



ANDREW H. FOOTE AND THE GUNBOATS AT FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON

by

Lonnie E. Maness, Ph.D.

Soon after the firing on Fort Sumter, James B. Eads of St. Louis, Missouri, was in Washington conferring with Gideon Welles, the Secretary of the Navy, and Gustavus V. Fox, later Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Then in August, Eads, being the best bidder for the construction of an ironclad gunboat fleet for the western waters, was awarded a contract for the construction of a fleet of seven vessels, to be completed and ready for action within sixty-five days.¹

These vessels, according to contract, were to draw six feet of water, be covered with 2½-inch iron plate, have a speed of nine miles an hour, and carry thirteen heavy guns each. Each boat was to be 175 feet long, have a 51½ feet beam, and the sides were to be sloped at an angle of about thirty-five degrees. Each was pierced for three bow guns, eight to the broadside (four to each side), and there were to be two stern guns. These vessels were the **DeKalb** (at first called the **St. Louis**), **Pittsburgh**, **Mound City**, **Cairo**, **Cincinnati**, **Louisville**, and **Carondelet**. Even before these gunboats were completed Eads contracted to convert the snag-boat **Benton** into an ironclad, the largest of the eight gunboats. The **Benton** was about two hundred feet long, had a beam of about seventy-five feet, and was covered with iron 3½ inches thick on the side casements and bow. The wheel-house and stern were covered with 2½ inch iron like the other seven vessels. The **Benton** carried sixteen guns—seven 32-pounders, two 9-inch guns, and seven army 42-pounders.² Altogether, the ironclad fleet of eight gunboats mounted one hundred seven guns. These ironclads, supplemented by several woodclads, is the fleet that Flag Officer Andrew Hull Foote would use to such advantage to the Union cause in the campaigns against Forts Henry and Donelson on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers.

Foote assumed command of the Western Flotilla at Cairo, Illinois, on September 6, 1861, even before Eads had completed the construction of the ironclads. In order to expedite the completion of the ironclads, Foote stationed himself in St. Louis so he could work closely with Eads and the army commander, meaning first John C. Fremont and after his removal, Henry W. Halleck. Foote placed Commander Henry Walke in charge of the woodclads at Cairo, these being the **Tyler**, **Lexington**, and the **Conestoga**.³

By mid-January, 1862, the ironclads, now increased to nine by the addition of the **Essex**, were at Cairo and ready for action, along with a large number of mortarboats and troop transports. The woodclads under Walke

had already received their baptism of fire in the Battle of Belmont, Missouri, in early November, 1861. In fact, had it not been for these wooden gunboats, Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant would not have been able to successfully retreat from Belmont.⁴

By early 1862 the Confederate line of defense stretched from Columbus, Kentucky, eastward through southern Kentucky to Bowling Green and on to Cumberland Gap in eastern Kentucky. Forts Henry and Donelson were important links in this line. They had to be held or middle and west Tennessee would fall, and Union forces could then penetrate all the way to northwestern Alabama and even invade Mississippi. Grant realized that Columbus was too strong for a frontal assault to succeed; thus he never made the attempt. However, both he and Foote realized that the two river forts, Henry and Donelson, were vulnerable to a combined operation by both army and naval units. Their capture would isolate and outflank the Confederate positions at Columbus and Bowling Green. In fact, the Union Navy had been watching Fort Henry very closely since the past October.⁵ On January 22, 1862, using the woodclad **Lexington**, Brigadier General Charles F. Smith made a reconnaissance of Fort Henry. In his report to Grant, he stated "that two iron-clad gunboats would make short work of Fort Henry."⁶

Grant and Foote were of essentially the same opinion. Halleck had previously turned down a request by Grant for an attack on Fort Henry, and Grant was reluctant to make another request. However, at Foote's insistence, both he and Grant now sent new requests to Halleck, dated January 28. In his request Foote stated that both he and Grant believed that Fort Henry could be taken with the use of four ironclads and infantry. Grant stated that he would "take Fort Henry . . . and establish and hold a large camp there . . . The advantages of this move are as perceptible to the commanding general as to myself, therefore further statements are unnecessary."⁷ On January 30, Halleck instructed Grant to make his preparations to take and hold Fort Henry. He was to take all available forces from Paducah, Smithland, Fort Holt, Bird's Point, Cairo, etc. However, Grant was cautioned to leave sufficient garrisons at these places in order to hold them against a possible attack from Columbus where Leonidas Polk had a garrison of some 17,000 troops. Grant was urged to move with dispatch because a telegram had just arrived from Washington and warned that General Pierre G.T. Beauregard had left Manassas Junction, Virginia, four days previously with fifteen regiments with which to reinforce the Confederate line of defense in the west.⁸

Having received permission to move, Grant and Foote now acted with dispatch. According to plans previously formulated, four ironclads, along with the three woodclads, rendezvoused with the troop transports at Paducah on February 3. From there they proceeded up the Tennessee River. The first transports carried Brigadier General John A. McClelland's division. They were escorted by the **Essex** and the **St. Louis**, two powerful ironclads. Foote left Paducah with the rest of his gunboats a few hours later.

At 4:30 a.m. on the 4th the convoy was eight miles below Fort Henry. McClelland's division started to disembark. Grant studied the maps of the area and soon decided to put the troops back on their transports. They were taken to Bailey's Landing, some four miles below Fort Henry. The transports were sent back to Paducah to pick up Smith's division. On the 5th the transports returned with Smith's troops, bringing Grant's strength up to some 17,000 men at Bailey's Landing. Grant now began to make his plans for the investment of Fort Henry while the gunboats attacked. Foote was also busy on the 5th clearing away Confederate mines that had been wrenched loose from their moorings in the front of the fort, mines that were floating downriver toward the fleet.⁹

The defenders of Fort Henry were not able to withstand the Union onslaught. There were some 2,610 troops with which to do the job. The earthworks of the fort had eleven artillery pieces on the river side. There were entrenchments surrounding the fort which the garrison occupied. The artillery was manned by Company B, 1st Tennessee Artillery, consisting of some fifty-four men and commanded by Captain Jesse Taylor, an experienced artillerist and a native of Lexington, Tennessee.¹⁰

Brigadier General Lloyd Tilghman, the commandant of Fort Henry, was able to ascertain that the Federals were close by and in overwhelming numbers, after some preliminary skirmishing. Early in the morning of February 6 Tilghman knew that Grant had thousands of troops plus seven gunboats at hand. He also knew that Grant had put part of his infantry on the west bank of the Tennessee River in order to move against Fort Heiman, located across the river from Fort Henry. Realizing that this made Fort Heiman untenable, Tilghman ordered it evacuated.¹¹

The Confederate commander was a realist. He knew that Fort Henry could not withstand such odds. However, Fort Donelson might survive if it was reinforced, and his 2,610 man garrison could help in making a successful defense of that fort. At least his garrison could help hold the fortress long enough for General Albert Sidney Johnston, the Confederate commander in the west, to make a new disposition of forces that would be necessary if the center of the defensive line, which rested on Forts Henry and Donelson, both fell to the Union forces. Tilghman believed that the fate of the left wing of the Confederate Army at Columbus depended on getting his men to Donelson and holding it as long as possible.¹² Having reached this conclusion, he ordered his second in command, Colonel A. Heiman, to assume command of the garrison troops and began the withdrawal to Fort Donelson. Tilghman, being urged by many of his men and officers, decided to remain at Fort Henry with Captain Taylor and his artillerists and fight a delaying action.¹³

At 11 a.m., February 6, Grant put Smith in motion toward Fort Heiman; McClelland moved directly on Fort Henry at the same time. Both were hampered in their movements by mud on the roads and swollen streams because it had rained throughout the previous night.¹⁴ Foote and his gun-

boats also got under way at 11 a.m. His battle formation consisted of two divisions, the first and second. The First Division consisted of the four ironclads. These were: the flagship **Cincinnati**, Commander Roger N. Stembel; **Essex**, Commander William D. Porter; **Carondelet**, Commander Henry Walke; and the **St. Louis**, Lieutenant-Commander Leonard Paulding. The Second Division consisted of the three woodclads **Conestoga**, **Tyler**, and **Lexington**, commanded respectively by Lieutenant Commander S.L. Phelps, Lieutenant Commander William Gwin, and Lieutenant Commander J.W. Shirk. Phelps was in overall command of the woodclads.¹⁵

The gunboats steamed up to Panther Island, some two miles below Fort Henry. Having passed the foot of the island, the gunboats formed in line and approached the fort with the four ironclads in the lead—four abreast. The woodclads followed astern and took up a supporting position. It was now 11:35 a.m.¹⁶ A momentous battle was about to take place. This would be the first time that American-built ironclads would be tested under fire and the first time that American officers and crews had fought in such vessels. This was also to be the opening move in the western army's first campaign of 1862.

As the gunboats moved up the narrow Tennessee, not a sound could be heard. There was no activity in the dense woods on the riverbanks. About noon the fort and the Confederate flag came into view, along with the barracks, new earthworks, and guns facing the river. On came Foote's gunboats. The time and place were most opportune for the upcoming battle. The river was at high tide; part of the fort was under water along with some of the guns, and the Confederates could not direct a plunging fire at the gunboats. In other words the Confederate guns were at about the same level as the Union guns on the river. Besides, should the gunboat attack fail, the fort was surrounded by high ground on all sides, terrain that would be advantageous to an investing army.¹⁷

When Foote had closed to a range of 1,700 yards, the flagship **Cincinnati** fired the first shot at Fort Henry. It was now 12:30 in the afternoon. The other gunboats opened fire immediately, a combined fire from over fifty guns which far overmatched anything Tilghman could direct at the gunboats with his eleven heavy guns.¹⁸ Captain Taylor assigned each of his guns a specific vessel to which it was to pay its compliments. As the gunboats approached, they increased the rapidity of their fire. Taylor's men commenced firing. On came the gunboats until they were within six hundred yards of the Confederate guns, and for the next thirty minutes or so the fire was terrific on both sides.¹⁹

Some twenty minutes before Tilghman surrendered, the ironclad **Essex** was totally disabled by a shot through her middle boiler. Steam and hot water sprayed the forward gundeck. The master's mate, S.B. Britten (the captain's aide), was killed by the shot before it entered the boiler. Others were killed by the scalding steam and water; still others that had

been scalded jumped into the river and drowned. All told, thirty-two lives were lost because of that one shell. Among those wounded was the ship's captain, William D. Porter. He was badly scalded and splattered with blood and brain tissue. Unfortunately, he was standing near Britten, looking out a porthole, when the young man's head was torn to bits by the shell. The **Essex** drifted downstream out of range and out of action. The **Essex** had been hit fifteen times.²⁰

The Confederate fire was rapid and accurate. It "broke and scattered our iron plating," Walke remarked, "as if it had been putty, and often passed completely through the casements."²¹ The **St. Louis** was struck seven times, but no one on board became a casualty of war. The **Cincinnati** was struck thirty-one times, and there was extensive damage to the after-cabin, her chimneys, the lifeboats, and two of her guns were disabled. One crew member was killed, and nine others were wounded. The **Carondelet** was struck six times, but there were no casualties.²²

For a moment after the **Essex** was disabled, the fleet hesitated. It looked as if the Confederate defenders might make a successful defense of the fort. Then things began to go wrong for the defenders. The very effective 24-pounder rifled gun burst, disabling every gunner at the piece. Immediately following the loss of the 24-pounder, the vent of the 10-inch columbiad closed, rendering the big gun useless. The vent could not be reopened. The fleet had now closed to a distance of less than six hundred yards. Shortly, all but four of the defending guns had been rendered useless.²³

Tilghman now realized that further resistance would only cause a useless loss of life. Besides, the delaying action had achieved its intended purpose, giving the Confederate garrison time to escape to Fort Donelson. After consulting with Major Gilmer and Captain Taylor, the decision to surrender was made and the colors above the fort were struck. It was now 1:55 p.m. The firing ceased, and Tilghman, Gilmer, Taylor, hospital attendants, and some stragglers from the infantry—about seventy men in all—became prisoners of war. The hospital boat **Patton** was also captured. The fort, its guns, all other equipment, and the prisoners were turned over to Grant when he arrived about one hour later. In his report, written at Cairo, Illinois, on February 7, Foote stated that his ironclads had "resisted effectually the shot of the enemy when striking the casements." He concluded that Fort Henry had been "defended with the most determined gallantry by General Tilghman, worthy of a better cause, who, from his own account, went into the action with eleven guns of heavy caliber bearing upon our boats, which he fought until seven of the number were dismounted or otherwise rendered useless."²⁴

Foote left Fort Henry on the evening of February 6 with the **Cincinnati** and **St. Louis** and arrived at Cairo the next morning. He began repairing his ironclads and securing new crew members. At this same time news of the capture of Fort Henry was spreading across the North. The **New York**

Times was exultant. Now operations, the **Times** stated, could "very soon be begun against Nashville, Memphis, and the whole of the rebel region of the Southwest. As General Hallack says: ' . . . The flag of the Union is reestablished on the soil of Tennessee. It will never be removed.' It must henceforth be borne steadily southward to the Gulf of Mexico."²⁵ But first the flag had to be borne twelve miles eastward to Fort Donelson. Then the movement southward could commence.

On the Sunday following the capture of Fort Henry, Foote and his gallant seamen went to church services at a Presbyterian church in Cairo. They wanted to thank God for their recent victory and for having kept them safe thus far. After the congregation assembled, it was learned that the minister was sick and could not officiate. Foote, being a devout Presbyterian for several decades and a very good speaker, got up and went to the pulpit. After the usual prayer and hymn, Foote selected John 14:1 as the text for his sermon. It read: "Let not your heart be troubled: ye believe in God, believe also in me." The Flag Officer delivered what was described as an excellent sermon, an exhortation that was widely published in many newspapers. A newspaper which carried his sermon came into the hands of Foote's little niece. She was just learning to read. The little girl read the sermon and exclaimed to her father: "Uncle Foote did not say that right." "Say what right?" asked the father. "Why, when he preached." "What did he say?" "He said, 'Let not your heart be troubled: ye believe in God, believe also in me.'" "Well, what should he have said?" inquired the father. "Why, he ought to have said, 'Let not your heart be troubled: ye believe in God, believe also in the gun-boats.'"²⁶

In the meantime Grant began his movement against Fort Donelson, moving out from Fort Henry on Wednesday, February 12.²⁷ He wanted to isolate Donelson and prevent reinforcements from reaching its defenders from Bowling Green or Columbus. Grant and Halleck urged Foote to make haste in also moving up the Cumberland River to Fort Donelson.²⁸ The **Carondelet** had already arrived below Donelson on February 12. Commander Walke could not see a living creature at the fort. At 12:50 p.m., to unmask the silent enemy and to let Grant know he had arrived, Walke fired ten shells at the fort. There was no response. One report states that when Grant's men heard the guns of the **Carondelet** they gave one cheer after another and then engaged in some skirmishing with the fort's defenders. On the morning of the 13th Grant sent a dispatch to Walke, informing him that his army had arrived the previous day and had almost entirely invested the enemy's works. Grant stated: "Most of our batteries are established, and the remainder soon will be. If you will advance your gun-boat at 10 o'clock in the morning, we will be ready to take advantage of any diversion in your favor."²⁹

Grant's men had been firing before sunrise. At 9:05 a.m. Walke moved his ship to the cover of a heavily wooded point and commenced firing. He fired 139 70-pound and 64-pound shells at the fort. The Confederate batteries returned the fire, with the **Carondelet** sustaining little damage except

from two shots. At 11:30 a.m. a 128-pound solid shot struck the port broadside casement and roamed around inside the **Carondelet**, going through the boilers, burst the steam heater, and destroyed the railing around the engine-room. Splinters flew everywhere, and several men were wounded. The **Carondelet** ceased firing for a short time, the wounded were transferred to the **Alps**, damages were repaired, and the firing was resumed at 12:15 p.m. and continued until it was getting dark. By this time Walke had expended nearly all of his 10-inch and 15-inch shells. The **Carondelet** now moved further down the Cumberland and disengaged.³⁰

At 11:30 p.m. on the night of the 13th, Foote arrived with the ironclads **Pittsburgh**, **Louisville**, **St. Louis** and before 6 a.m. the next morning sixteen transports arrived from Cincinnati, St. Louis, and Cairo with 10,000 reinforcements for Grant.³¹ This brought Grant's strength up to some 27,000 men to oppose Brigadier General John B. Floyd's Confederate garrison of approximately 15,000 men. The Union noose was beginning to tighten.

The night of February 13 turned very cold, a most unwelcome development. It started to rain very hard at about 6 p.m., with the men on both sides—blueclad and grayclad alike—being soaked to the skin. The rain turned into sleet and snow, and the landscape was blanketed with ice and snow. Many of the soldiers were without overcoats and blankets, and they could not build fires because they were so close to the Confederate lines. Brigadier General Lew Wallace, who later wrote the immortal **Ben Hur**, was present, and he wrote about the suffering of the soldiers. "Inside the works," Wallace wrote, "nobody had overcoats; while thousands of those outside had marched from Fort Henry as to a summer fete, leaving coats, blankets, and knapsacks behind them in the camp. More than one stout fellow has since admitted, with a laugh, that nothing was so helpful to him that horrible night as the thought that the wind, which seemed about to turn his blood into icicles, was serving the enemy the same way; they, too, had to stand out and take the blast."³²

The morning of the 14th was very cold; two inches of snow covered the frozen land, and many disabled men were dying due to the weather. At 9 a.m. Grant visited with Foote on his flagship and remained with him for about one hour³³ They were planning the day's activities. Grant was hoping that Foote's gunboats could knock out the Confederate batteries, that Foote, in short, would be able to do just about what he had done at Fort Henry. But this was not to be.

Circumstances were entirely different. Fort Donelson occupied a very good defensive position. The fort was constructed on a bluff that was about 120 feet in height, "on the west side of the river, where it makes a slight bend to the eastward." There were three batteries which mounted fifteen guns. The lower battery or water battery was some twenty feet above the level of the Cumberland; the second was some fifty feet above the water line, and the third was at the top of the summit. In other words, when Foote's

gunboats got in close—300--500 yards—these guns could direct a plunging fire onto them. This could not be done at Fort Henry. It was Foote's task to silence these three batteries, go on upstream several hundred yards, and enfilade the Confederate rifle pits on the Confederate left wing. This was to be done in conjunction with Grant's assault.³⁴

There was much uneasiness in the Confederate ranks, though not openly admitted. The gunboats frightened them. They had reduced Fort Henry. Would there be a repeat performance at Fort Donelson? Despite this concern the Confederates worked feverishly on their rifle pits. They were determined to make a good fight of it. In the early afternoon of the 14th, at about 2 p.m., Foote put his gunboats in battle formation, the four ironclads abreast and leading the way with the two woodclads following at a safe distance. By 3 p.m. the gunboats were within range, and the flagship the **St. Louis** fired one of its bow guns giving the signal for the gunboats to open fire. The engagement lasted an hour and a half. On came the gunboats until they were within less than 400 yards of the river batteries, the gunboats firing more rapidly as they approached the fort.³⁵ As the gunboats came closer, the enemy fire increased; it became more accurate and deadlier as the ships drew closer while most of the projectiles from the gunboats overshot their mark because of the elevation of the batteries.³⁶

The **Carondelet** was in the thick of the fight. A 128-pound shot struck the **Carondelet's** anchor, smashing it into bits, and then bounded around the vessel, smashing the iron boat-davits, and a life boat dropped into the water. Another shot went through the iron plating and lodged in the casement; another struck the pilot-house and killed one of the pilots. Still another shot took away the remaining boat-davits and the life boat with it. Still the shots came fast and heavy, taking away smoke-stacks, flag-staffs, and tearing off the "side armor as lightning tears the bark from a tree." The **Carondelet's** men grew very excited, loaded too heavily, and the port rifled gun exploded and burst into three pieces. This knocked the gun crew down, wounding about a dozen men and spread confusion and dismay. By this time the ship was on fire, causing more confusion before it was brought under control. When within about 400 yards of the lower battery the **Carondelet's** pilot-house was struck again, with one pilot being wounded. The wheel was broken. All four life boats were now shot away and were dragging in the water.³⁷

On came the gunboats, regardless of the pounding they were taking. Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Bedford Forrest and many other Confederates watched the river action with great apprehension. Turning to his second in command, Major Kelley, who had been a Methodist minister before the war, Forrest said, "Parson! for God's sake, pray; nothing but God Almighty can save this fort."³⁸ Floyd was also so concerned that he telegraphed General Johnston, stating that "the fort can not hold out twenty minutes. Our river batteries working admirably."³⁹

The **Pittsburgh** was struck many times. In her haste to turn, the **Pittsburgh** struck the stern of the **Carondelet**, breaking the starboard rudder of the **Carondelet**. The **St. Louis** was struck repeatedly; her pilot was killed. The pilot of the **Louisville** was also wounded. The wheel-ropes of both the **Louisville** and **St. Louis** were shot away. The men of the **Louisville** could not steer their vessel with the tiller-ropes at the stern because of shells from the woodclads that were bursting over them. Thus, the **St. Louis** and **Louisville**, becoming unmanageable, were forced to drop out of the action. The **Pittsburgh** soon followed. All of the ironclads had suffered greatly; their decks were slippery with blood, and even Foote was wounded twice. The **Carondelet**, being alone, could not continue the battle for long. A few minutes later Walke and the **Carondelet** gave up the contest, the **Carondelet**, according to Walke, having been hit more than any other gunboat and suffering more casualties than all the other gunboats combined.⁴⁰

As the gunboats fell back out of range of the Confederate guns a cheer went up from the defenders. As Forrest stated: "Old men wept; shout after shout went up; the gunboats driven back; the army was in the best possible spirits, feeling that, relieved of their greatest terror, they could whip any land force that could be brought against them."⁴¹ It was now up to Grant and his infantry. He had about 27,000 men for the job.

Grant was also one of the witnesses to Foote's defeat. As he was watching, he saw the **Pittsburgh** and **Carondelet**, the last two gunboats, disengage and move downriver. Grant promptly cancelled his scheduled attack on the Confederate positions. After the war was over, Grant wrote that the "sun went down on the night of the 14th of February, 1862, leaving the army confronting Fort Donelson anything but comforted over the prospects."⁴²

Foote claimed that victory was only minutes away when the **St. Louis** and **Louisville** were disabled. However, there is no real proof to back up this contention. Not a single Confederate gun was put out of action by the gunboats on the fourteenth, and there were no Confederate casualties due to the intense fire of the gunboats.⁴³ Indeed, the gunboats were roughly handled. This represented the first defeat—the first real setback—for the Navy since the war had begun.

The flotilla spent the morning of February 15 burying its dead. After consulting with Grant aboard his flagship, Foote took two of the gunboats and headed for Cairo for repairs, leaving the **St. Louis** and **Louisville** to aid Grant. They did throw a large number of shells into Fort Donelson on the afternoon of the 15th, firing until it was nearly dark. However, they played no significant role in the fighting of that day. Grant's right wing was pushed back, and for awhile it looked like the Confederate forces would break through the investing army. However, Grant's army stopped the Confederate attack, and late that afternoon Grant counterattacked with his left wing and gained a commanding position when nightfall put an end to the fighting. The two gunboats contributed little to this success. General Wal-

lace sees this matter in a somewhat different light: "As to whether the attack was of assistance to us," Wallace wrote, "I don't think there is room to question it. It distracted the enemy's attention, and I fully believe it was the gunboats, the awful ironclads especially, that operated to prevent a general movement of the Rebels up the river, or across it, that night." The next day, Sunday, February 16, Brigadier General Simon Bolivar Buckner surrendered Fort Donelson and its garrison of approximately 9,000 men, General Floyd's brigade having escaped by riverboat and Forrest's cavalry by land. The wounded had already been evacuated, for the most part.⁴⁴

The great victories at Forts Henry and Donelson eliminated the center of the Confederate defensive line. Now the Tennessee River could be utilized to invade the South all the way to northern Alabama. With the fall of Donelson, the Cumberland River could also be utilized for a movement against Nashville, a movement that did not prove to be necessary. Bowling Green and Columbus were now outflanked, and this caused General Johnston to order their evacuation. In fact, most of middle Tennessee was evacuated, including Nashville, the Tennessee capital. Also a new defense line was established in west Tennessee which rested on New Madrid, Missouri, Island Number Ten, and on to Corinth, Mississippi, to the south. Even so, most of middle Tennessee was given up as well as much of west Tennessee. These two victories represented the beginning of the end for the Confederacy. And Foote's valiant Western Flotilla deserves a share of the credit for this achievement.

1. Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel, eds., *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, Inc., 1956), I:338-339 (Hereinafter referred to as *Battles and Leaders*).
2. *Ibid.*, I:339-340.
3. *Ibid.*, I:359-361; *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion*, 30 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1894-1914), Series I, Vol. 22:307 (Hereinafter cited as *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies*).
4. *Battles and Leaders*, I:359-361.
5. James Mason, *Life Of Andrew Hull Foote* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1874), p. 174.
6. *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 69 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Series I:7:561 (Hereinafter cited as *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*).
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 120-121; U.S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant*, 2 vols. (New York, 1885-1886), I:286-287.
8. *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series I, 7:121-122.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 126-129; *Battles and Leaders*, I:362.
10. *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series I, 7:136, 140; Stanley F. Horn, *The Army of Tennessee* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1952), p. 82; James D. Porter, *Confederate Military History: Tennessee* (Secaucus, New Jersey: The Blue and Gray Press), p. 19.
11. *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series I, 7:137-140; Horn, *op. cit.*, p. 82.
12. *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series I, 7:140.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 122; *Battles and Leaders*, I:362.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 362.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 363; *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series I, 7:122.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 122, 136; *Battles and Leaders*, I:363.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 370; *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series I, 7:122.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 122-123; *Battles and Leaders*, I:365, 370; Virgil Carrington Jones, *The Civil War At Sea*, 3 vols. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1960-1962), I:364-365; John D. Milligan, *Gunboats Down the Mississippi* (Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1965), pp. 41-42.
21. *Battles and Leaders*, I:363.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 365; *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series I, 7:123.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 141; *Battles and Leaders*, I:370-371.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 366-367, 372; *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series I, 7:123-124, 142; *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies*, Series I, 22:537-538, 546.

25. *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*. Series I, 7:123; *New York Times*. February 8, 1862.
26. *Battles and Leaders*. I:343-344.
27. *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*. Series I, 7:601.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 600, 603, 604.
29. *Battles and Leaders*. I:431.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 431-433.
31. *Ibid.*, I:433; Jones, *The Civil War At Sea*. I:378.
32. *Battles and Leaders*. I:410; Jones, *The Civil War At Sea*. I:377.
33. *Ibid.*, I:377-378.
34. *Battles and Leaders*. I:430; *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies*. Series I, 22:585.
35. *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*. Series I, 7:166; *Battles and Leaders*. I:435.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 433.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 443,444.
38. John A. Wyeth, *That Devil Forrest: Life of General Nathan Bedford Forrest* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 40.
39. Roy P. Stonesifer, Jr., "The Forts Henry-Heiman and Fort Donelson Campaigns: A Study of Confederate Command." (Ph.D. Dissertation: The Pennsylvania State University, 1965). p. 252.
40. *Battles and Leaders*. I:434-436; according to the New York **Herald**, February 21, 1862 and Franklin Matthews, *Our Navy in Time of War* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1899), p. 78, the **St. Louis** was struck fifty-nine times, **Pittsburgh** twenty, **Louisville** thirty-seven, and the **Carondelet** twenty-six. Foote's official report of February 15 also verifies that the **St. Louis** was struck fifty-nine times. See *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*. Series I, 7:166. It would seem that Walke was wrong on the **Carondelet** being hit more than any of the other gunboats. However, most of the dead and wounded were accounted for by the **Carondelet**. Walke may even be right in saying that his ship suffered most of the damage during the engagement.
41. *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*. Series I, 7:384.
42. Grant, *Personal Memoirs*. I:303.
43. *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*. Series I, 7:166, 263.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 328-336; *Battles and Leaders*. I:436-437, 398-428; Milligan, *Gunboats Down The Mississippi*. pp. 48-49; Jones, *The Civil War At Sea*. I:381-382.

