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Human Migration Rates in Relation to HDI Scores of States

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HUMAN MIGRATION RATES IN RELATION TO HDI SCORES OF STATES

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HUMAN MIGRATION RATES IN RELATION TO HDI SCORES OF STATES

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of the requirements
for the Murray State University Honors Diploma

Amy Docter

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Abstract

Migration is a human phenomenon impacting various factors of society, politics, and cultures today that will continue to grow in both domestic and international importance. Despite this profound significance, there are numerous challenges for migration with little control of the flow of populations and limited understanding of the changing trends of migration. Historically, migration has been defined by South-to-North movements, with the main motive being economic opportunities with the allure of developed countries, but many articles today have found more South-to-South movements and myriad other factors influencing migratory decisions. By examining net migration population from 2014 and 2015, in conjunction with Human Development Index scores (HDI) with its variable breakdown from the year 2014, this paper attempts to answer the question of what factors cause net migration to increase or decrease. Specifically, it will be arguing that states with higher HDI value will have a larger net migration population.

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In 2017 alone, there were 258 million international immigrants, 150.3 migrant workers, 4.8 million international students, 68.5 million displaced individuals, 50 million irregular immigrants, 18.8 environmentally impacted individuals, and 25.4 million refugees (International Organization of Migrants, 2019). Of this gigantic population 48.8% were female and 14% were children (International Organization of Migration 2019). This population also contributed \$466 billion of remittances that were sent to middle- and low-income states (International Organization of Migration, 2019). Human migration is a common narrative facing all of communities, states, and any other political and social organizations. The universality of this phenomenon causes myriad problems nationally and internationally.

The arguably most affected factors are government institutions and communities – those groups of people who are in direct contact and living with migrants – due to the strain of resources and inability to manage rising levels of migrants. On the positive side, migration can aid in development in both destination and departure countries, especially with the practice of “brain circulation” in the framework that international movements are becoming easier with technology and information. For instance, in destination states targeted migration policies can help fill labor needs in certain economic areas, gender imbalance, and elevate the states’ overall development. In the case of departure states, migrants that leave and get a higher education may return, which can vastly aid their home states.

The struggle of governments is therefore obtaining the benefits of migration, rewards that usually coincide with positive policies and care towards migrants and migrant communities, while maintaining their internal structures and stability. This struggle of balance is due to the fact that institutions are man-made; thus, the things that impact and change the makeup of the populations impacts these foundations and organizations. This combines with the additional issue

of understanding and regulating such a phenomenon that is migration. Reactions against migrants and negative social concepts are factors that dictate pressure on policies regarding migration, and paired with the fact that migration is such a complicated and extensive issue, it can be hard to deal with all the facets of it. The shared trait of states is that migration holds monumental consequences at different levels of humanity, from geopolitical organization and states' policies to societal and cultural impacts on the receiving community and migrants themselves (O'Reilly, 2012). Human migration holds the potential to become a tragedy of the commons and international collective action problem, and both consequences would be dire for migrating populations as well as domestic populations.

Presently, there is a major dialogue reflecting upon the growing number and diversifying drivers in regard to global migration. In the face of globalism and changing patterns of relocation, economic opportunities, environmental changes, and a developing global system of governance and policies regarding migration, the study of migration has become a necessity today and for the future (United Nations Development Programme, 2009). An area of contention is what factors are truly behind the motives of migrants and the varying roles and significance that each generally agreed upon driver holds (Sanderson, 2010). In an effort to explore these factors and shed light upon such a perpetual human experience, academic studies and governmental research have been created to garner a better understanding of such a permanent, global, and impactful event that is human migration (O'Reilly, 2012). This paper explores the drivers of migration while trying to gain an accurate picture of which driver to frame in order to understand migration flows today.

In an attempt to add to this field and understanding of such a diverse and pertinent phenomenon, my research strives to determine factors behind net migration at a state level to aid

states in refining or bettering migration laws, institutions and organizations helping migrants and both departure and destination state, and current political and social practices in place. This data largely comes from Democracy Cross-National Data set and United Nations Human Development Programme: Human Development Reports, and the independent and dependent variables used will be from United Nations Development Programmes in the year 2014 and 2015. This paper will examine how rising levels of the Human Development Index (HDI) scores – a indices that seeks to numerically determine the educational, health, and economic well-being of states – on a scale from zero to one, impact the changing rates of net migration in states in a positive, negative, or possibly insignificant manner. The following results aim to contribute to reducing the problems of migration, in reference to the tragedy of the commons and collective action issues, and potentially aid migrants in regards to improved governmental policies—domestically and internationally—and better prepared communities.

Review of Literature

A key component to understanding international migration is looking at the rates of human movement at a state level, whether it be departure or retention rates, and trying to discern a pattern of such movements. A way to accomplish this is to examine net migration rates. The proposed definition of net migration by the United Nations Development Programme is, “net number of migrants, that is, the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants. It is expressed as thousands” (United Nations Development Programme 2009). This figure is derived from state-reported numbers of immigrants and emigrants – those going into the state and those exiting the state (United Nations Development Programme 2009). Using net migration, it is easier to gain a more accurate picture of the types of movement (entering, leaving, or staying) in

states' populations while seeing how states' policies and characteristics may impact rates of migration positively or negatively.

Levels of Examination in Relation to Migration

A factor to consider is how migration drivers have evolved historically and the levels of analysis they were studied. Modern migration has been divided into two waves; the first was between 1840 and 1914 and the second was 1914 to present, the focus of this paper (Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011). Each period has its own characteristics, and both need to be examined at three levels: micro, meso, and macro (Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011). The micro level can be understood as the individual's choice, with a weighing of costs versus benefits (Goldin, Cameron, Meer 2011). Meso focuses on networks, societal acceptance, and governance policies like the willingness to lower barriers or to help those trying to migrate (Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011; O'Reilly 2012). Lastly, the macro level examines the role of "demographic, economic, and political conditions that exert "push" and "pull" forces" (Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011: 98).

Of these three levels, micro and macro were the primary influences, and were commonly regarded as the main drivers in the past due to global movements being both more open and encouraged by the government and people's willingness to move, as can be seen in cases of colonization (Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011; O'Reilly 2012). The studying of migration and its trends tend to stick to these levels with little interplay, but new academics are pushing to tie all three levels together and show the relationships between each level on the migrant and the system as a whole, especially when considering the changing situations of states and their policies and how these relationships impact individuals (O'Reilly 2012). In the case of the second period of migration, new literature recently has begun to switch to this trend of

examining migration at all three levels (O'Reilly 2012). The importance of studying migration by levels is that it sheds light upon how migration is changing over time, and how aspects of each driver influences migrants (Black, Adger, Arnell, Dercon, et. al. 2011).

Drivers of Migration

Presently, the conversation around migration and the influences driving human movements with increasing recognized diversity, like the impact of intrastate conflict and environmental crisis. Generally, migration is being attributed to more specific motives, or drivers, and more focus is placed upon the individual's and government's roles (Black, Adger, Arnell, Dercon, et. al. 2011). The debate behind the drivers are largely centering around two distinctions: migratory patterns for a better life versus forced migrations; in layman's terms, migration driven by focus on general wellbeing versus physical harm (Black, Adger, Arnell, Dercon, et. al. 2011). These two groups – choice migration and forced migration – at their most basic level can be seen as a reaction against the changing drivers, especially in comparing the relevance of new migration drivers and changing situations in the world.

These changing situations can exemplified by myriad factors. In the case of choice migration, rising technological improvements in the sphere of information sharing and transportation are aiding these migrations. As for forced migrations, the turn towards intrastate conflict, especially since these types of conflict are on the rise and can be as damaging as interstate conflicts, increasing environmental crises, and technological improvements – those impacting choice migration as well – are all impacting this migration type. These distinctions and changes can be added to older migration drivers and even be further broken down along more traditional lines of examining migration; this dual reality can be helpful in explaining migration and understanding how it is evolving while in the framework of old drivers, which are understood fairly well. Commonly, the two groups are developed with attention paid to health,

education, and the overture of government involvement and policies versus economic opportunities (Lutz 1996). Going along with the new examinations, this section will briefly outline the above-mentioned drivers, and it will seek to find the most encompassing and best way to determine the main influence on migration today, especially in relation to new drivers.

Economic Input

Universally, one of the most agreed-upon drivers of migration is economic interests, whether it be people wanting to go to a country with better economic opportunities or people staying in economically strong areas (Black, Adger, Arnell, Dercon, et. al. 2011; Gorter, Nijkamp, and Poot 1998). The role of the economy is significant, especially when examining failing states and structural issues, while also having its own migration driving points (Lutz 1996). As Nayar states, “it is obvious that economics dominates the migration process” and by following push and pull motives there is “pull for those higher up in the economic hierarchy and push for those at the bottom” (Nayar 2014: 243). This can be derived from the fact that migration and the choices that go along with it have positive and substantial impacts on livelihood patterns, especially in the case of those coming from less economically developed states (Nayar 2014). The largest benefit is alleviation from poverty with large income gains for those who move to more economically secure states with better infrastructure and general stability (Nayar 2014; United Nations Development Programme 2009).

This experience aids the historical economic theories that asserted that migrants came from Less-Developed-Countries (LDCs) of the Global South and they typically resettled in the Global North in More-Developed-Countries (MDCs) (Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011). It is classified as South-to-North migration (Sanderson 2010). To clarify, the “North is synonymous with the industrialized countries where the income, on average, is roughly six times higher than in the developing countries, the South” (Lutz 1996: 337). The most common motive was

attributed to economic opportunities for migrants in their prospective new countries; in the past, these economic opportunities were largely more one way and permanent, but rising regional movements and technological improvements are making these migrations more fluid (Lutz 1996). This can be seen in older literature portraying such moves as “chasing the American Dream” and the hopeful futures desired by the migrants. Usually, they would move to countries of the Global North because of the economic development found there, and after moving they would send back remittances to their home countries (Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011; Lutz 1996). Much of these migrations were due to labor needs, which proved to be a major factor of increasing modernization (Castles 2009). The migration of populations, especially in the case of “brain drain” because of promises of wealth or opportunities in MDCs, would be directed towards states with higher economically developed labor systems and economic markets (Castles 2009).

While this economic motive of migration is vastly regarded as the main driver and therefore applicable, “theories that emphasize purely economic factors fail to capture the broader social framework in which decisions to migrate are taken” (United Nations Development Programme 2009: 13). Economic theories attempt to explain migration “at an individual (or micro) level,” which partially explains migrants’ personal goals but lacks the ability to capture the impact of migration as a whole (O’Reilly 2012). This is especially evident with the more “modern” versus “historical” roles economics has been playing on migration (Massey 2020).

According to Massey, “international migrants in the late 20th century generally moved from poor to rich countries in order to increase employment, raise earnings, and diversify sources of income” and “21st century international migrants increasingly appear to be motivated not by a desire to access opportunities but by a need to escape pressing threats to wellbeing from a variety

of sources” (Massey 2020: 13). The “variety of sources” Massey references are “state disintegration, civil violence, criminal predation, domestic violence, civil warfare, natural disasters, political upheavals, and economic collapse” (Massey 2020: 13). As can be seen, economic drivers are becoming less and less the main factor behind migration, and while it is still an important driver, much of that significance comes from its connection to other motives behind migration.

Health Drivers

Beginning with health, a rising importance is being placed upon physical insecurities with threats to life and the desire to move to relatively more stable states (Engel and Ibáñez 2007). Intrastate conflicts and violence are becoming primary motivators when it comes to migration, especially in cases of forced and displaced individuals (Engel and Ibáñez 2007; Adhikari 2012). Intrastate conflicts and violence are also important when considering the decline of hospital infrastructure, which impacts all sectors of society, as well as issues of general survival (Adhikari 2012). In states with civil wars, depending on the severity of the violence there can be an ousting of certain populations, i.e. religious or ethnic groups, that are forced to leave or face direct threats to their lives (Engel and Ibáñez 2007). This is connected with the general movement of individuals seeking to find safer and internally structured states (Engel and Ibáñez 2007). According to Lutz, “persecution exists in many parts of the world, such as Sudan, Myanmar, former Yugoslavia, and El Salvador. Ethnic tensions lead to murder in war times and persecution in peace times;” this reflects the threats to survival and lives and helps explain some migrations (Lutz 1996: 347). The potential for “improved access for work, civil and political rights, and security and health care” are common factors behind these migrations with survival and safety being of the utmost concern (United Nations Development Programme 2009: 49).

These migrants are generally referred to as refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced persons (Engel and Ibáñez 2007). Refugees are characterized by the forced migration as a result of conflict, violence, or prosecution with the added elements of race, religion, political stance, and social status (Engel and Ibáñez 2007.) Asylum seekers are closely related to refugees, but the main distinction is legal. Asylum seekers are migrants that have not obtained refugee legal status; obtaining refugee status is a process that begins with an asylum seeker, thus asylum seekers can become refugees (Engel and Ibáñez 2007). Lastly, displaced persons are similar to refugees in that they are forced to migrate, but they are pushed out by conflict, environmental, and epidemics (Engel and Ibáñez 2007). Another difference between displaced persons and refugees is the legal protections offered to each group; displaced persons do not have as high of a legal obligation tied to their movements, thus they are offered less protections (Engel and Ibáñez 2007).

In conjunction with migrations concerning survival and safety, those of the intrastate population that do not get pushed out because of immediate threat to their lives or their livelihood, oftentimes will eventually migrate due to the failings of the state (Engel and Ibáñez 2007; Adhikari 2012). With intrastate conflict and violence, there generally follows a breakdown in state infrastructure and the sectors that remain commonly cannot keep up with the population which puts the general population's health at risk. A main area impacted by the strain of the violence is healthcare systems (Adhikari 2012). Migration in these forced situations can be more permanent than other drivers, especially depending on how long the departed state stays in civil war and the specific reason migrants choose to leave (Adhikari 2012; Camarena and Hagerdal 2020). In cases where the violence is ethnically motivated and the migrants are fleeing as the discriminated group, even when the state ceases conflict, has economic and social growth, and is

relatively much more stable, many of these migrants will not return (Camarena and Hagerdal 2020).

In connection to this, the socioeconomic standing of the migrants plays a crucial role because typically those who depart more willingly and due to the state's infrastructural collapse will be able to return more easily if they desire because of their stronger social and economical state (Camarena and Hagerdal 2020). These groups depart relative to health concerns of a failing state, whether it be from physical threats to life through violence or declining healthcare infrastructure. When a state ceases civil conflict, has better control on violence, or generally improves the physical security of citizens, these groups commonly can and will return due to the conclusion of persecutions, discriminations, and ethnic cleansings which makes the departed state safe again (Camarena and Hagerdal 2020). The nature in which these migrants leave is key in understanding why and how long they will stay, the best policies for the receiving states to utilize, and the political and social changes necessary for departed states to achieve to regain migrants or support those who stayed (Massey 2020).

In addition to intrastate violence in the political and social realms, violence associated with drug cartels, gangs, and domestic threats is rapidly increasing the number of migrants seeking refuge (Orozco-Aleman and Gonzalez-Lozano 2018; Massey 2020). In Mexico, drug violence was linked to 6.4 homicides per 10,000 from 2006 to 2012, while in the U.S. there was only 0.12 per 10,000 drug related homicides in that same time period (Orozco-Aleman and Gonzalez-Lozano 2018). Overall, a substantial and growing amount of migration is being driven by violence, and sometimes the consequential breakdown of states because of it. According to Massey, "the total number of forced migrants in 2017 rises to 66.5 million, up from 20.7 million in 2000" with "the number of refugees increased by 64% and that of all forced migrants rose by

221%” (Massey 2020: 14). Much of this increase has been driven by health concerns, especially in relation to general survival (Massey 2020).

The idea of “environmental refugees” of “people forced to leave their places of origin by climate change, severe weather, or the social and economic consequences of these events” is another growing migration group (Massey 2020: 14). Right now, “the influence of the environment and environmental change is largely unrepresented in standard theories of migration,” and is most definitely not fully captured by the standard answer of economic drivers (Black, Adger, Arnell, Dercon, et al. 2011: 3). A growing number of migrants are having to flee their homes due to threats to physical survival from environmental disasters, states’ dire responses or inability to combat and aid populations from and after disasters, and also challenges to states’ health and social infrastructure due to overall state struggles derived from environmental problems (Massey 2020).

The environmental drivers are characterized as “availability and reliability of ecosystem services and exposure” (Black, Adger, Arnell, Dercon, et al. 2011: 3). These relate directly to environmental pressure on individuals and their survival- as is the case of rising water levels, desertification, declining soil production, natural disasters, and environmental catastrophes. (Black, Adger, Arnell, Dercon, et al. 2011; United Nations Development Programme 2009; Lutz 1996). Furthering the impact of environmental crises and its impact on health, the indirect role these problems have on increasing individuals’ and states’ competition over resources result in violence, declining access to resources needed for healthy living, and increasing exposure to harsher environments that impact physical security (Massey 2020; United Nations Development Programme 2009). Environment also indirectly impacts migration due to how it impacts the

other major areas dictating migration, like changing economic practices and jobs which also can potentially hurt personal security (Black, Adger, Arnell, Dercon, et al. 2011).

These negative environmental consequences will only deepen as climate change “is projected to increase environmental stress in already marginal lands and to raise the frequency of natural hazards,” which means the present threats to survival will deepen and new threats will arise (United Nations Development Programme 2009: 45). The role of environmental influence is a huge one with “some estimates of the numbers of people who will be forced to move as a result of climate change... ranging from 200 million to 1 billion” (United Nations Development Programme 2009: 45). It does not help that the majority of environmental catastrophes occur in developing countries, in which many states are not equipped to handle such stresses and consequences from such events, especially in healthcare responses and lacking health infrastructure; since the majority of migrants are from less-developed countries, this will only increase the amount of migrants (Lutz 1996). Overall, migration due to environmental factors can be summed up by disruptions of “elemental, biological, slow-onset accidents; developmental factors; and finally, environmental warfare,” all of which have the potential to cause immediate or imminent harm physically to individuals and threaten migrants’ lives (International Organization for Migration 2019).

Educational Evidence

Education is another driver of migration that acts as a cross-section between the general wellbeing and forced movement (Dustmann and Glitz 2011). In relation to forced migration, education-driven migration commonly is found in states that are unstable and suffering conflict (Browne 2017). The importance of education in connection to fragile and conflict-affected states is heightened when potential migrants have children to consider, and since state conflicts, depending on the severity, have the potential to break down a state’s educational infrastructure

many will move (Browne 2017). The main role education plays in this breakdown is not necessarily acting as a primary driver, but it is a key determinant of where migrants will choose to settle (Browne 2017). This ties into concerns of future careers and securities, and in the case of young children it often relates to family reunification (Browne 2017). There is a search for better educational institutions, and this pursuit is even more evident at university levels in many developing states (Browne 2017). Many students will migrate in hopes of attending a better educational program and thus securing their future, a fact that is supported by the increasing number of student migrants (Browne 2017; Dustmann and Glitz 2011). This point is important even in the destination country because it can help indicate patterns of settlement; some universities have varying access for migrants, especially illegal migrants, so it can help indicate where specific migrants may choose to go (Nair-Reichert and Cebula 2015).

Beyond this, in countries with low gender equality, there are larger migration populations of women (Browne 2017). Migration is seen as an opportunity and a way to escape possible persecution if education is specifically frowned upon for females in certain repressive states (Dustmann and Glitz 2011). This is also an important indicator for how long a female refugee will stay in a receiving country because if, upon return to their departed country their educational opportunities cease, they commonly will not return (Dustmann and Glitz 2011).

Education provides other avenues and protections as well in many developing countries, like those in South America and Asia, which view it as a way to overcome poverty (Browne 2017). It is a way to achieve security indirectly (Dustmann and Glitz 2011). This view is done on an individual level with migrants comparing opportunities consequentially from migration to opportunities spawning from lack of movement (Dustman and Glitz 2011). This comparison focuses on how migration opportunities would compare if one chose not to migrate with the

potential economic security due to educational attainment of those who chose to migrate (Dustmann and Glitz 2011).

This relationship is further exposed when comparing education attainment between those who chose to migrate and those who do not by looking at the generational effects when comparing both parties' children (Ichou 2014). It has been found that migrants who leave and obtain higher education usually surpass those who chose to stay, and coincidentally their children follow this trend which leads to an overall higher socioeconomic gain and security for those who migrate and get more education (Ichou 2014). A reflection of this is that education does play a substantial role in migrant choices because they will aim to go to states with relatively better education systems, thus improving education levels (Ichou 2014).

As for the general wellbeing aspects of education, the correlation of movement and education can be tied a number of ways. A rising phenomenon currently is "brain circulation," which consists of migrants traveling abroad for specific educational programs to return and support their own state and impact its infrastructure (Thomas 2008). This is becoming more prominent in states that historically have faced problems with "brain drain," a trend where migrants would be already skilled and not return to the state (Thomas 2008). "brain circulation" solves a number of problems for migrants; it allows them to gain necessary skills to promote a more secure future for themselves, may permit them to avoid dangerous situations in their home state, as is seen with Ugandans avoiding a violent regime, and builds a positive development system with human capital that will help their future generations and state (Thomas 2008). The phenomenon also is a way to track how long a migrant may stay abroad, which is helpful for receiving states to know and monitor (Thomas 2008). Generally, migrants who leave for educational attainment but plan on returning seek out education through the university level

(Thomas 2008). This gives a general idea on how long migrants from certain states may stay with the regard that most will stay until they complete their university training (Thomas 2008). Incentivizing “brain circulation” migration is that returning immigrants are more likely to be employed compared to their non-migrant counterparts who hold the same educational level and training (Thomas 2008). This is theorized to stem from a belief that education from more developed institutions in more developed states are given more value (Thomas 2008).

A last educational note in relation to general wellbeing promotion is the role of remittances. Oftentimes these monetary packages come because a parent chooses to migrate in hopes to provide funding and better lives for their family members (Cox and Ureta 2003). In instances where these funds were apparent, research has shown that investment in education is a common expenditure covered (Cox and Ureta 2003). It instills positive opportunities of development for the non-migrant members in the home country by offering children the ability to attend school in lieu of working and reenforce education infrastructure (Dustmann and Glitz 2011). It inspires human capital investment in the home country because in cases where remittances were present there were typically higher literacy rates and school attendances (Dustmann and Glitz 2011). Remittances increase school retention especially at higher levels of education and make it more costly to leave school (Cox and Ureta 2003).

The Role of Human Development Index

In light of the necessity to be more inclusive and take further considerations in the drivers of migration beyond economic development, specifically considering threats to health, education, and livelihood, the Human Development Index is a more comprehensive explanation for migration. This index operationalizes examining states’ development and the impact a states’ development has on individuals; it looks at the state level but sheds light upon the individual level as well (United Nations Development Programme 2009). It provides a numerical

distinction of the connection between the wellness of a state and the wellness of the population living in that state (United Nations Development Programme 2009).

In understanding the Human Development Index (HDI) values, a working definition and background would be beneficial. HDI is a number composed of three main dimensions: long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living (United Nations Development Programme 2009). This breaks down into indicators of life expectancy at birth, expected years of schooling with mean years of schooling, and gross national income (GNI) per capita to create dimension indices of life expectancy index, education index, and GNI index, which are the indices that combine to create the HDI score for countries (United Nations Development Programme 2009). The HDI values can be separated into low, medium, high, and very high levels, which are the following: low 0-0.499, medium 0.500-0.799, high 0.800-0.899, and very high 0.900-1 (United Nations Development Programme 2009).

The importance of this in relation to net migration, HDI is a more advanced set of criteria for determining a state's development beyond looking at economic development and provides insight on why some countries may have different HDI values in terms of domestic policies despite similarities in GNI or life expectancy (United Nations Development Program 2009). Utilizing HDI scores as a way to explain migration versus examining economic, health, and educational development individually provides a more encompassing view towards overall state development (United Nations Development Programme 2009). When employing solely one of those factors as an explanation for migration patterns there are issues of "false development" and a state appearing more stable and advanced than it really is (United Nations Development Programme 2009). For instance, some states may have a strong economy but are lacking educational and health systems. If a researcher were looking at a state in this situation they

would determine that the state is “developed” and therefore an appealing state to migrants. The economic development would be “propping-up” the state’s development which paints a false idea, but HDI controls for this issue since it accounts for multiple development factors.

HDI allows for the relative nature of HDI scores and states in a region to be comparable. It can show that migrants may not be looking for the most developed state, but one that is better than the one that they were leaving. There are also some shortcomings of using HDI in terms of inequality, corruption, environmental crises, poverty, and human security, but overall it grants a relatively accurate picture and standard idea on what states’ true levels of development are and the livelihood populations can expect in that state (United Nations Development Programme 2009). These shortfalls are also covered in HDI because many of these problems will impact a state’s economic, health, and educational systems, and while HDI does not specifically tackle these issues, they are incorporated to some degree (United Nations Development Programme 2009). In addition to what it directly measures, it also provides insight to governance because there is a high correlation between positive government policies and higher HDI scores; it connects how and why government policies influence healthcare fields, education systems, and economic practices because states’ governments are the most important actors in these sectors (United Nations Development Programme 2009).

The largest gains can be seen in the lives of migrants who move from low HDI level states to relatively higher HDI level states. This can be seen in the income differences between those who stay in low HDI states and those who leave; there was a \$13,736 income difference for those who move to high HDI states from low HDI states (United Nations Development Programme 2009). In the past, this movement was characterized by South-to-North movement, but this movement is no longer the most prevalent (Sanderson 2010). There is increasing South-

to-South movements, and this phenomenon may be connected to HDI levels of states (Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011). Also, tying into this connection is the individual agency of migrants. While migrants are to some to degree forced to move, many migrants now are more involved in their choice of where to go (Sanderson 2010). This agency can be characterized in connection with more South-to-South migrations due to the increasing ability of migrants to return and leave easier (Sanderson 2010). This ability is connected to the technological developments mentioned earlier; in the case of sharing information migrants are able to amplify their agency in performing a more informed choice as well as increasing their agency on the ground when reaching their new state (Sanderson 2010). With increased agency by migrants, and even on behalf of migrants in some cases, South-to-South migrations are becoming more normal.

In fact, this phenomenon is quickly rising with “one-half of all migrants from developing countries now [moving] to another developing country” (Sanderson 2010: 59; Castles 2009). The growing argument is that globalization is making this become the new trend due to increasing HDI levels for a majority of states- especially in the case of LDCs, and developed countries may no longer be the primary receivers (Sanderson 2010; Gorter, Nijkamp, and Poot 1998). Many of the past Southern departure states, individually and as a region, suffered under the Cold War due to proxy wars, intolerant and dangerous dictatorships, and being economically behind (Lozano Ascencio and Gandini 2011). The Northern states were destinations that escaped these dangerous situations and failing infrastructure then, but now, since many of these states and regions have settled politically and socially with increased economic growth, they are more attractive for regional movements (Lutz 1996).

Another aspect to consider in these movements to higher HDI level states is the fact that the states that typically have some of the above-mentioned drivers of migration, like intrastate

conflict and declining state infrastructures, are states with low HDI scores (Lozano Ascencio and Gandini 2011). The movement itself does not automatically mean the highest HDI states will be the only receiving states; it means that states with relatively higher scores than the ones migrants are leaving will be the target destinations of migrants, hence the reason why current stability in past unstable regions is causing more regional movement (Gorter, Nijkamp, and Poot 2009). Latin America is an example of this due to the rising rate of development in the region by some states and their linked rising HDI scores; this practice will only progress (Lozano Ascencio and Gandini 2011). The movements become more regional, contributing the more South-to-South migration, and will further the argument that developed states or states with strong economies may not be the only places to really consider as destinations, especially when other factors besides economic strength are considered (Lozano Ascencio and Gandini 2011).

The same trend of migration being based on states' relative development can be found in educational attainment, another factor of HDI and driver behind migration (United Nations Development Programme 2009). Furthering this point is "people who move to emerging and developing countries, as well as those who move within, tend to gain" and that this is contributing to the rising situation of "brain circulation" as well as "brain gain" with HDI and economic development levels on the rise (United Nations Development Programme 2009: 49; Castles, 2009). For "brain gain," migrants seek out opportunities educationally in higher-developed education institutions that generally are in states with higher HDI scores and return back to their home country after their education attainment (Ichou 2014). Essentially, destination possibilities, the number of people moving, and the amount of times people move, are all increasing because they are gaining more than just economic benefits like educational attainment (Sanderson 2010; Koser 2010). These educational movements can be connected to human

development levels due to the deeper understanding of other factors going along with economic development, which is typically improved because of educational attainment under “brain circulation” and “brain gain,” and the subsequent technology and expertise moving back to countries that need this information (Koser 2010).

In respect to this, the non-economic drivers of migration apply directly to individuals in conflictual situations seeking refuge, increase personal security, and will provide opportunities for the future (Gorter, Nijkamp, and Poot 1998). Because of this, states with relatively higher levels of HDI scores will be the most attractive receiving states because of their relatively higher security (Gorter, Nijkamp, and Poot 1998). The central inputs of the scores of HDI— education years and healthcare with life expectancy rates— are some of the main points of focus for migrants in these situations, especially when states in crises that have low scores of HDI struggle with these aspects (Lozano Ascencio and Gandini 2011; United Nations Development Programme 2009). The departure states typically are more unstable and unable to support some of the elements going into HDI scores, which impacts their native populations’ lifestyles, opportunities, and in extreme cases the lives of individuals themselves (Gorter, Nijkamp, and Poot 2009). Due to this, people will migrate to survive these circumstances while seeking out destination states with more stability and better infrastructure (Gorter, Nijkamp, and Poot 2009).

The relative size of the migrating populations will have a large impact on receiving states’ future HDI scores due to the states’ ability to handle the wide variety migrations. The framework of institutional aptness and the native residents’ feelings will play a large role in the support of such migrants, and if either of these aspects are lacking it can spell dire consequences for every level of the state and society with the expected decline of HDI scores (Gorter, Nijkamp, and Poot 1998). These components will determine the stability of such states after these

movements and this will either positively or negatively impact their HDI scores (Gorter, Nijkamp, and Poot 1998). A major player in this is states' political policies and citizens' social standards regarding migration and migrants (Koser 2010). In the international community, there has been a move away from interstate to intrastate war in the shape of civil wars, rebellions, and general unrest, which is causing different forms of migration, like refugees from persecution (Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011; Lutz 1996).

States' relationships with potential refugees and the barriers that they erect commonly cause more illegal migration paired with humanitarian issues, which is a challenge to the state as well as society in the sphere of being unprepared to handle migrants and the social rejection of them with the added negative to migrants' lives (Migration and Human Development 2009). In conjunction, it arguably cuts down on the potential benefits states may receive from allowing migrants to enter (Migration and Human Development 2009). This relationship is beginning to be uncovered when comparing states who actively seek out migrants that are prepared with governing policies, advocate for social acceptance in the domestic population, and focus on social inclusion of migrants (Migration and Human Development 2009). Receiving states who seek out migrants typically see a growth in their HDI as a result because they are prepared and are harnessing the potential benefits, which creates a positive cycle (Migration and Human Development 2009).

Global Governance and Policy Making Factors Cyclical Nature

There are myriad ways the policies and social attitudes also influence the flow of migrants (Mouthaan 2019). According to Goldin, Cameron, and Meer, "policy shapes the context within which potential migrants make their decisions about whether to move, where to go, and for how long" and that "most policies are aimed at either increasing or decreasing barriers to entry" (Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011: 116). The problem with this is numerous factors

impede progression of policies, norms, and international systems (International Organization of Migrants 2019). These blockages are multilayered with issues of sovereignty, domestic rejections, individual states' unclear objectives, asymmetrical process building (hegemonic influence), and the human factor being prominent issues (International Organization of Migration 2019). A possible solution in this area is the role of information and communication (Kotyrla 2019). Increased access to information has cheapened the cost of migration while also allowing migrants to find better migration policies for themselves, create international contacts, and form communities more easily in their host country (Kotyrla 2019). Plus, "existing migration routes and migration networks abroad facilitate the flow of refugees" (Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011: 115).

In response to this rapidly increasing flow and challenging situations, lagging government policies are playing a role. Many different actors outside of individual states are striving to fill this gap and are beginning to reshape ideas about borders and migration (Stock, Ustubici, and Schultz 2019). The already-present migration policies are being "confronted, succumbed, modified, and contested" by potential and current migrants, social organizations, and civil society actors to challenge how borders and legal roadblocks are sometimes unfairly in the way of migrants (Stock, Ustubici, and Schultz 2019: 1). This outside influence is not only on the defensive or supportive side of migrants with many receiving states' citizens calling for policies restricting migration (Bohmelt, Bove, and Nussio 2020). The increasing illegal migration and the consequences of such responses involve rising nationalism and xenophobia, degrees of "foreignness," acculturation, and assimilation issues for migrants (Migration and Human Development 2009; Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011; O'Reilly 2012).

A rising trend is how terrorism is impacting social attitudes and acceptance of migrants (Bohmelt, Bove, and Nussio 2020). Even when the terrorism is not in their own state and is not directly linked to refugees or migrants, public opinion in many receiving states will shift to become less open and kind towards potential migrants, those already there, and the possibility of providing aid to migrant communities (Bohmelt, Bove, and Nussio 2020). Thus, to counter potential terrorist attacks in their state, many civil groups will begin to voice their negative feelings towards migration and will push the government to create more restrictive policies (Bohmelt, Bove, and Nussio 2020).

Due to the complex nature and role that states' policies play in migration, it has been shown that states with migration policies aimed at supporting migrant communities generally are better prepared (Lutz 1996). The significance of this relationship is that when states are better prepared, even in some cases states asking for migrant populations like Germany, they typically reap more benefits from having migrants (Lutz 1996). This is not to say that the negative impacts of migration, like social conflicts and resettlement crises, are not felt, but the state is more prepared to control and tackle these problems, which in turn allows them to benefit the state overall, stabilize non-migrant inhabitants, and provide direct aid to the migrant populations (Dustmann and Glitz 2011).

From this, it has been found that states that are progressive with migration policies will see an increase in their HDI scores, and states that lack prepared and adjusted policies will decrease in HDI (Dustmann and Glitz 2011). The states that see a decrease in HDI scores in relation to their migration policies often have more of the negative impacts of migration, such as xenophobia, heightened nationalism, and even political polarity, with the potential positive impacts from migration being repressed (Dustmann and Glitz 2011). Thus, there is a distinct

circular relationship between governments' policies regarding migration and the benefits received from mobile populations. For states that had progressive policies, their HDI generally increases, which can make them appear a better destination to future migrants, and since they capture more benefits, these states should continue to make positive migration policies (Dustmann and Glitz 2011). On the flip side, states with reactive policies typically see a decrease in HDI, which may make them a less appealing destination for migrants, and as such states face more of the problems of migration, they may be reluctant to accept future migrants (Dustmann and Glitz 2011).

As mentioned, migration is occurring at unprecedented levels on a global scale, which inhibits single state controls and effectiveness, causing myriad diverse consequences: exploitation, lack of protections, inequality, disappearances, illegal movements, welfare, etc. (Koser 2010). As a result of these consequences, many migration policies are becoming humanitarian concerns and capturing public concern more (Lutz 1996; Koser 2010). Another reaction has been an increased call for international cooperation, and many institutions have been stepping in to help resolve this international problem through either acting themselves- like Amnesty International- or creating a forum of discussion and trying to formulate international agreements (Koser 2010; United Nations Developmental Programme 2009). The European Union is such an organization seeking to step in and relieve some of the pressure on individual states, especially because of the porous nature of EU borders (Zanker 2019).

In an attempt to help manage rather than control migration from Africa flowing into Europe, the EU is beginning to work more closely with some African states, like Ghana and Senegal, as well as organizations, like the African Union, covering migration to adopt better policies (Zanker 2019). Many committees in the United Nations are concerned with "liberalizing

and simplifying regular channels, ensuring basic rights for migrants, reducing transaction costs associated with movement, improving outcomes for migrants and destination communities, enabling benefits from mobility, [and] developing national strategies” (United Nations Developmental Programme 2009: 95). Overall, there is a direct connection between governmental preparedness, social acceptance, and general migration understanding, and as such the more that governments and societies understand about migration, the better implementation of policies and positive benefits are created (Lutz 1996).

Controlling for other possible explanations, the positive relationship between net migration rates and HDI scores will showcase the impact HDI levels have on migratory patterns and states’ characterization of being a destination or departure state. In connection to this theory, the changes in migration destinations of more South-to-South movements while in the framework of the modernizing world, it would be beneficial to study how shifting HDI levels of states may dictate migratory choices.

Methodology

Since the aim of this paper is to research how HDI scores influence net migration rates, it employs HDI scores from 2014 and net migration rates from 2014 and 2015 to track the potentially positive relationship. Both variables are at a state level and on a ratio scale with net migration detailing a country’s overall migration population per 1,000 and HDI scores indicating a country’s level of development on a scale of zero to one. Despite the state level data, both variables also interact at the individual level by showcasing individual’s movements and the type of livelihood individuals can expect due to HDI scores. The reasoning behind utilizing HDI scores in an attempt to answer migration questions and its connection to development is that HDI gives a fuller view on state development beyond economic rates, like gross domestic product

(GDP), which commonly has been the main marker behind development. It produces a larger view on what development truly is, and it looks at other appeals of states beyond just economic strength. The HDI values range from low, medium, high, and very high levels, which are differentiated as the following: low 0-0.499, medium 0.500-0.799, high 0.800-0.899, and very high 0.900-1 (United Nations Development Programme 2009). No state scores zero, and likewise they do not obtain perfect scores of one either. Below are the descriptive statistics for HDI scores in 2014.

Figure 1: HDI Scores 2014

		Number of cases
Minimum	0.34	185
Maximum	0.94	
Mean	0.6845	
Range	0.61	

For net migration, the rates allow both aspects of human migration—emigration and immigration— to be incorporated and see that some states have a lot of movement in spite of low levels of immigrants or emigrants. This number is derived from the totals of immigrants subtracting the total of emigrants into a given state per 1,000. It essentially measures population change and shifting demographics in states. It showcases flow trends for states, regions, and the world. When combining these two elements it allows the research to examine what aspects are most enticing for migrants and how states’ relative HDI scores may encourage movements when looking at other states in the region. Net migration rates can be very reactive and change quickly. Thus, year-to-year comparisons of net migration rates can be very different. The table below includes the general descriptive statistics for the years 2014 and 2015—the two years that this paper is utilizing.

Figure 2: Net Migration per 1,000

	2014		2015	
		Number of Cases		Number of cases
Minimum	-15.7	183	-54.7	184
Maximum	59.2		54.7	
Mean	0.3623		0.1266	
Range	74.9		109.4	

The two variables that this research paper is using are the Human Development Index (HDI2014) values by state as the independent variable and the net migration (UNDP_Migration2014) rate by state as the dependent variable, with both being from 2014 for the primary analysis. Both the independent and dependent variables' data come from the Democracy Cross-National Data set. Democracy Cross-National Data is extremely extensive due to its state-by-state information with many of the sources being from reliable organizations. The HDI variable comes from an extensive mathematical and logistical program run through the United Nations. The net migration variable comes from the United Nations as well, specifically the United Nations Development Program for Human Development Indicators.

The reliability of the data organized from such an organization is high because nearly every state in the world participates, barring North Korea. Plus, the findings for each state are published publicly, which means the data is easy to study, there are a multitude of related research articles and books on the topic, and anyone can replicate this study. There are many cases to choose from, which will aid in determining the relationship between the variables and if outside conditions are affecting certain results or states. This means that there are more cases and opportunities to determine if the variables have a similar relationship all around the world, not just regional phenomena.

In conjunction with the reliability of the data, the validity of the variables is consistent. The HDI data may be considered more valid due to the factors that go into determining the numerical ranking, but the net migration variable is also strong. The main point of contention behind the net migration variable is that migration is very difficult to trace for any state and some states may not have the operational capacity or resources to accurately track migration, especially in the case of illegal migration. Also, both variables collect data from state reports, which may cause issues of state transparency and doctored findings due to what states report. Despite this, the variables are strong due to the United Nations being the institution behind the data collection, and analysis and determining the actual values without state reports or input would essentially be impossible.

The research will examine how the rising HDI value, a ratio scale from zero to one, impacts the increase or decrease of net migration, another ratio scale. Other variables include net migration rates from 2015 and a breakdown of HDI scores from 2014 with GNI per capita, literacy rates for those 15 and older (UNDP_literacy15), and life expectancies (UNDP_Life2014). The last two variables are from the Democracy Cross-National Data set and the others are from the United Nations Human Development Programme: Human Development Reports. For net migration rates from 2015, it too is measured per 1,000 in states' populations and its descriptive values are mentioned above in figure 2. As for GNI per capita, this value is derived from a state's final income for the year divided by its population. Similar to net migration, there is a span of values that states can have with this variable. This can be seen in the table below, which highlights the general values of the GNI per capita from 2014, the year this paper is employing.

Figure 3: GNI per Capita 2014

		Number of Cases
Minimum	730	180
Maximum	123250	
Mean	18326.6	
Range	122520	

The other HDI breakdown variables are also important to shed light upon. In the case of literacy rates, the values for this variable are generated by state-reported information on literacy rates for their population above the age of 15. This is computed by taking the number of literate individuals divided by the total number of people in that age demographic. The values of literacy rate at its lowest can be zero, while at its highest 100. Literacy rates generally are seen as a way to measure the efficacy of a state’s education system.

Figure 4: Literacy Rate 2014

		Number of Cases
Minimum	25.3	145
Maximum	100	
Mean	81.7855	
Range	74.7	

Another state reported number is life expectancy. This value is determined by an aggregate population total of ages of those at the time of death, and this number is projected onto those at birth for their “expected” years to live. The age in years are only predictive values. This variable is impacted by a variety of factors, like nutrition, medical practices and availability, and presences and prevalence deadly violence. Overall, it indicates the strength of a state’s healthcare system.

Figure 5: Life Expectancy 2014

		Number of Cases
Minimum	45.56	189
Maximum	83.58	
Mean	70.3434	
Range	38.02	

As for control variables, there will be three different groupings. The first is concerned with the demographic of states with percentages of refugees in a population (UNDP_Refugees) and the percentage of the population that is already foreign (Migration_Pop). The percentage of refugees is calculated by dividing the number of refugees by the general populace of a state; the percentage of foreign population is measured by dividing the number of foreigners, or those not born in the particular state, and dividing by the state's population. The second set of control variables is the states' regime type (fhcat14). This variable is measured by Freedom House, an organization that examines states' governmental institutions. This variable is composed of 25 indicators, like electoral process, political participation, functioning of the government, and more, that are aggregated to create an index of the strength of a state's democracy. It is on a scale of -4 to 100, the -4 coming from an extra optional indicator, like ethnic cleansing. The scores states receive are subdivided into three levels: free, partly free, and not free. Scores from 71-100 are free, scores ranging 40-70 partly free, and scores from -4 to 39 are not free.

The third control group examines inequality and perceived corruption (UNDP_Gini2014 and CPI2014). The Gini coefficient captures inequality in states by determining income inequality for states; it measures this by comparing if income was distributed equally among individuals versus the reality of income distribution. The gap between income equally distributed and the how income is actually distributed is the Gini coefficient. States score on a scale of zero to 100. Generally most states reside between 20 to 70. The scale is divided, with zero to 19 being near perfect equality, 20-29 being relative equality, 30-39 being adequate equality, 40-50 a large income gap, and 50 and above being severe income inequality. The last variable, corruption perception index, determines how corrupt states are seen in their public sector and apply a score

from zero to 100 on that perception. The index is created by a panel of experts that examine a multitude of issues, like freedom of expression, openness to civil society, uncontrolled media, and more, to determine the corruptness of states. States are given a score from zero, being very corrupt, to 100, being very clean or lacking corruption. All the control variables come from the Democracy Cross-National Data set and are measured on a ratio scale.

The primary analysis will run a regression analysis examining the relationship between net migration and HDI scores from the year 2014. Following this analysis, a lag model will be run with HDI scores from 2014 and net migration rates from 2015. After exploring HDI scores as a whole, another set of regression models will be run that breaks down the components of HDI scores. The first model will utilize net migration rates and GNI per capita, literacy rates, and life expectancy – all from 2014, and the second model will be a lag analysis with the net migration data from 2015 and GNI per capita, literacy rates, and life expectancy still being from 2014. After these initial analyses, the controls will be implemented.

There will be four analyses run with the controls. The first model will be in a regression model with net migration and HDI scores from 2014. The second model will be the controls in the lag framework with HDI scores from 2014 and net migration rates from 2015. The third model will place the controls with the broken-down variables of HDI scores and net migration from 2014. The last model will be a lag model with the broken-down variables from 2014 and net migration from 2015. In analyzing the output from these tables, special attention will be paid to the adjusted R-squared values; this is due to the desire to uncover the correlation between the dependent and independent variables, and discovering what that relationship looks like. Also, the ability of adjusted R-squared in exposing predictability will help determine the importance of the relationship between the variables.

This paper is attempting to determine the relationship between HDI and migration rates, whether it be an inverse or positive correlation relationship. These variables were chosen due to their strong connection regarding influence and already extensive knowledge of both. Due to the connected nature of the variables, it may be hard to distinguish the exact nature of the relationship and whether or not migration also affects HDI levels. In concurrence with this, there are many other conditions that may impact migration as well, some of which are controlled for with the added control variables. Despite this, there are numerous factors, like foreign aid, states' diplomatic relations, and states' proximity, which may hold a significant impact on international migration rates and patterns. This is commonly the case with international studies and cases, and as such should be taken into account for any findings.

Analysis

After examining the role HDI scores and HDI scores' breakdown variables on net migration in both 2014 and 2015, the proposed relationship between HDI scores and net migration rates can be determined. The first table is this research paper's analysis baseline findings with running a linear regression between net migration rates from 2014 and 2015 and HDI scores from 2014.

Relationship of Migration Rates with HDI Scores: 2014 and 2015

Table 1: Net Migration and HDI Scores

	2014		2015	
	Coefficients	P-Value	Coefficients	P-Value
Constant	-8.041	0.001	-0.690	0.842
HDI Scores 2014	12.235	0.000	1.261	0.798
Adjusted R-Squared	0.063		-0.005	
N= 180			N= 174	

* When HDI and its component variables are included in the same model, VIFs exceed 10, which means multicollinearity exists and they cannot be included in the same regression model.

HDI scores are significant, which demonstrates support for the alternative hypothesis that HDI will impact migration rates. This significance is represented by the p-value, which is 0.000 for 2014 HDI. This value is under the .05 threshold so it supports the acceptance of the alternative hypothesis. The data also supports the idea that the relationship would be positive, as can be by the figure 12.235 per 1,000 in a population. This means that for every one point increase in HDI scores, the net migration of states that see this increase can also expect 12.235 more migrants, whether it be from increasing immigrants or more retention of potential emigrants. When applied, this effect ranges depending on states' HDI scores. For instance, the country with the lowest HDI score in 2014, Niger with .34, would expect approximately a population change of 4.16 population change per 1,000. On the opposite end, the state with the highest HDI score, Norway with .94, would expect 11.5 population change per 1,000. These numbers showcase the range of the effect on net migration in relation to states' HDI scores. The strength of these numbers though, and their ability to fully explain migration rates, is not very high.

This can be seen when examining the adjusted R-square value, which provides insight into the predictability of the figures. This analysis provides only 6.3% of an explanation of the variation in migration by supposing that HDI scores are the main cause. Due to this extremely low predictability value of only 6.3%, it is necessary to examine how HDI compares to other potential factors that may impact net migration, as is shown in the lag model with a one-year linear regression gap between HDI scores of 2014 and net migration rates of the following year. The relationship between HDI scores and their impact on net migration rates a year later is not significant and counterintuitive in explaining the relationship between the two variables. First, the impact of HDI scores on rates of migration has decreased sharply to only 1.261 more

migrants as HDI scores increase one point rather than the 12.235 increase of migrants when the variables are from the same year. This number 1.261 is even less important because it is not even statistically significant with a p-value of .789, which is much higher than the .05 threshold of significance. Another factor that displays the lack of relationship is the -.005 adjust R-squared value. The negative nature of this number expresses that there is not a relationship between the two variables and to assume a relationship between them is incorrect. The variability of the change in migration rates between 2014 and 2015 cannot be explained at all by using HDI scores from 2014.

Since table 1 does showcase a significant relationship between HDI scores and net migration with some predictability, yet it also conveys in the 2015 column opposite findings, when examining HDI scores and migration rates between years, a breakdown in the values of HDI may indicate what is really impacting net migration rates. This first step towards determining the important values and roles of certain variables in HDI scores can be found in the next table, which analyzes GNI per capita, literacy rates of those 15 years and older, and life expectancies in states in both 2014 and 2015.

Migration Rates Relationship with HDI Scores Breakdown: 2014 and 2015

Table 2: Net Migration and HDI Breakdown

	2014		2015	
	Coefficients	P-Value	Coefficients	P-Value
Constant	-8.620	0.084	-4.800	0.394
GNI Per Capita 2014	-0.0001579	0.600	0.000248	0.000
Literacy Rate 2014	-0.014	0.742	-0.066	0.160
Life Expectancy 2014	0.135	0.157	0.093	0.388
Adjusted R-Squares	0.001		0.293	
N= 134			N= 131	

When breaking down the HDI variable into its three main components, there is a clear distinction between which elements are affecting net migration and which are not. In the case of

the above table, it is shown that all the breakdown variables are not only insignificant, but also have an incredibly small impact. Starting with GNI per capita, it is insignificant with a p-value of .600. The next two variables are just as insignificant with literacy rates being .742 and life expectancy being .157. With all of the variables being insignificant, it is not surprising that the adjusted R-squared value is .001, which means it predicts one percent of the variability of the effect of these variables on net migration. This extremely low number dictates that these elements broken down lack an important relationship with net migration.

Interestingly, the fact that these variables hold no influence over migration rates further supports the connection between net migration and HDI scores in itself. It supports the idea that HDI scores as indices are distinctly different from the components that are the makeup of it, thus explaining why there is a difference in the significance and relationship when going from HDI scores versus the breakdown variables of HDI scores. In comparison to table 1, HDI scores as indices at least were statistically significant and did provide minimally more insight to the relationship between HDI scores and net migration with an adjusted R-squared percentage that is 6.2% higher. Despite this, there is still a large gap in understanding this relationship, which table 2 tackles with a lag linear regression model.

In analyzing the role that the one-year lag plays on the relationship between the breakdown variables and net migration, the first notable thing is that one variable, GNI per capita, is statistically significant with a p-value of .000. Making this finding even more important is that the other variables are not statistically important with literacy rates having a p-value of .160 and life expectancy having a p-value of .388. As for the impact of GNI per capita, it is also interesting that there is such a small connection between increasing or decreasing net migration because the coefficient is .000248. In the case of states with low GNI per capita, like Democratic

Republic of the Congo with a GNI per capita of 440 USD, they can expect .10912 migrants per 1,000. Conversely, in states with high GNI, like Qatar with a GNI per capita of 123,250, they can expect approximately 31 migrants per 1,000. This slight increase in GNI per capita conveys its smaller effect on migration rates, but this may tie into the differential nature of the net migration variable. It also should be remembered that this small effect is applied by per 1,000 in the population, so depending on the population size of the state this effect can become quite large. Since net migration is determined by subtracting emigrants from immigrants and the coefficient is .000248, this may denote a high degree of mobility of those who are choosing to migrate. It also may be tied into more regional movements because of the relativity of HDI scores, along with their makeup components, and the nature of regional movements, which tend to be highly mobile with people moving back and forth quickly and seeking better opportunities in a close place.

Another notable factor for this linear regression model is that the adjusted R-square is .293, which is much higher and illuminating on the relationship between the variables than the previous adjusted R-squared values. The value in this case denotes that the variables in this model are able to explain 29.3%, and while this number is still low, it is a markedly larger insight to the connection between these variables and their relation to net migration in a one-year lag framework. It highlights the fact that while the HDI score factors are unimportant during the same year, their impact does shift over time and their relation with the dependent variable of net migration. Despite this impact, there are numerous issues that need to be controlled for, which the next table will introduce.

Table 3: Net Migration and HDI Scores with Controls

	2014		2015	
	Coefficients	P-Value	Coefficients	P-Value
Constant	-6.666	0.002	-20.325	0.018
HDI Scores	0.789	0.689	0.248	0.976
Refugees 2014 (thousands)	-0.017	0.000	-0.005	0.674
Foreign Population 2005	0.113	0.001	-0.036	0.789
Regime Type 2014	1.463	0.000	4.947	0.003
Gini Coefficient 2014	-0.006	0.815	0.127	0.217
Corruption Perception Index 2014	0.080	0.000	0.172	0.035
Adjusted R-Squared	0.563		0.061	
N= 91			N= 87	

The relationship between net migration and HDI scores when controlling for other possible factors changes greatly from the relationship when controls are not included. The HDI score variable goes from being statistically significant to insignificant, at a p-value of .689, and other variables impact net migration more. Of all the control variables, refugee population per country of origin, foreign population per state populace, regime type, and the corruption perception index are relevant in affecting net migration values. With p-values of .000, .001, .000, and .000 respectively, each of these variables impact migration in different ways. Of the four significant values, foreign population, regime type, and corruption perception index cause more migrants as their values increase with values of .113, 1.463, and .080. This means that a state with higher foreign populations, the more “free” a regime is politically and civilly, and a state with a higher score on the corruption index, denoting a “cleaner state,” will be more attractive as a destination country, which is relevant for migrants who have more agency to choose their destination and helps migrants who lack the freedom to choose to settle in better.

Conversely, especially since the foreign population variable is positive, the more refugees a state receives the less attractive the state becomes as a destination with a value of -.017.

Another interesting value in this table is the adjusted R-square, which is .563. This value is substantially higher than all the adjusted R-squared values from the tables above and since it amounts to a predictability of 56.3% in covering how these variables impact migration rates, it is a strong indicator of the relationship between the significant variables and net migration with the ability to predict future or other movements by using those variables.

In connection to this relationship, the lag model data of 2015 on the migration rate is noteworthy to see if these shift in significance – a trend seen in table 1 with the year lag. Table 3 showcases that HDI scores are still insignificant, a carryover from table 1 and its lag model, even when there are controls added. HDI scores have a p-value of .976, much higher than the .05 threshold, thus making it unimportant when it comes to influencing migration rates. Different in 2015 than in 2014 is the fact that only two of the controls are statistically significant – regime type with a p-value of .003 and the corruption perception index with a p-value of .035. The relationship with migration stays positive and even increases for both in connection to migration with a value of 4.947 for regime type and .172 for corruption perception index. Overall, this linear regression analysis, despite the impact of regime type and the corruption perception index, is not a good indicator of what influences migration as can be seen with the 6.1% value of the adjusted R-squared. This low value and the lack of HDI scores' influence is further explored in the next table, which runs a linear regression analysis with the HDI scores' breakdown variables and the controls.

Table 4: Net Migration and HDI Breakdown with Controls

	2014		2015	
	Coefficients	P-Value	Coefficients	P-Value
Constant	-5.63	0.039	-30.007	0.004
GNI Per Capita 2014	-0.000002308	0.826	0.000227	0.000
Literacy Rate 2014	0.007	0.670	-0.088	0.177
Life Expectancy 2014	-0.007	0.860	0.213	0.164
Refugees 2014 (thousands)	-0.016	0.000	-0.005	0.553
Foreign Population 2005	0.179	0.000	0.007	0.960
Regime Type 2014	1.093	0.008	4.181	0.007
Gini Coefficient 2014	0.020	0.434	0.116	0.219
Corruption Perception Index 2014	0.047	0.063	0.185	0.053
Adjusted R-Squared	0.562		0.419	
N= 70			N= 68	

This table somewhat continues the statistical significance pattern seen in table 3 in 2014 with the variables of refugee population per country of origin, foreign population percentage, and regime type all being significant. The corruption perception index is no longer statistically significant when the regression is run with HDI component variables and net migration in 2014. With p-values of .000, .000, and .008, they are the only values on this table that are statistically important, which also follows along with the trends from table 1, which showed how the HDI breakdown variables were all insignificant as well. Also carrying over from table 1 is that the nature of each variables' relationship does not change. The coefficient for refugees is still negative, while the foreign population and regime type are still positive. Interestingly, the 2014 data does diverge with table 1 in that the adjusted R-squared value is much higher, and thus, making the statistical relationships in this table much stronger. The .562 value of the adjusted R-squared, or 56.2%, highlights the close relationship between the significant values and migration rates.

Another noteworthy characteristic of this value is that it acts conversely from table 2. The extremely low adjusted R-squared value in that table for the year 2014, .001, is completely flipped when running the same HDI breakdown variables with the same year net migration rates with controls for a value of .562. This huge increase without a change in significance for the HDI breakdown variables showcases just how much the control variables are explaining the rates and possibly patterns of net migration, thus making HDI scores seem further removed. This is not completely the case, though; HDI scores and their influence can be seen in the lag year model when net migration is from 2015.

Migration in the above regression output is chiefly influenced by the GNI Per Capita variable, as can be seen in the .000 p-value, and by the fact that only one of the other control variables have statistical significance, regime type with a p-value of .007, which has consistently been significant. This draws light to the fact that none of the last few variables – refugee population, foreign population, and the corruption perception index – were significant. This is an important shift because of all the data from the tables with the control variables accounted for, this is the only one where at least one of these independent variables is significant while only one control variable is significant. Paired with this, the fact that only GNI per capita is significant out of all the component variables of HDI scores highlights its more direct role and relationship with net migration. The other breakdown variables of HDI scores, literacy and life expectancy, are still not statistically significant, which follows the trend from table 2. It also provides further support of the relationship of the importance of GNI per capita when applying a year lag, as can be seen in the differing statistical importance in table 2 for both 2014 and 2015.

Along with this, the prominence of the connection between GNI per capita and net migration is amplified by the adjusted R-squared value of .419, or 41.9%. This value is larger

than that in table 2 for 2015, and emphasizes the significance of GNI per capita, especially when all other variables are insignificant except regime type. The fact that the coefficient is still .000227 echoes the idea that migration movements are extremely mobile between states and the possible factor that movements are being done regionally. Also, keeping in mind that this effect is applied per 1,000 in a state's population is key due to the relevance of population rates. Putting this into perspective with the two GNI per capita cases above, when GNI per capita's effect is applied to the Democratic Republic of the Congo's GNI per capita of 440, the effect is .09988 per 1,000 in the population. As for Qatar and its GNI per capita of 123,250, the effect is 27.977 per 1,000.

Final Analysis

The definitive relationship between net migration and HDI scores is anything but a definitive relationship, as can be seen in the fluctuating relevance and significance in the tables above. When trying to determine if HDI scores do have a positive relationship with net migration, only table 1 supports the idea that a higher HDI score will increase a state's net migration rate. Despite this support, since the adjusted R-squared value is so low, this support can be seen as very fickle, something that table 1 in 2015 and table 3 for both 2014 and 2015 showcase, since HDI scores are no longer statistically significant. In short terms, HDI scores as indices are only positively correlated with net migration when examining data from the same year and there are no other possible influences provided as alternative impactors on net migration.

When HDI scores are broken down into its components, GNI per capita, literacy rates, and life expectancy, there is a slightly better correlation between HDI scores and migration rates. In tables two and four, GNI per capita is statistically significant. Problematically for HDI scores, neither of the other two breakdown variables of literacy rates and life experiences are significant.

This makes it seem that net migration is correlated with GNI per capita and not HDI scores since not all of the variables were significant. Also, GNI per capita was only statistically significant when placed in the lag model with its values being from 2014 and those of net migration from 2015. This difference further removes it from the same scope of HDI scores because HDI scores were only relevant when the data of its scores were from the same year as the net migration.

Another diverging factor is that in the tables where GNI per capita was significant, no other variable or control was significant except for regime type, thus GNI per capita was the only variable impacting net migration in these regressions with only one control variable also having an effect on net migration. This further supports the idea that GNI per capita has its own impact on net migration without a reliance on HDI scores to prop its relationship. Along these lines, the adjusted R-squares in the tables in which only GNI per capita was significant out of the HDI score components were much higher values than the adjusted R-squared value in the table in which HDI scores was significant, which denotes a stronger connection between the GNI per capita and net migration. Knowing this, it calls into question when HDI scores were statistically significant if this was propped up by the close relation between net migration and GNI per capita. This issue of propping by GNI per capita for HDI scores can be written off slightly considering that HDI scores were only significant when HDI scores and net migration rates were from the same year, while GNI per capita was only significant when GNI per capita and net migration rates were from two different years.

One thing that HDI scores do have a higher value on is its effect on the rates of migrants as can be seen when comparing HDI scores' coefficients with those of GNI per capita. When significant, HDI scores increase net migration 12.235 per increase of one point in HDI scores. Conversely, every time that GNI per capita is significant, it increases net migration by .000248

and .000227 per one dollar increase in GNI per capita; it should be remembered this effect on net migration is per 1,000. This may be due to the increasing mobility of migrant populations, especially in the case of regional movements which typically support season or cyclical movements. Regional movements are supporting the rising trend of more South-to South migration rather than South-to-North migration. The role of GNI per capita, which has been slowly rising in many developing or lesser-developed countries, paired with the increasing regional migration supports this trend. This may be tied into relative regional HDI scores as well since GNI per capita is a variable used in the HDI indices. While the other aspects of HDI scores were not relevant in the tables above and GNI per capita was, it does not mean that net migration is impacted by GNI per capita and not HDI scores, especially when HDI scores from the same year as net migration are significant and GNI per capita from the same year as net migration is not.

Conclusion

Overall, the findings in this paper provide further illumination on the human phenomenon that is migration. While HDI scores of states do play only a minor and sometimes insignificant role, knowing this information is important for states to understand, especially when considering how their own development may make them appear as a destination or departure state. Besides the role of HDI scores, the secondary findings of the importance of refugees in populations, percentage of foreign populations in states, regime type (free, fairly free, and not free), and the corruption perception index all shed light upon what other factors are potentially taken into account for migrants. Along this line, the breakdown of HDI scores into its respective divisions of economic security, education, and health help determine which factor is significant and when this applies.

The role time plays on migration can be briefly seen when the independent variables, from HDI scores to its breakdown variables, were significant. Since HDI scores were only significant when in the same year as migration, this may provide an idea of the connection and importance of HDI scores being an indicator of general expected wellbeing of those living in those states. This would come into play in the case of forced migrations, especially those that are very rapid with migrants being driven by crises in personal survival. Tied into this type of forced migration is the rising role of regional movements. In these cases, migrants are not looking necessarily for destination states to settle in for long term reasons, but as short-term solutions. In connection with this, some cases of forced migration impact large segments of societies, like environmental disasters, and relating to populations of lower socioeconomic status, their ability to migrate to far destinations or states with marginally higher HDI scores can be limited due to monetary issues. This can be connected to the rising trend of South-to-South movements, which are diverging from past historical trends of South-to-North directional migration movements.

As for the breakdown variables, the only time any of these variables was significant was in the models with a one-year lag. Along with this, only GNI per capita was statistically significant, which may point to the role economic security and opportunity plays on decisions for migrants, especially decisions in cases of non-forced migration. While this research paper did not examine the role of economic development or security outright, it would be advantageous to analyze if economic factors are more influential in migrations that are more planned or thought out rather than forced. Another interesting insight that the breakdown variables provide is that when GNI per capita was significant, no other factor other than regime type was statistically significant. This illuminates the direct connection between GNI per capita and net migration, and does provide the idea that maybe GNI per capita is a significant driving force behind migration.

Expanding upon this, in relation to the impact on net migration, GNI per capita did not increase or decrease migratory rates drastically – only by .000248 and .000227. This may possibly be linked to increasing mobility of migrants themselves, as can be seen in seasonal migrations, lowering barriers to migration with more favorable government policies, improved travel methods, wider information networks, and the increasing number of drivers. Just because education and health indicators in the HDI breakdown variables did not register as significant in this research does not mean that they are insignificant or are not drivers of migration. There are numerous reasons why people choose to migrate, many of which we have not uncovered the significance of or when such drivers are relevant, which reflects upon the nebulous and complicated nature that is the human phenomenon of migration.

In spite of the global scale presented and the extensive cross-national comparisons afforded in this paper, there are limitations to the data and also the foundations to explaining migration itself. In regards to the data, some states are not featured due to the lack of data present on them and the data itself is commonly state reported. This raises the question on the legitimacy of the data, especially in cases where states would like to present a more positive front so their reporting numbers may be favorably skewed. Despite this, the majority of the data is from the United Nations in some scope, which brings back some legitimacy due to the strength of the UN institution.

Another possible limitation in the data is the tracking of net migration, which is typically more difficult than what is assumed on paper. For instance, illegal migration poses a challenge of determining actual numbers for even large, organized countries. This effect is only heightened in smaller, less-organized states who may lack the resources to accurately track such an issue. Beyond the data, trying to utilize HDI as the main explanation behind net migration increases or

decreases is arguably presumptuous. In cases of forced migration, whether it be natural disasters, civil wars, or political and social persecutions, HDI would probably not play as huge a role in an individual's choice to leave than in cases of more regular migration. HDI scores may possibly help determine the destination countries.

Since comparing HDI values and net migration rates hopefully provide researchers with at least a baseline of understanding in the most basic sense, further research may be conducted in regards to the individual with more observable experiences and testimonies. By understanding the individuals' reasoning behind movements, researchers may be able to glean information not previously taken into account or the significance of different factors, especially in cases of forced migrations. It could also potentially be done regionally to determine if certain cultural, social, and political elements play a larger role in the individual's thought process in some parts of the world versus others.

In addition to this, it would be of interest to see how an individual's knowledge of states' regulations of migration impact their choices, and ascertain if the individual is accurately informed of states' laws. Also relative to the migrant, breaking down net migration by age groups would be a good next step in trying to understand how HDI scores and its components effect migration decisions. This may expose if age plays a role in what migration factors are most attractive to certain age groups. Along the informed vein, examining states' changing policies in respect to migration – strategies aimed at attracting certain qualities in migrants, legal guidelines of migration and the ease or difficulty of said rules, and states' policies in regards to populace push back or acceptance – would all be interesting avenues of research that would further illuminate the role of states in modern migration patterns. Since migration is such a global phenomenon, yet is uniquely a human experience, seeing how international barriers

interact with immigration and emigration would be key to study in hopes to clarify and better manage such a difficult issue that will only continue to grow in numbers and globally.

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