-290.
47 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 43.
48 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 45.
49 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 109, 123; 59, 51-2, 100.
50 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 247.
51 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 62.
52 Putnam notes a truly sustainable increase in materialism among my generational cohort (between 1975 and 1996, the number of college freshmen who identified having “a lot of money” with “the good life” rose from 38% to 63%).
54 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 264-5.
Religion may have a salutary effect on civil society by encouraging its members to worship, spend time with their families, and to learn the moral lessons embedded in religious traditions.25

What is essential to realize, I think, is that in healthy communities of the sort Toqueville observed, a person's family, his neighbors, his congregation, his own religious faith, and his wider community—all and together by a common geographic affinity (the township), and thus, by apparent mutual dependence—made moral demands of individuals, demands which helped men and women to overcome, or at least to moderate, their selfish and narrowly self-indulgent temptations. In short, the associations to which all Americans once belonged typically involved obedience or a particular sort. At church and at school to be sure—but more than this, everywhere people interacted with one another—authorities of one kind or another were watching, demanding observance of standards of decency, goodness, gentlemanners, nobility, etc. Communities of this sort “thought about things in moral terms, in the language of good and evil.”26 The demands they made of those who belonged to the groups—though uncomfortable, and even stifling, at times, to natural rebellious youth—were men and women out of themselves, out of their natural tendency to withdraw into themselves, and brought them together into public life. Whether it was the local pastor, or Sister Francis, or the disciplinarian gym teacher, or the shop foreman, or the patriarchal father, or simply one of many familiar neighbors, “individuals were always in the public eye,” as Rousseau once put it speaking of his own community; by quietly (by their very presence) encouraging compliance to expectations and standards that were, in truth, demanding, men and women living in tightly knit communities are “born censors” of one another.27 This was the cost—but also the prerequisite—of the “cohesion of relationships,” the generally good behavior, and the social trust characteristic of tightly knit communities.28

The contemporary response to a way of life of this sort tends to be “yuck”; and nowadays, precisely because our political order is founded on the presumption that all have an equal and indelible right to pursue happiness—and an equally indelible right to determine for themselves what happiness means to them personally—unreflective aversion to a life less easy and self-indulgent than ours is today (within a community that imposes standards of behavior, for instance),

25 Petren, Reading Abba, 72, 76.
28 Ehrenshilt, The Lost City, 257.

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is generally sufficient to discredit it. This idea is, no doubt, largely artifact of German thought—its idealized notion of the authentic self—which made its way into the American political consciousness thanks to Progressive reforms to government and education in the early part of the twentieth century through to the New Deal and Great Society. Above all, the Progressives sought to undermine the societal forces that once served to temper this individualistic and in the service of a radical, though certainly well-intended, individualism.

There is no more revealing example than religion and its interaction with contemporary America. Once upon a time, belonging to a community required common worship and the community’s faith made moral demands of virtually every member of the community. This is no longer the case, however. As Alan Wolfe triumphantly concludes, religion in America has been diluted and distorted beyond recognition: it has “already become more personalized and individualistic, less doctrinal and devotional, more practical... American religion has been so transformed that we have reached the end of religion as we have known it.”29

Nor is the spread of this individualistic ethos confined to churches today. Teachers today are discouraged (if not virtually forbidden) from making character-building demands of their students for fear of intruding upon those students’ “rights,” and connected to this, from fear of litigation. To employ shame or embarrassment as a pedagogical tool — implying as it would that a community’s standards of noble and base, decent and obscene, may have something to recommend them—is, nowadays, almost unthinkable. All authoritative moral standards, from good and evil to beautiful and ugly, have been jettisoned in the name of free choice. Where character education—once rooted in the local community—is abandoned, however, free choice comes increasingly to mean free surrender to inclination and immediate desire.

As Alan Ehrenshilt labor to show in a book entitled The Last City, the changes that have banished authority (and obedience to authority) from American society were and are motivated by “our worship of choice.” What has been lost is local community and everything which depends on it. In 1957, it is probably true that “very few people were concerned about America producing a generation of hyperindividualists.”30 “Only a wave of individualism, and disrespect for authority,” Ehrenshilt goes on, “is powerful enough to explain” what can only be called a radical transformation in the way Americans live.31

30 Ehrenshilt, The Last City, 267.
32 Ehrenshilt, The Last City, 267.

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The concluding sections of *The Last City* capture the significance of this transformation particularly well. What we have done in the last forty (now more than fifty) years is repeal a bargain that, if it was starting to unravel a bit at the margins in the 1950s, nevertheless was a fact of day-to-day life for nearly everyone in America.

What we have done in the last forty (now closer to fifty) years is repeal a bargain that, if it is was starting to unravel a bit at the margins in the 1950s, nevertheless was a fact of day-to-day life for nearly everyone in America.

The bargains provided us with communities that were, for the most part, familiar and secure; stable jobs and relationships whose survival we did not need to worry about in bad or good times; and rules that we could live by, on, when we were old enough, rebel against; and people known as leaders who were trusted with the task of setting that the rules were enforced.

The price of the bargain was a whole network of restrictions on our ability to do whatever we liked.

It turned out to be possible to emancipate the individual and to give him free choice in all sorts of decisions which were once imposed on him by habit, custom, or authority. And we have done that. But it has not turned out to be possible to make that change without sacrificing many of the things most Americans still value as comforts of life...65

In his (very) famous book, *The Lonely Crowd*, David Riesman explained what has been lost from the perspective of the individual we privilege over community today. As Tod Gitlin cogently puts it his preface to a later edition of the work, "The book's subject was nothing less than a sea change in American character.[...], the character of its upper middle classes was shifting from 'inner-directed' people, who as children internalized goals that were essentially implanted by elders, to 'other-directed' people, sensitive to the expectations and preferences of others."66 In a nutshell, this is the effect of individualism on the individual; it is the effect of the recent secession shift from a culture that recognizes authorities who make moral demands, to a culture that glorifies free choice and nothing but free choice. In Riesman's own words, these recognized authorities, by the demands they made, helped individuals to develop a "social character" by helping them to "acquire even in

tragic irony: we have gained this liberty to do anything, but we have lost the capacity to choose anything except what everybody else does. To be “out-directed” means to be bound to fashion, to the whims of the majority opinion. It is not, however, equivalent to freedom in any meaningful sense of the term. On the contrary, Riesman defines “out-directed people” in these terms: shallow, uncertain of themselves, demanding of approval. One is inclined to add they also tend to lack most every classical virtue: fortitude, ambition, pride, public-spiritedness, moderation, courage, and moral seriousness.

Our privileging of choice and the individual over community is an attitude that reflects the unfortunate degree to which we have moved away from viewing the aim of or the end of political life as Tocqueville did. To repeat an earlier point, the Frenchmen thought that “securing the new goods equality can offer” would yield unprecedented equality of opportunity; a kind of social justice would be gained at the cost of the brilliance of aristocracy. But he also realized the democratic revolution he was witnessing might turn out to be “fatal to humanity.” Tocqueville believed it “easier to establish an absolute and despotic government in a people where conditions are equal than in any other”; he believed, moreover, that “not only would it oppress men, but in the long run it would rob them of several of the principle attributes of humanity.”

Not only freedom, but with it, the taste for greatness and the capacity for happiness might all be lost. What has caused this transformation that threatens humanity and civilization if Tocqueville’s warnings are to be believed? Obviously, it is not sufficient to answer that responsibility lies squarely with decline of the habit of local association as described by樊纽。 For to answer thus is merely to push the question one step further back: what, then, caused centuries-old character-building associations suddenly and rapidly to erode? Here, again, Geitin and Riesman are helpful; it may well be true that “the shift from traditional society to the whole of modernity is the momentous transition in human history.”

Tocqueville’s emphasis on townships as the seed and roots of free institutions was, perhaps, altogether prescient, then. To destroy the root of local association (according to Tocqueville, the local political association or township) is eventually to destroy everything that depends on it for support (civil associations, the church, the community, perhaps even the family). The most obvious cause of this sudden shift from “traditional society to the whole of modernity” is industrialization. But as we shall see, the administrative centralization that followed—the Progressive turned New Dealer response to the challenges of post-agrarian America that above all else dramatically expanded the size, scope and power of the national government—was also an important factor.

“MOMENTOUS TRANSITION” AND THE NEW AMERICA: INDUSTRIALIZATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE CENTRALIZATION

“Western civilization is itself a history of eroding community and authority, reaching back to the Reformation if not further,” Alan Ehrenhalt suggests near the end of his book. So not to quibble with all that his characterization of Western exceptionalism leaves out, we can at least agree that Fifities Chicago was not, nor even close to, the ideal political arrangement, but rather a portrait community in the final phase of its extinction at the hands of the great city and its various springs. Ehrenhalt’s later point, that “the West has spent the last five hundred years moving inexorably away from the values of tribe and hierarchy and village life and toward individualism and the market,” is uncontroversial. Dramatic though his characterization may seem, the triumph of individualism and what comes with it is a development of civilization-transforming consequence.

Granting the many benefits that issued from these various attempts to free mankind from despotic reigns and oppressive religious doctrines, it seems, nonetheless, undeniable that in the last century and a half, the same ideas have ushered in changes as thorough through perhaps not quite as beneficial. Some have argued that the widespread and thorough industrialization and urbanization which occurred between the Civil War and World War I represent “the most rapid and profound transformation” in the history of American society; or as Morton Keller puts it, “there are grounds for holding that around the turn of this century, much of Western society experienced change at a pace.

30 Magazine, America, 665.
31 Riesman, The Lonely Crowd, 66.

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and on a scale, far beyond what had been seen before—or, arguably, since.24 My argument, then, is that industrialization (and the consequent urbanization of America) has aggravated the threat posed by individualism in three important ways: (1), the primacy of the township—for millennia, the root of community—has been permanently destroyed; (2), where business is big, government has a tendency to become big, that is, governmental administration tends to centralize; and (3), the shift from an agrarian economy which, of necessity, emphasizes "production," to an industrial economy which, of necessity, emphasizes "consumption," is a truly poisonous shift: it may make the nation powerful by growing the economy (perhaps a necessity in a world of competing states), but it feeds the very basest form of individualism, materialistic individualism.

Jefferson's animus against big cities and all that comes with them permeates his writings. Of firm belief that "the mobs of great cities add just as much to the support of pure govern as the do to the strength of the human body," he preferred rural, agricultural life, and so famously declares, "Let our workshops remain in Europe"(in fact, Jefferson believed America would remain virtuous for many centuries as long as remained chiefly agrarian).25 As Professor Mansfield observes, in saying so, Jefferson realized that "it was necessary to accept backwardness and dependency in manufacturing in order to protect the cultivated independence of free men."26 Though Toqueville believed Jefferson to be the "most powerful apostle of democracy ever had," there is no explicit and corresponding observation in Toqueville. In fact, in a chapter entitled "WHAT MAKES ALMOST ALL AMERICANS INCLINE TOWARD INDUSTRIAL PROFESSIONS," Toqueville presciently articulates what the effects of American individualism would be for Jacksonian America—which is to say an important aspect of the American character he was observing.

Caliber of the earth proves almost certain, but slow, means for his efforts. One is enriched by it only little by little and with difficulty. Agriculture suits only the rich who already have a great superfluity, or the poor who ask only to live. His choice is made: he sells his field, quits his residence, and goes out to engage in some hazardous, but lucrative, profession... In democratic countries a man, however opulent one supposes him, is almost always discontented with his fortune, because he finds himself less wealthy than his father and he fears his sons will be less so than he. Most of the rich in democracies therefore dream constantly of means of acquiring wealth, and they naturally turn their eyes toward commerce and industry...27

In short, the rich and the poor alike—animated by a very natural love of wealth and opulence—incline toward commerce and industry, and away from agriculture, wherever there is freedom and opportunity to do so. As Toqueville saw so very clearly, modern liberal democracies have as their principle, not the promotion of virtue as did ancient republics, but the defense of citizens' political liberty and equality. As Marvin Myers observes in The Jacksonian Persuasion, however, "liberty and moral reformation are not a perfect match." That is, taking Americas as they are, the very principles America was created to advance and defend "led toward the city, the factory, the complex market and credit economy, the simplest agrarian republic of virtue couple not stand against it." One implication of this fact, of which Toqueville must have been well aware, is that the township—which he considered to be the very "seed" of free institutions—would decline in importance relative to larger and larger, boroughing and anonymous cities. It seems strange, then, that Toqueville seems less troubled by the emergence of large cities than were Jefferson and Rousseau. For while Toqueville definitely recognizes that "the people are coarser in... opulent cities than in the countryside" (which he likens to "aristocratic countries"), and while he recognizes that "great wealth and profound miseries... depravity of morals, individuals selfishness, complicated of interests," and the like "almost always arise from the greatness of the state" (specifically, in the presence of large "metropolises"), still the growth of such cities is not obviously a primary, or even a secondary or tertiary, concern of Democracy in America.28

One of the biggest puzzles of the book, I think, is Toqueville's apparently naysaying combination of Jeffersonian rhetoric and Hamiltonian political-economic realism: America is exceptional for her rural Jacksonian character—rugged life in a log-cabin, the traditional family and virtuous women, serious religious conviction, strong community life—but Americans will inevitably incline toward industry, away from that character. For Toqueville clearly realized that "we see rising before our eyes" the scene of "great workshops"

27 Toqueville, Democracy in America, 526-7.
29 Toqueville, Democracy in America, 24, 151.
which had already begun to appear in London, Amsterdam, and Paris, and through manufacturing, perhaps also the emergence of the "rarest [aristocracy] that has appeared on earth"; he even realized, with Hamilton, that the nation's power would be tied to the "superabundant force" and "prodigious industry" generated by the narrow (economic) ambitions of so many individual democrates.80

How does one reconcile this apparent contradiction? Perhaps Tocqueville believed the functions of the local township could simply be transferred to larger political associations (cities and states) as the urbanization of America proceeded, that local government need not be township government in order to resist administrative centralization. In this connection, he does observe that "inside the great national association, the law has established in each province, in each city, and so to speak in each village, small associations having local administration as its object.81 But one also finds, in an early note to Democracy in America for instance, the recognition that "large townships" and "large cities" are governed in a way that is much less representative than what one finds in smaller townships. Moreover, the close identification of private interest and common good that expands citizens' conception of their own self-interest, the salutary effects of shared leadership of the community, and the automatic and reciprocal guardianship of more that can exist where communities are made up of neighbors known to one another, cannot easily be replicated in burgeoning, anonymous, industrial metropolises.

If the question is left open in Democracy in America, it must be confronted by Americans living in modern times. For the size and complexity of political communities has increased dramatically in the years since Tocqueville visited America to "see what a great Republic is." Tocqueville's visit took place at the midpoint of a forty-year migration to urban centers that saw the number of cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants jump from twelve to 101, the population of eight of these cities growing to exceed 100,000.82 As Meyers notes, "recent economic historians seem fairly well agreed on the proposition that Americans underwent a revolution in the organization of their economic lives between 1815 or 1820 and 1860," the results of which would only be accentuated and after the Civil War.83 For in the years leading up to and including World War I, labor shortages and new opportunities in northern industry drew further migration (especially among Southern black farmers, sharecroppers, and agricultural laborers) toward the cities. The Great Depression—aggravated by persistent drought, declining farm prices, and a

rapid increase in the number of foreclosures—marked yet another period of accelerated urbanization in what was, by then, a consistent trend.84 By 1953, only 36 per cent of the American population lived in rural areas; today, that figure has dropped to 21 per cent.85 But even this figure is deceptively high. For while some sixty million Americans live outside of urban and suburban areas, only 1 per cent of Americans live on farms today. As a consequence, the vast majority of those who do live in rural America (defined by the Census Bureau as "open country and small town areas that lie outside of urban clusters of 2,500 or more people") spend much of their time and energy outside of their political communities.86 In a recent study, Allison Tarven found that of those considered to be rural dwellers according to census criteria, many commute like their urban counterparts to [metaj] job centers. Several million others have long found work in local manufacturing or, more recently, in industries made feasible by modern communications such as telemarketing, reservation centers, or catalog sales or that capitalize on recreation or the lower costs found in small towns.87

Among industries which continue to locate themselves outside of major centers, she found surprising growth in the number of casinos and recreational properties, as well a disproportionate number of state and federal prisons. In short, the species of industry and employment that remains in rural America tends to serve urban markets and urban life in one way or another.

The result is the vast majority of Americans who do not live in urban centers either work in cities or in industries that are completely unconnected to the towns in which they do live. Tarven invokes Calvin Beale of the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture to make the point that "so much of rural America... has become the playground of urbanites.88 As a consequence, it is true to say that for virtually every American—urban and rural alike—"the demands of work, family, and community are sharply separated and often contradictory."89 The stable political association Tocqueville found in the township—and which served as the solid foundation for a community made up of inter-connected relationships, associations, and responsibilities—has been wiped from the American landscape. Public and private life are centered around great

80 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 531-2, 233-4.
81 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 494.
82 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 54.
83 Meyers, The Jacksonian Persuasion, 112.
85 Allison Tarven, Fifty Years of Demographic Change in Rural America. PRB. Online.
87 Allison Tarven, Fifty Years of Demographic Change.
88 Tarven, Fifty Years of Demographic Change.
89 Tarven, Fifty Years of Demographic Change.
90 Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart.
metropolises today. And as Robert Bellah et al. remark in *Habits of the Heart* (a term taken from Tocqueville himself), “though urban Americans still get involved... the associational life of the modern metropolis does not generate the kinds of second languages of social responsibility and practices of commitment to the public good that we saw in the associational life of the "strong independent township." "94" Rousseau's analysis was more worthing; he believed big cities, inevitably, to be "full of scheming, idle people without religion or principle, whose imagination, deprived by sloth, inactivity, the love of pleasure, and great needs [thus engender only monsters and inspire only crimes.]"95

Tocqueville's apparent ambivalence to great cities is all the more inexplicable to the extent that he perceived this change clearly. He knew that the increasingly complexity of political life would not lead to larger and more inclusive associations, but on the contrary, to a delusional (if only half-conscious) withdrawal from the wider community and its expectations generally. Larger communities fuel individualism because "as the circle of public life grows larger, one must expect that the sphere of private relations will narrow." When frequent interaction with (the same) members of one's community first in public affairs,(and following from this, in private affairs), when this interaction ceases, individuals lose sight of their connection to their fellows—mostly because that connection becomes less important, of less apparent value to naturally self-interested democrats. Thus, Tocqueville confesses, “instead of imaging that citizens of new societies are going to end by living in common, I indeed fear that they will finally come to form no more than very small coteries.”96 Where ties to the wider community and habits of the heart disappear, where the demands and duties once imposed by neighbors and community figures can no longer exert a formative force, there is little remaining with sufficient force to draw democrats away from self-indulgent and materialistic pursuits. Men finally become "preoccupied with the sole care of making a fortune... the exercise of their political duties appears to them a distressing counterpoint that distracts them from their industry. If it is a question of choosing their representatives, of giving assistance to authority, of treating the thing in common, they lack the time; they cannot waste their precious time in useless work..."97

**Middletown, America, Transformed**

A striking portrait of the transformation is captured and relayed in a book written by Robert and Helen Lynd and published in 1929 called *Middletown: A Study in American Culture.* The study endeavored to chronicle changes to the nature of community and the lives of ordinary Americans between 1890 and the Roaring Twenties. The authors of the study chose a city "as representative as possible of contemporary American life." Middletown's climate was moderate; it was neither a burgeoning metropolis nor an agricultural village or one-industry town; religiously, its diversity mirrored America's; etc.98 Their conclusions are striking, if not particularly surprising for us today: as the authors put it, "in case after case the preceding pages have revealed Middletown as learning new ways of behaving toward material things more rapidly than new habit addressed to persons and non-material institutions."99 What the case studies elucidated in *Middletown* highlight for modern readers the extent to which the changes made possible (or inevitable) by industrialization are fundamentally regrettable. Changes to the nature of the community bring with them changes to virtually every facet of public (and even private) life: changes to the nature of work, to the structure of familial authority, to the way (and purpose for which) society raises its children, changes to what men and women do in their leisure time, and finally, a transformation in the way the community worships. Readers of *Democracy in America* will notice, of course, that virtually all of the changes described reflect movement away from the America Tocqueville observed.

By the twenties, the trend away from an economy in which ordinary Americans produced much (if any) of what they consumed was well underway. Not only were more individuals less self-sufficient than at any previous point in American history, but to an ever-increasing extent, political communities were becoming increasingly interdependent as well. As noted in the study, "only a negligible extent does Middletown make the food it eats and the clothing it wears."99 Instead, like most modern towns, Middletown specialized in a handful of industries, demanding specialized though not particularly skilled or dignified labor. In particular, Middletown's economy was focused on the production of glass bottles, transistors, and automobile engine parts. As the authors presently conclude, "This gap between the things the people do to get a living and the actual needs of living is widening. Radical changes in the activities of the working class in the predominant industries of Middletown during the last four decades have driven the individual worker ever farther from his farm and village background of the eighties."99

With this 'radical change' came changes to many facets of life. For instance, the effects of industrialization reached deep into the family itself. The

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95 Lynd and Lynd, *Middletown,* 499.
expanding industrial labor market offered older children living at home opportunities for employment and to make money of their own, opportunities and resources which were neither connected nor controllable by their family (i.e., more and more young Americans were permitted and required to seek employment off the family farm and outside of family-owned businesses). The fruits of modern industry, not surprisingly, offered inducements and character-transforming ways to spend this money. The invention of the automobile and the movie theater, as well as the increasing popularity of community sporting events permitted a more elaborate and less supervised social life. Thus, in their interactions, young girls and women were emancipated from the watchful eyes of parents and other figures of authority to a significant degree—not surprisingly, this changed how the young interacted with one another. Less obviously, however, it also changed the character of the family. More financially independent than ever before, the young were subordinating less easily to the authority of their parents as traditionally recognized. As described by the Lynds,

the traditional vise that the dependence of the child carries with it the right and duty of the parents to enforce discipline and obedience still prevails. And yet not only are parents finding it increasingly difficult to enforce adherence to established group sanctions, but the sanctions themselves are changing: many parents are becoming permissive and unsure as to what they would hold their children to if they could.189

The shift exemplified in this is much wider and of greater significance than rebelliousness in seventeen and eighteen year-olds might initially appear to be. In short, the young were beginning not to look to their parents primarily for life-guidance or as role models. To begin with, the staggering pace of scientific “progress”—evident to everybody in the form of new inventions designed to make life easier and more enjoyable, as well as new industrial techniques to make work less demanding and workers more efficient—meant that for perhaps the first time, a generation of children was keenly aware that their lives would be very different than their parents had been. They were not destined to follow in their parents and grandparents’ footsteps as so many generations before them had been; they had more options than ever before and were free to make of their lives whatever they wished—most importantly they knew it. Under the mistaken impression that their parents’ life experience could be of little value to them in what was sure to be a different world, a generation was eager to turn away from those who actually had life experience. Perhaps even more important than this for the emancipation of youth was the psychological impact of the first war to meet the name “World War”—the human cost of which had been borne by this generation disproportionately. As William Leuchtenburg notes in another old book, The Perils of Prosperity,

in every age, youth has a sense of separate destiny, of experiencing, what no one else has ever experienced before, but it may be doubted that there was ever a time in America when youth had such a special sense of importance as in the years after World War I. There was a break between generations like a geological fault: young men who had fought in the trenches felt that they knew a reality their elders could not even imagine. Young girls no longer consciously modeled themselves on their mothers, whose experience seemed unusable in the 1920s. Instead of youth creating age, age initiated youth.190

Perhaps it can be said that wherever nobody expects the future to resemble the past, there is little impetus to model oneself after role models who symbolize—past the. Only the part of the century may represent the point at which ordinary Americans became conscious that the future would be fundamentally different. Free to make that future, a young but proud generation felt free to give less regard, less obedience, to authorities they believed to be representative of the old order.

For reasons equally connected to the changing nature of the economy and society, children were being raised very differently by the end of these decades of rapid change. By 1929, the Lynds could observe that the education of youth, both in its optional, non-compulsory character and also in its more limited scope the school training of a generation age appears to have been a more casual advance of the main business of “bringing up” that went on day by day in the home. Today, however, the school is relied upon to carry a more direct, if at most points still vaguely defined, responsibility. That in turn rested upon the content of the teaching and encouraged a more utilitarian approach at certain points.

History and Latin, Literature and Geography, were being replaced by classes in shorthand, bookkeeping, applied electricity, Mechanical draffing,
Printing, Machine Shop, Manual Arts, and Home Economics. The most
prominent region of movement, the Linds go on to note, "appears in the
rush of courses that depart from the traditional digested conception of
what constitutes education and seek to train for specific tool and skills
activities in the factory, office, and home." A utilitarian approach to formative education
has the unfortunate, but inevitable, result of emphasizing the good of the
individual at the expense of developing the virtue we call humanitas, a
true concern for the common good. Lessons in History and Literature with
the power to teach individuals of their connection to past times and other places—
their place in a world much bigger than they are—are replaced with lessons
designed to focus young men and women on preparing themselves to succeed
individually, to put their own private good first and foremost. Every potential
spur to a truly liberal education is smothered by one designed to help students
earn a living.

The effects of industrialization have also deeply touched the manner in
which men and women employ the time they spend away from work.
Although church and community associations remained important sources of
associating for leisure, for Middletown residents, friendships were becoming
increasingly based on relationships cultivated at work (the invention of the
automobile and the telephone made this possible). As a consequence, "the
neighborhood appears likewise to have declined as a place of most constant
association of friends." Once again, the city is larger, more complex and
seems to be a retreat to cocoon—little societies defined by shared
interests—at the cost of associations developed around geographic proximity
and common participation in local political affairs, a type of association which
bridged a variety of narrower interests and thus served to unite the entire
community thereby including in individuals a concern for the general well-
being or common good. As stated near the end of the story,

Everyone in Middletown was absorbed in keeping his job or raising
his wages, building his home, 'boosting' his club or church, educating
his children. Now a member of this group, now of that, he shuttles
his intent across amid the congress of jostling groups that make up
the larger group which is Middletown. And ever and again he finds
his particular business affected by things which are the corporate
business of that larger group. Since the nineties, these things
regarded as everybody's business have multiplied: more officials and
administrative agencies are needed to care for them, more money is
spent in operating them, and they involve more laws.

Middletown's religious orientation was in the midst of a sea-change
reflective of the transformation in religious belief occurring in America
generally (as noted above and by Alan Wolfe). For instance, the authors found
that "belief in hell is apparently dying out somewhat... Heaven seems also to be
diminishing in interest, especially among the business class." Connected to
this, the study also concludes that the ministers' authority was in the process of
being reduced substantially. No longer were religious authorities making
demands of the congregation; instead, the congregation's irreligious
preferences were increasingly determining the character of the authorities
themselves. As the Lynds observe, the "emphasis placed on selecting a
minister upon his success with young people and with men indicates points
of strain in the church..." In short, the church's power to demand compliance
to authoritative moral standards was rapidly dissolving in the face of new
and contradictory ideals advanced by industrialized society. The impetus
behind this final decline of ecclesiastical authority over the community is noted
by the authors.

As changes proceed at accelerating speed in other sections of the
city's life, the lack of dominance of religious beliefs becomes more
apparent. The whole side of industrial culture would seem to be set
more strongly than in the literature village of thirty-five years ago in
the direction of the 'go-getter' rather than in that of 'Blessed are the
meek' of the church; by their religious teachers Middletown people
are told that they are simply as need of salvation, by speakers at
men's and women's clubs they are assured that their city, their state,
and their country are, if not perfect, at least the best in the world,
that it is they who make it so, and that if they continue in this
present vigorous course, progress is assured.

Today, we can say without trepidation that the tension has been resolved
in the favor of the 'go-getter.' As Leuchtenburg characterized a transformation
then occurring, but now more or less completed, fear of hell and interest in
heaven were being subordinated to "demands for material fulfillment of
Earth." Americans were "less sin-ridden than ever before," and what is a
natural consequence of this, "material comfort has become" not a means to an
end but the final end of life itself.\footnote{Leuchtenburg, The Fools of Prosperity, 157.} Tooele ville saw this danger very clearly:

Christianity—\textit{in all its forms}—was so critical an aspect of American \textit{mor}

text

\footnote{Lynd and Lynd, Middletown, 321.}
\footnote{Lynd and Lynd, Middletown, 347.}
\footnote{Lynd and Lynd, Middletown, 406.}
\footnote{Leuchtenburg, The Fools of Prosperity, 157.}
\footnote{Leuchtenburg, The Fools of Prosperity, 175, 188.}
WHETHER TOCQUEVILLE'S "SEED OF FREE INSTITUTIONS"

because where "democracy favors the taste for material enjoyment" religiosity is the "general, simple, practical means of teaching men the immortality of the soul." That men and women continue to believe they have a soul is so important because once they come to believe "that all is nothing but matter," theoretical materialism transforms individualism into a selfish and narrow materialism. Typically, theoretical nihilists are practical hedonists and for a hedonist, there is no reason to pursue or refrain from anything until the result will be increased pleasure.

That we, today, are so struck by Tocqueville's insistence upon the importance of American religiosity for the health of the nation—for instance, he notes, "I am so convinced that one must maintain Christianity within the new democracies at all cost, that I would rather chafe priests in the sanctuary than allow them to leave it"—is indicative of the extent to which cares of the church and churchgoers have fled from religion. Leuchtenburg plainly states what underlies Tocqueville's fear: By the 1920s, that class of men and women who had for so long set and enforced the nation's moral standards—ministers, teachers, the rural gentry, urban patricians, motheos and fathers—were being replaced by a business class that was "frequently not equipped—or lacked the desire—either to support old standards or to create new ones." Leuchtenburg perceived in America a nation without direction precisely because so many Americans were consciously rejecting obedience to the moral standards that had provided direction for generations of men and women. He invokes Freda Kichway to make his essential point: "Never in recent generations have human beings been so floundered about outside the ropes of social and religious sanctions."

To recapitulate my essential point, then, this entire array of social change—from the disintegration of parental authority, to the end of friendships with their roots in the local community affinity, to the slackening of American moral standards and the decline of religiosity in America—all of it can be connected to the local township with its established and inscrutable social hierarchy. The 1920s refigure a change in America that goes deeper than a movement of people away from the countryside; the decade represents a tonic shift in norm, "a conscious rejection of rural values..."

THE PROBLEM OF SIZE

Big Industry means Big Government. Or, rather, big industry means the hard, cruel, industrial attention Tocqueville foresaw if one does not move in the direction of a larger centralized administrative apparatus. Or at least, this was the fear seized upon, and perhaps fuelled, by America's Progressives. As the American economy moved further and further toward industry, much of American society demanded more and more federal regulation and involvement at a time when an important segment of the intellectual and political class was eager to expand the role of government.

The trend toward a bigger, more interventionist central administration, began with that section of American society historically most opposed to a powerful federal administration. The Populist movement of the decades between 1870 and 1900 was initiated and sustained by "the most 'tough individualists' of all—the family farmers." But they invoked government help in an effort to preserve their way of life in the face of a rapidly changing nation. Many of the nation's farming communities had been established as a result of the great American migration Westward, yet the major markers for agricultural production remained in the East. The agricultural sector, having thereby grown more and more dependent on rail and shipping, on manufacturing and finance, demanded the regulation of these industries—as a way to protect the viability of their way of life.

A second segment of the population began demanding bigger government between the 1890s and World War I. Based mainly in the cities—and among the middle-class as much as the poor—this early "Progressive" movement had "social justice" as its aim. The reforms sought by this group were "mainly nonsocialistic and regulations imposed on swashbuckling private corporate predominance." Their list of accomplishments is modest by modern standards, but it is hardly inconsequential. The Progressive initiatives that did succeed were, quite obviously, made necessary by the changing nature of the American economy and aimed squarely at controlling industry: anti-trust legislation, health and safety regulations, child-protection laws, railroad rate controls, and state minimum wage regulations.

Although the American response to World War I brought with it increased centralized planning and intervention, the Progressive cause was left aside during, and then after, the war had been won. For some reason, there was no mood to prolong the successful experiment with bigger government in the service of Progressive purposes; as a result, the American "cast administrative machinery [was] dismantled" following Allied victory. In the end, the twenties was a decade of "intact capitalism" according to economist Joseph Schumpeter. As Walker and Vatter put it, big government was immediately abandoned following the war "in favor of a return to a smaller federal establishment and a shift by business leaders back to their traditional

124 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 519.
125 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 521.

Abandoning tradition and laissez-faire philosophies, even business groups were clamoring for more federal intervention by 1932. Together with social groups as well as state and local government, these societal factors, "already near the boiling point" in 1932, "overrode" the federal government to depart from the tradition of minimizing its size and role, and intervene with the New Deal. In other words, the "depth of the collapse" necessitated a systemic, planned response; inevitably, "planning was much more explicitly linked to the role of the state."214

Without question, Progressives recognized the crisis as a second opportunity to increase the role and scope of the federal administration; without question, the administrative state as it exists today owes its existence to the confluence of economic crisis and the very deliberate plans of those interested in a larger government for reasons exceeding economic recovery. The extent to which President Roosevelt (and those who would elaborate the entitlement programs in the decades that followed, often in his name) went further than necessary is a question that must be left aside. The rest of the story is familiar though. Federal Building Construction to address unemployment; measures for drought relief; the inauguration of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (which aimed at helping 25 million families directly); and New Deal reforms including Social Security and unemployment insurance, legislation to regulate minimum wages and maximum hours, changes designed to encourage union activity, higher transfer payments to lower levels of government, the increased size and budget of the federal bureaucracy—all these federal measures helped to ease the pain caused to ordinary Americans by the economic contraction. The result: Americans' expectations of government also changed.

As Ortis Graham sums up,

The most dramatic political result of the New Deal was perhaps the transformation of the national Democratic party from a staterights, factional conservative, minority party into a majority party with a strong urban base, lower-class sympathies, and a thrust, even a social-democratic program. The size, power, and functions of the national government were greatly enlarged, and most of the new governmental duties were institutionalized in an invigorated executive branch. In all, the New Deal seemed to have vastly accelerated the drift toward a centralized, powerful, national government with democratic sympathies and a clear mandate of intervention to ensure economic security and social justice. It

125 This list is compiled mainly from Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 248-50.

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Jonathan W. Pelkey

Whether Toqueville’s Seeds of Free Institutions?

sought to contemplate, who remembered the floundering Democratic party and treasured national government of the 1930s, the sharpest change in American political life since the days of Lincoln.126

Suddenly, the central administration was involved in the lives of ordinary Americans as never before: in a ‘managerial role.’ By creating policies and agencies to provide services directly (the Bureau of Employment Security to address unemployment, Social Security to address poverty in old age, the Food Stamp Plan to distribute food to the poor, the Rural Electrification Act to help extend the electrical infrastructure throughout the countryside, and the Federal Security Agency to deliver health, education and welfare services); by inaugurating administrative measures designed to guide the allocation of resources related to specific economic activities (loans to encourage infrastructure development, the Farm Credit and Agricultural Adjustment Acts to ease the economic burden of farmers, the Homeowners’ Loan Act to secure the homes of ordinary Americans, and the Banking Act to shore up the banking sector); and by advancing administrative measures designed to regulate the economy (the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to protect depositors, Securities and Exchange Commission to protect investors, the Federal Communications Commission to regulate broadcasters, the National Labor Relations Act to regulate union activity, and on and on and on and on and on)—a panoply of new federal initiatives altered the relationship between Americans and the Federal Government in very important respects.127

It may well be true that the relationship between federal state and local government changed most decisively in the decades that followed, everyone one of them apparently redefining American federalism anew. True also, “the long arm of the federal government,” in particular, the extended reach and scope of national executive and judicial authority into many spheres thither Considered the sacred jurisdiction of state and local authorities, was essential to passing and enforcing the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts. Moreover, it is no doubt true that meaningful racial equality would not have been achieved in America if “the long arm of the federal government” had not reached further and into many spheres thither considered the sacred jurisdiction of state and local authorities.128 Even so, with the good often comes the not-so-good; or in this case, regrettably development may have been the prerequisite, and its amplification the consequence, of worthy and overdue progress in another area. American more—in this case, the public’s expectations, even demands, of the national government and the extent of federal interventions Americans would tolerate—had already changed enough as a result of the New Deal programs that the sixties’ interventions for racial justice were, first of all, conceivable, and secondly, could be perceived as legitimate by an important portion of the American population. Following that, new federal regulations to protect the environment, to regulate the economy, to improve American education, and most recently, to redefine the state governments’ role in providing health insurance for low-income inhabitants of the states, have been tolerated if not actively embraced.

In all, the expanding scope of administrative centralization has not only progressively eroded the impetus that once inspired Americans to associate and participate actively governing themselves (the simple need to do so), but it has also chipped away at state and local authority, thereby reducing opportunity to do so. The story here, as Toqueville would tell it, is a familiar one: where less is demanded of people, people expect less of themselves. Pride is eroded. People retreat from public life. The extension of interest from self to community ceases. Loss is that constellation of characteristics Toqueville thought so essential to healthy democratic governance—so much of it instilled thanks to local self-government and everything connected to it. If local government is the "seed of free institutions," a federal government that costs $4 trillion a year is a toxin that wipes out every new shoot. As Donald Macleay explains in his aptly titled "Making Non-Citizens: Consequences of Administrative Centralization in Toqueville’s Old Regime," Toqueville perceived with respect to France that where local political activity is systematically disrupted by the intervention of bureaucrats acting as agents of a centralizing administration... the natural forms of communal association and self-government could not reconstitute themselves in the new circumstances.”129

Conclusion: An Altogether New America?

Some time after the fifties, following an interlude encompassing the most severe Depression and the most costly war in American history, American culture once again embraced the materialistic excellence first exemplified in the Roaring Twenties. Indeed, in many ways, we have gone much further today. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001—the most deadly attack ever to occur on American soil—the President did not urge young Americans to enlist in the Armed Forces in order to defend their

127 This list is compiled mainly from Walker and Victor, The Rise of Big Government in the United States, 60-62.

https://digitalcommons.murraystate.edu/crps/vol1/iss1/8
DOI: 10.61611/2994-0044.1031
country, nor that the general population prepare itself to make sacrifices as America grided for a war with the explicit aim of "making the world safe for democracy." Instead, George W. Bush urged Americans not to stop shopping. Today, there is the general recognition that the prosperity and peace of the nation depends on the material well-being of the individual worker—and on his (and her) confidence in the wider economy, on our willingness to keep spending our hard-earned money and working hard for more of it. We are attached to our right to be selfish, our right to immediate gratification, with almost religious ardor—it is the one great passion we all share. One detects in the President's exhortation the triumph of Alexander Hamilton's vision for America over the Jeffersonian, and in some senses, the Tocquevillean vision.

Near the beginning of Federalist 28, Alexander Hamilton reveals what he takes to be the guiding purpose of the new regime he imagined, and in which we are living. In contrast to Tocqueville and Jefferson's aims, the words "happiness," "greatness," "virtue," "freedom," "self-sufficiency," "morality," "independence," "education," "community," and "friendship" are noticeably absent. According to the New Yorker, "the principle purposes to be answered by union are these—the common defense of the members, the preservation of the public peace... the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the states, the superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries." He goes on to add that "government's authority must be sufficient to achieve these goals, an objective best accomplished, and accomplished most efficiently, by concentrating its authority in a strong and energetic executive."

What must first be noted of Hamilton's thoroughly modern formulation is the extent to which government exists not to promote any particular conception of the good life, but simply to protect mere life. Government must be powerful, but the point of its power is to defend Americans and their liberty to pursue whatever they, personally, call happiness from the comfort and security of a prosperous regime, and within the generous confines of the law. Duty and moral responsibility are sacrificed to personal choice—choice for the sake of generating economic and military power, according to Hamilton. Whereas Jefferson and Tocqueville intended to provide Americans with a salutary way of life and through it, a moral education—both designed to help transform ordinary human passion into beautiful action and America into a virtuous republic—Hamilton was more concerned with harnessing human passion in its most ordinary, most uncivilized form in order to transform America into a powerful republic, one capable of competing with Europe on equal terms. In the words of the first American economist, "The government of the Union... must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals and to attract to its support those passions which have the strongest influence upon the human heart." Unlike Jefferson and Tocqueville, then, Hamilton's goal was not to create a Constitutional arrangement in which the private moral-religious sphere, that part of American society rooted in the townships and the churches and dedicated to the purification of our strongest but often most disappointing passions, would remain strong, but rather, to exploit those low passions in order to build a nation much like the one which has emerged.

In his 1791 Report on Manufactures, Hamilton argued that "...nations, merely agricultural, would not enjoy the same degree of opulence in proportion to their numbers, as those which united manufactures with agriculture." Agrarian republics do not produce very much, Hamilton argues, precisely because there is little incentive to work hard where there is little material reward for doing so. What good is laboring to produce a surplus where it cannot be translated into myriad pleasure-enhancing things? Accordingly, to compete with commercial republics, "it is requisite to govern men by other passions, and animate them with a spirit of saviate and industry, art and luxury." Americans workers are tured to work hard, to produce a surplus, by the promise that a (small) portion of that surplus will be acknowledged as theirs personally, to trade for whatever luxury or whatever commodity suits their fancy. Thus, in times of peace, the industrial infrastructure is naturally strengthened as men—be they farmers, traders, artisans, or factory workers—engage in a restless struggle for commodity after commodity, luxury after luxury, that ceases only in death. More importantly, however, this modern economic arrangement provides a solid base of revenue and resources (from which to tax, and otherwise raise and support powerful armies in times of emergency.

As a result, in a very short time, the most powerful nation ever to exist has risen to prominence, and almost from nothing. But for all of the choice afforded to us, and in spite of our myriad comforts, it is hardly clear that the lives of ordinary Americans are particularly good or happy lives. How often do Americans talk about greatness, as Tocqueville would have insisted?

But let us stay closer to home. As Rousseau recognized (after Machiavelli, ironically), the human desire for material things and others' esteem is in principle infinite, while our capacity to satisfy these desires cannot but be

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186 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #16.

Happiness will always be elusive where one’s desires exceed his ability to satisfy them, however; in fact, the greater the disproportion between a man’s desires and his capacity to satisfy him, the greater his unhappiness. Yet the very essence of our consumer culture is the attempt always to multiply our superficial desires—so persuade us that we always need more. Toqueville’s emphasis on community, on family, on religion—his insistence on the importance of habits of the heart in preference to the materialistic habits of the European bourgeois Rousseau so deprecated—follows from his appreciation that bourgeois men and women can never be happy; they are destined to seek furiously after ‘imaginary repose.’

For a variety of reasons, however, the very foundation for the strikingly Rousseauan society Toqueville found in (mostly pre-industrial) Jacksonian America could not be maintained. In the decades since Toqueville wrote his masterpiece, industrialization and urbanization—and the opportunity for administrative centralization—have destroyed the township that constituted the indispensable root of community life for millennia. The consequence of our industrial-commercial disposition has been the erosion of tradition moral bonds—to family, to religious authority, to the small civil communities to which individuals once felt profoundly attached. The result absent authoritative moral guidance from an early age, very few are successful in the attempt to cultivate a capacity for inner-directedness, freedom, and wholeness as traditionally understood. At the same time, a powerful—and in many respects tautology—authority has risen among isolated and individualistic democrats. In the place of moral direction, today, men and women are left floundering about without definite aims or ideals. We are finally restrained and guided, but by forces external to us: by public opinion and by the threat of forcible coercion or economic penalty if we do not do this or that—what amounts to a political condition very much like the Soft Despotism Toqueville most feared.

Thus, we face a terrible dilemma in modern times. As Robert Bellah et al. aptly put it in Habits of the Heart, “Modern individualism seems to be producing a way of life that is neither individually nor socially viable, yet a return to traditional forms would be a return to intolerable discrimination and oppression.” More than this even, a return to traditional ways and norms is impossible for reason connected to the realities of modern political economy (and international relations), as well as the fact that Americans would simply not stand for it. In short, we would not easily (read: willingly) give up the

materialistic spoils of our easy and self-indulging way of life, so many of them for so many provided by that great tautology authority.

Some have proposed a return to a specific sort of localism—to something akin to the urban localism of Chicago as described in The Last City. If only power were returned to the states and important decisions were made at the local level by members of the local community, it is suggested, then perhaps civic engagement and association would reappear. While it is no doubt possible that ordinarily introverted democrats might be persuaded to leave their cocoon and to see beyond their narrow interests were local civic engagement to promote them important personal benefits connected to the affairs of their neighborhood, I doubt very much that this would go very far toward addressing the essential problem. The demise of the township is so regrettable because outside of it, the sort of education and training it alone makes necessary, appealing, and possible simply disappears. A resurgence of neighborhood organizations cannot be sufficient to retrieve the most important aspect of township life precisely because the loss of easy and self-indulging city life will always remain (only a short subway ride away) to compete with whatever demands neighborhood associations manage to make of their members—which, incidentally, will in no way provide a substitute for demands once made by the web of influences linked by the local political community. And in any case, most will choose licentious city life to obedience to authorities that are easily escaped and which are necessarily only loosely connected to their own lives.

Is there a way to combat the seductive appeal of individualism and materialism, to combat contemporary atomism? Probably not. But since it is a question of destroying old dogmas in favor of inculcating new wholesome opinions, post-progressive educational reform appears most promising to me. One might suppose that a curriculum built around stories and novels written to expose young readers to the emptiness of the busy, individualistic, lives recommended to them by contemporary cultural influences might go a way toward helping youth to question, for themselves, the adequacy of our materialistic city-culture for their own lives and future happiness. That literary movement, of course, was called modernism, and it accomplished precisely nothing beyond persuading the young to put down their books altogether—which was perhaps not the end of the world considering what came after modernism.

Rousseau, long before Facebook and cell phones, perceived the same problem, the problem of the bourgeois, very clearly. He also proposed something of a solution: he had high hopes for the pre-modern novel. As explanation for one of his own literary forays (that is, what he hoped to accomplish by a novel called Julie), he made this pronouncement qua philosopher.

125 Bellah et al, Habits of the Heart. 144.
Woah! It looks like the text is missing or has been omitted entirely. I'm not sure what's going on here, but it seems like there's a problem with the document's content. If you have more information or if there's a specific part of the text you'd like me to help with, please let me know!


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