Honors College Senior Thesis Presentations

Title

The Circle of Coercion: An Analysis of How North Korea Utilizes Its Nuclear Program as an Economic Bargaining Chip

Presenter Information

Lilli HanikFollow

Academic Level at Time of Presentation

Senior

Major

Japanese and International Studies

List all Project Mentors & Advisor(s)

Dr. Marc Polizzi; Dr. Warren Edminster

Presentation Format

Oral Presentation

Abstract/Description

North Korea has been developing its nuclear program since 1989, and, despite heavy opposition from the international community, this strategy has persisted through three generations of the Kim Regime. This paper will be an analysis of North Korea’s nuclear program via a game-theoretic model and case study analysis of noteworthy cycles of the nuclear program’s development and disarmament since 1989. It will cover a brief history of North Korea’s nuclear program through 2022, explain my theory of mutual mistrust, and explain why and how North Korea has developed and utilized its nuclear program as a method to obtain better bargaining terms from stakeholder states. I will utilize an extensive form game to model the interactions, as well as analyze the impact of concerned states utilizing a united front or a fragmented approach when negotiating with North Korea. Through game theory and case study analysis, this paper aims to parsimoniously analyze North Korea’s nuclear program, define mutual mistrust, and explain how mutual mistrust affects this particular game and the outcomes that may occur.

Spring Scholars Week 2022 Event

Honors College Senior Thesis Presentations

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The Circle of Coercion: An Analysis of How North Korea Utilizes Its Nuclear Program as an Economic Bargaining Chip

North Korea has been developing its nuclear program since 1989, and, despite heavy opposition from the international community, this strategy has persisted through three generations of the Kim Regime. This paper will be an analysis of North Korea’s nuclear program via a game-theoretic model and case study analysis of noteworthy cycles of the nuclear program’s development and disarmament since 1989. It will cover a brief history of North Korea’s nuclear program through 2022, explain my theory of mutual mistrust, and explain why and how North Korea has developed and utilized its nuclear program as a method to obtain better bargaining terms from stakeholder states. I will utilize an extensive form game to model the interactions, as well as analyze the impact of concerned states utilizing a united front or a fragmented approach when negotiating with North Korea. Through game theory and case study analysis, this paper aims to parsimoniously analyze North Korea’s nuclear program, define mutual mistrust, and explain how mutual mistrust affects this particular game and the outcomes that may occur.