

Bushwhackers: Guerrilla Warfare, Manhood, and the Household in Civil War Missouri. By Joseph M. Beilein Jr. (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2016, Pp. 1, 283. \$34.95, 978-1-60635-270-0).

For many authors, books are born out of dissertations and master's theses. The basis of Joseph Beilein Jr.'s new book, *Bushwhackers: Guerrilla Warfare, Manhood, and the Household in Civil War Missouri*, can be traced to the author's graduate work at the University of Missouri, although his first interest in Missouri's guerrilla conflict surfaced during his undergraduate years at Kenyon College. An assistant professor of history at Pennsylvania State University-Erie, Beilein is a scholar in the fields of Civil War history, guerrilla studies, and masculinity. He is the co-editor of the anthology, *The Civil War Guerrillas: Unfolding the Black Flag in History, Memory, and Myth*.

Now a completed project, Beilein's *Bushwhackers* is featured in the series, *The Civil War Era in the South*, published by the Kent State University Press. *Bushwhackers* shares modern scholarship that seeks to add a dimension to the image of a Civil War-era guerrilla that has not been studied extensively. The author considers the ways in which several different bands of guerrillas across Missouri conducted their war in concert with their households and their female kin who provided logistical and material support. Stories of guerrilla fighters such as Frank James, William Clarke Quantrill, Clifton Holtzclaw and many others are part of the scholarship that Beilein relies on to analyze how these men imagined themselves as fighters and offers a new interpretation of the guerrilla war in Missouri.

Bushwhackers presents several views of how the guerrilla warrior has appeared to Americans, from military scholars to history enthusiasts. To some, the guerrilla might have been a hero. To others, primarily historians, the guerrilla represented "anarchy and confusion" (p. 3), contending "that the guerrilla war was an orgy of destruction, a dehumanizing carnival of blood in which even the men who survived lost their humanity" (p. 4). Indeed, although the guerrilla did not wear an official uniform as Union and Confederate soldiers did, the guerrilla was a military man who "exact[ed] brutal violence" (p. 31) against his enemies, but military history has not embraced fully this subject as a research interest that deserves attention. Beilein explains:

As a one-dimensional character—either good *or* bad—each guerrilla plays out a predictable narrative that does little to complicate or make real our understanding of war. Modern scholarship works to correct this simplicity to move the guerrilla war from the 'sideshow' of Civil War history into the limelight of that scholarship (p. 4).

With a focus on the guerrilla war efforts in Missouri, Beilein's book adds to the robust literature of various Civil War topics, but the research contributes greatly to an area that has not been as mainstream as other military and Civil War subjects. Both the Union and the Confederacy used guerrilla warfare tactics throughout the Civil War, particularly in the Border

States such as Missouri and other heavily contested areas. In Missouri, guerrilla fighters—regardless of which side they showed loyalty—were commonly called “bushwhackers,” although pro-Union partisans were also known as “jayhawkers,” a term that had originated in Kansas during the pre-Civil War period. Beilein expands on the image of the guerrilla as a bushwhacker:

The term ‘bushwhacker’ got to the very essence of what made the guerrilla a unique form of man. In that word, the two seemingly opposed currents that composed his identity were rolled into one. The guerrillas fought their war hiding away in the brush (hence the “bush” in “bushwhacker”) yet were brutally violent (the “whack” in “bushwhacker”). They may have been invisible, always running and hiding in the brush—or acting unmanly—but at the moment when they attacked, they revealed themselves to their enemies (p. 185).

The guerrilla conflict in Missouri had roots in three events: the federal passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in May 1854, allowing people in the territories of Kansas and Nebraska to decide for themselves whether to allow slavery within their borders; violence between abolitionist settlers and their proslavery counterparts; and the war between abolitionists and Missourians over the border. Beilein refers to numerous primary and secondary sources to frame comprehensively how the guerrilla campaign unfolded from these events. The guerrilla war observed an uptick in violence after the state of Missouri abolished slavery on January 11, 1865, and lasted until that summer.

For the Jackson Purchase area that includes portions of west Kentucky and west Tennessee, this book provides a new historical lens for those interested in studying the guerrilla military impact on the region. The author did not discuss whether the guerrilla war effort existed beyond Missouri’s eastern border. However, given the proximity of the Jackson Purchase’s Confederate-dominated counties to Missouri, the opportunity is fertile for future research on whether Missouri’s guerrilla activity had any bearing on the Jackson Purchase region. On another related note, in spring 1865, William Clarke Quantrill left Missouri for Kentucky on his horse, Charley. The book did not document Quantrill’s route to Louisville; therefore, it is unclear whether Quantrill traveled through the Jackson Purchase area to avoid any possible Union confrontation north of Kentucky into Illinois. Nevertheless, historians interested in Quantrill’s history and guerrilla involvement could study his travels to discover whether any significant connections might exist.

Both the reader and historian will find *Bushwhackers* to be useful for further research. The book is divided into three sections. In the first section on the structure and organization of the guerrilla war effort, chapters on the household, kinship relations, and the importance of hired hands to the guerrilla movement are included. For the second section, four chapters explore the guerrilla in the context of material culture. Chapter topics in this section study the guerrilla

through the food that sustained him while fighting, his clothing and appearance, his horse and his firearms. The third section brings all the different perspectives from the previous chapters into two units—one that examines the guerrilla in combat and the other that discusses him in death. Each chapter has its own chronology, within or around 1861-65. In addition, the book includes five appendices that compile data on rebel households and their supporters in Missouri, primarily centralized on the Fristoe and Holtzclaw family networks.

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Paducah and the Civil War. By John Philip Cashon (Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2016. Pp. 1-141. \$21.99, 978-1-46713-696-9).

Though Kentucky was an oddity of nineteenth century politics, clinging desperately to both slavery and the Union, it was, to paraphrase Lincoln, the whole game, and taking Paducah was the first step along the path to winning that game in the Civil War West. In fact, author John Philip Cashon asserts that the move to capture Paducah was the “single most important move that Grant did during the war” (11). While this is a bold statement, it cannot be dismissed as an obvious exaggeration, and it is worthy of consideration. With quality leadership in short supply on the Union side early in the war, it was the kind of action that Lincoln so highly prized as he searched for the right generals to carry out his vision for saving the Union.

To bolster his claim, Cashon points out a number of factors regarding the strategic importance of Paducah and the surrounding Jackson Purchase region. Without question, the rivers were the superhighways of their time, and Cashon is quick to mention that Paducah was the key to controlling traffic along the Tennessee and Mississippi River, a fact that contemporary newspapers of record mentioned in their reporting. Without maintaining a grip on the region, supplies vital to Union forces could not be transported south, and such a dilemma would have, at the very least, hindered the war effort. Cashon supports this idea with Grant’s own words, when he said, “[T]he enemy would have seized Paducah and fortified it, to our very great annoyance” (50). Cashon’s use of phrases such as “crucial supply lanes” and “life-threatening delays for the Union army” (84) are certainly appropriate when considering the significance of Paducah to the western part of the war.

While Grant was able to take Paducah without any initial resistance, he was assuredly in hostile territory. Union strategists felt that Paducah was important enough to warrant the construction of Fort Anderson to guard against a Rebel invasion, and as it turned out, the fort was a target for an attack in the Battle of Paducah, which Cashon describes in a detailed yet clear account, following the invasion street-by-street and hour by hour. Prior to the Union occupation of Paducah, the Army went to the trouble of constructing a pontoon bridge across the Ohio